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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades, capital markets have changed drastically the way financial trades are 
carried out. Nowadays, outcry markets conducted by men wearing in color-coded jackets that 
ran, yelled, and gesticulated in order to stand out amongst the crowd to transfer information 
across the stock exchange floor, do not exist anymore. 
Conversely, the most of trades on securities markets are now dominated by sophisticated 
operators utilizing super computers with complex algorithms to perform thousands of trades in 
a matter of milliseconds or even microseconds, before a normal person could even blink their 
eyes, in a practice known as high frequency trading (HFT).  
Such practice is the last step of an evolutionary process which has involved the financial system 
originated by a series of substantial changes spurred by a favorable regulatory environment, 
technological innovation concerning electronics and communication networks, and a growing 
competition among traders and stock exchanges.  
In spite of the predominant role of HFT, currently, there does not exist a univocal and globally 
recognized identification of the phenomenon and this has complicated the acknowledgment of 
the traders who use it (HFTs) and consequently their regulation. Nevertheless, it is catalogued 
as a subset of algorithmic trading (AT), a technique that uses pre-set algorithms to make 
decisions such as timing, pricing, execution and modification of orders in total autonomy 
without human intervention. 
There are unique aspects that make distinguish HFT from other trading activity. One of these 
features is represented by the employment of specific infrastructure aimed at limiting as much 
as possible the trading latency, i.e. the timing of processing, analyzing, and sending of orders, 
which constitutes a significant competitive advantage with respect to traditional traders. 
In addition, it is not recognized in a specific trading strategy but HFTs can utilize their 
technological advances in terms of computer software, hardware, and ultra-low latency 
networks by applying a wide range of different trading strategies with the aim to make profit. 
The global presence of HFT on the securities markets and its rapid development have given rise 
to a heated debate among financial operators and regulatory authorities regarding the potential 
consequences that such trading practice may entail on the market quality aspects; in particular 
experts are wondering whether HFT produces more beneficial or detrimental effects concerning 
liquidity, trading costs, bid-ask spread, price discovery, efficiency and volatility; but since HFT 
branches off in very different trading applications and HFTs are identified by using different 
methods, also the answers about market implications result very divergent. 
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Additionally, HFT has drawn remarkable public attention after the notorious “Flash Crash” of 
May 6, 2010 and subsequent observations of market failures, which has put under the 
magnifying glass some specific aggressive high frequency practices which demonstrated to 
have provoked an important risk for the integrity and stability of capital markets. 
These observed phenomena led in the following years to a series of regulations targeted to 
strongly discipline the HFT world and heavily deter the most contested trading activities. 
The fundamental aim of this work is, therefore, to describe, analyze and study the high 
frequency trading phenomenon in most of its aspects, as detailed as possible, and by 
maintaining an impartial position about it. This is made through the reporting of relevant 
literature in subject, both on the side of the supporters and of the detractors, whom have dealt 
with the effects of HFT on capital markets dynamics. Furthermore, we are going to examine an 
observation of a flash crash phenomenon that hit the British Sterling and from which it is 
supposed that HFT has played an important role on its appearance. 
This present work is organized in the following way. Chapter 1 describes the revolutionary 
process occurred in the capital markets in the last years, both in terms of technological adoptions 
and regulatory developments, with the implementation of a series of projects and initiatives that 
resulted a very favorable context for the birth and proliferation of HFT activities.  
Chapter 2 details the specific characteristics of HFT and AT and determines the different 
approaches used for identifying HFTs.   
Chapter 3 lists the wide range of trading strategies that ATs and HFTs may implement, some 
of these are not new for the trading system, while others are exclusively carried out by HFTs. 
Different trading strategies implies also different assessments of behavior of HFTs. 
Chapter 4 reports the relevant studies about HFT and its impact on market quality measures, 
such as liquidity, price discovery and volatility. These studies may be in form of theoretical and 
empirical methodology, with different estimations and approaches for the identification of HFT. 
Chapter 5 debates the potential risks coming from HFT activity. Among these, we report 
phenomena of market abuse and observations of market failures, such as flash crashes.  
Chapter 6 is a review of the current regulation activity on HFT subject. It includes also a 
discussion of potential rules that may be adopted to strongly limit HFT activity.  
Finally, Chapter 7 examines an empirical observation of a flash crash occurred on Sterling 
trading. We analyze the specific dynamics of the phenomenon, the potential causes and effects 
on future trading. In addition, we wonder whether the behavior of HFT has played a role in that 
specific situation.   
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1. THE BIRTH OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 
 
1.1. Revolution of Financial Markets 
Advances in technology have totally changed the way in which transmission and execution of 
orders are performed on financial markets. A fundamental role is attributed to the “electronic 
revolution”, that through the emergence of innovative practices both for trading Exchanges and 
market traders, has led to many advantages for financial trading including the reduction of order 
execution time and trading costs. 
In this scenario, new trading disciplines were born representing the iteration between two 
worlds: the finance and the technological innovation. The former introduces the object of their 
core activity, whilst the latter specifies the way in which such activity is exerted. 
Sophisticated trading techniques, such as algorithmic and high frequency trading, are the last 
result of a series of evolution processes happened in the last years involving the financial 
system; trading evolution takes into account changes occurred by means of: communication 
networks, electronics, innovative technologies such as algorithms, and regulatory 
developments. 
In this chapter, we will describe the principal events that have revolutionized the structure and 
the functioning of the capital markets, identifying the steps and causes that have contributed to 
the affirmation of alternative trading techniques, including the high frequency trading 
phenomenon. 
 
1.2. Evolution of Electronic Trading 
Securities trading methods and techniques have come a long way since the early 18th century 
when they were carried out in the first US financial market established on Wall Street. 
For many years, securities markets were represented by a physical location called “trading 
floor” where buyers and sellers met in order to execute their trades1.  
Up to 1960s, trade information was spread in human fashion, typically in person or through 
telegraph and telephone. 
Thanks to the emergence of electronics and computerized systems, there has been an important 
shift in how securities are traded on the capital markets. 
The use of information technology for order flow in the financial markets has started about 40 
years ago in 1971, when the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) introduced a 
                                                 
1 Anuj Agarwal (2012), High Frequency Trading: Evolution and the Future, Capgemini, 4 
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market-making system assisted by computers, by creating its own automatic quotation (AQ) 
system and therefore giving life to the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation (NASDAQ), the world’s first electronic stock market2.  
A few years later, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) introduced a procedure known as 
“Designated Order Turnaround” (DOT) system in 1976, and later Super-DOT in 1984. Such 
procedures allowed the transmission of orders to the trading post in an electronic manner; that 
is, orders appeared on a special workstation, called “Display Book”, which enabled each 
specialist located on the floor of the Exchange to execute orders for the market3.  
These first electronic systems have permitted to consistently speed up the dissemination of 
information about orders, compared to the slower physical meetings on the trading floor and 
telephone communications. 
The 1980s saw the beginning of decline of floor-based trading caused by the advent of the first 
fully-electronic financial markets and the performing of particular trading strategies such as 
“Program Trading”, loosely defined by the NYSE as the placing of orders to buy or sell 15 or 
more stocks valued above $1 million total. This strategy gained popularity for trades between 
the S&P 500 equity shares and the futures markets because “program traders” could buy or sell 
stock index futures contracts, such as the S&P 500 futures, and at the same time sell or buy a 
portfolio of up to 500 stocks at the NYSE matched against the futures trade; with the aid of 
computers, this program could be pre-programmed to enter automatically into the NYSE’s 
electronic order routing system at the time when the futures price and the stock index were far 
enough apart in order to make a profit4. Nevertheless, this type of stock index arbitrage strategy 
was later condemned by some as leading to the “Black Monday” stock market crash in 19875.  
As it regards the use of electronics in the implementation of orders, in 1985, NASDAQ 
established an automatic order execution platform only for small volume orders called “Small 
Order Execution System” (SOES). This practice enabled small traders to execute orders 
automatically without the intermediation of a dealer and by means of this, very aggressive 
traders called “SOES bandits” realized several trades per day in order to profit by establishing 
positions before most market makers have updated their quotes and lay off them at favorable 
prices6. 
                                                 
2 Black, Fischer (1971), Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange, Part 1, Financial Analysts Journal 27, 29-34  
3 Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty (2008), For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors 
and the Growth of ECNs, 33 Iowa J. Corp. L., 897-898 
4 Dean Furbush (2010), Program Trading, Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 
5 Liz Moyer & Emily Lambert (2009), Wall Street’s New Masters, Forbes, Sept. 21 
6 Jeffrey H. Harris & Paul H. Schultz (1998), The Trading Profits of SOES Bandits, Journal of Financial Economics 
Vol. 50, No. 2, Oct.  
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In 1992, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), a financial and commodity derivative 
Exchange, launched the first global electronic trading platform called Globex7. This fully 
electronic trading system allowed market participants to trade futures contracts through a 
computer software program over a network connected to a financial intermediary while they 
were sitting in office thousands of miles away from the exchange. 
While electronic trading in the eighties was dominated by trading on NASDAQ and NYSE, the 
1990s saw the emergence of other electronic trading venues called “Electronic Communications 
Networks” (ECNs). An ECN is a type of computer network that facilitates trading of financial 
securities outside of the regulated Stock Exchanges8.  
Subscribers to ECN can enter orders electronically (e.g. using algorithms) into the network via 
a custom computer terminal and then the system will automatically match and execute contra-
side orders; in case of mismatching, the ECN orders could be posted externally on the regular 
markets9.  
The development of ECNs has provided many benefits with respect to the traditional trading 
venues including the reduction in costs and trading errors, greater speed and efficiency10.  
In 2010, all seven US exchanges offered either fully electronic or a hybrid mix of floor and 
electronic trading in options11. 
Therefore, the process of electronification has been slow and gradual, but the last years has seen 
an acceleration which has completely changed the financial framework and has led to the birth 
of new market participants, such as high frequency traders. 
 
1.3. Regulatory Developments in the Capital Markets 
The development of new trading methods and the creation of alternative electronic markets 
would not have been possible without a regulatory environment that has allowed and even 
encouraged such proliferation. 
Regulatory agencies such as the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) have the core objective of protecting 
                                                 
7 Pavitra Kumar, Michael Goldstein, Frank Graves, & Lynda Borucki (2011), Trading at the Speed of Light: The 
Impact of High-Frequency Trading on Market Performance, Regulatory Oversight, and Securities Litigation, The 
Battle Group Issue 02, 2 
8 Lauren Liebenberg (2002), The Electronic Financial Markets of the Future, and Survival Strategies of the 
Broker-Dealers, 73-75 
9 Id 
10 Id 
11 See Kumar, supra note 7 
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investors, and maintaining fair and efficient markets by improving market transparency, capital 
formation and competition12. 
In the US, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the US Commission introduce a series of reforms 
aimed at modernizing and regulating the financial markets, which have had a deep impact on 
the securities system structure by implicitly favoring the implementation and subsequent 
success of more advanced trading techniques, including algorithmic and high frequency trading. 
In 1998, the SEC issued the Alternative Trading Systems Regulation (Reg. ATS)13, where 
authorized and resolved any concerns about alternative trading systems. 
An alternative trading system was defined by Reg. ATS as a “non-exchange trading venue that 
performs as a Stock Exchange by matching buyers and sellers of securities but does not set 
rules for subscribers like regulated venues”. An example of alternative trading system is an 
ECN.  
One of the main weaknesses of the first ECNs in the early nineties consisted in the presence of 
a sort of “Chinese Wall” between ECNs and regulated markets inasmuch as, trading orders 
issued to ECNs could not be routed to Exchanges14. Such market split implied the risk for 
investors to receive a worst price on ECNs with respect to regulated Exchanges. 
This market inefficiency has been resolved by the Reg. ATS with the introduction of a “Limit 
Order Display Rule”, a transparency imposition which obliged market-makers to show traders 
the best present price in all regulated and alternative markets.  
Such regulation has been the precursor of innovative electronic systems (e.g. Smart Order 
Routing system) able to automatically connect ECNs and Exchanges in a very quick way. 
In particular, Smart Order System has been fundamental for the emergence of high frequency 
trading, which exploits its speediness advantage in order to perform trades specially through 
inter-market connections.    
However, the milestone of the algorithmic and high frequency trading phenomenon dates back 
on 2005 and it was due to the Regulation National Market System (Reg. NMS)15. 
SEC defined Reg. NMS as “a series of initiatives designated to modernize and strengthen the 
National Market System for equity securities”. The regulation was intended to assure that 
investors receive the best price executions for their orders by encouraging competition among 
individual markets and individual traders.  
The most notable rules of the NMS are: 
                                                 
12 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website available at: https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
13 Alternative Trading Systems Regulation (1998) available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40760.txt 
14 Alfonso Puorro (2013), High Frequency Trading: una panoramica, Questioni di Economia e Finanza n° 198, 
Banca d’Italia, 7 
15 National Market System Regulation (2005) available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808.pdf 
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i) Access Rule (Rule 610); 
ii) Order Protection Rule (Rule 611); 
iii) Sub Penny Rule (Rule 612). 
The Access Rule16 was intended to create an environment in which there was fair and efficient 
access to quotations throughout the National Market System by requiring greater linking and 
lower access fees. 
The Order Protection Rule17 also known as “Trade-Through Rule” claimed that any submitted 
order should be executed at the National Best Bid and Offer price (NBBO). 
The Rule 611, hence, ensured that both institutional and retail investors must receive the best 
possible execution price for orders that can be executed immediately and consequently, it 
prohibited market operators to execute orders at any inferior price. 
Before this rule, brokers were allowed to execute orders just at the venue’s best available price 
even if another platform displayed a better price; but by means of the Order Protection Rule, 
whether the best price is a displayed price, it cannot be “trade-through” or, in other words, it 
cannot be ignored.  
The Order Protection Rule implied that each venue must establish and enforce policies to ensure 
consistent price quotations for all NMS traded financial products, which include the major stock 
Exchanges as well as the ATS. 
The rule was imposed by the SEC to make the financial markets more liquid and transparent 
and for reinforcing the inter-market connections among venues by routing orders in order to be 
execute at the NBBO. 
Through the Sub Penny Rule18, SEC, instead, imposed to all American financial markets to 
adopt the decimal system as units of measure for computing securities price quotations over the 
unity. The decimalization was intended to make as small as possible (i.e. $0.01) and univocal, 
the minimum price movement granted for all stocks traded, called “tick size”.  
In this way, the bid-ask spread has been tightened by making the financial instruments cheaper 
and by increasing the opportunities for liquidity provision; this has opened up a new road for 
the development of very fast automatic systems, able to execute many operations per day, which 
may offer or ask a tick value slightly above or below of current quotation in order to exploit 
new trading suitability based on a potential smaller profit but more present and less risky. 
                                                 
16 Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 611 and Rule 610 of Regulation NMS available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/nmsfaq610-11.htm, April 4, 2008 Update 
17 Id 
18Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 612 (Minimum Pricing Increment) of Regulation 
NMS available at:  http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/subpenny612faq.htm, October 21, 2005 Update 
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Even in Europe, similar dispositions were introduced with the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID)19 issued in 2004 by the co-decision procedure of the Council of the European 
Union and the European Parliament and the subsequent implementation in 2007 in each 
European country legislation. The directive’s main objectives were to increase competition and 
consumer protection in investment services. The most relevant rules of MiFID are: 
i) Development of Multilateral Trading Facilities; 
ii) Introduction of Best Execution for investment firms; 
iii) Obligation of Transparency. 
MiFID has eliminated the monopolistic concentration of the financial instruments traded on 
Regulated Exchanges, by enabling the development of new categories of trading venues called 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs). A MTF can be seen as the European equivalent to the 
US Alternative Trading Systems, in particular is defined as a “non-exchange financial trading 
venue, alternative to the traditional stock exchange, where securities are traded typically using 
electronic systems”. The new entrant MTFs have had a considerable impact on European share-
trading by initiating a process of “fragmentation” of the financial markets, where liquidity for 
one financial instrument is no longer concentrated on one exchange but across multiple venues 
competing each other20. 
The diffusion of MTFs, and in particular thanks to advanced platforms able to increase the 
speed of execution and charged low commissions, has led to the development of sophisticated 
traders as high frequency traders that implement their trading strategies based on a competitive 
and low-latency environment.      
The introduction of Best Execution rule referred to the duty for investment firms to perform the 
best possible execution of their clients’ orders, mainly, in terms of better execution price and 
speed. This rule is the symmetric of the NBBO for the US financial markets21. 
As it regards transparency, MiFID has required to make available order information such as by 
displaying trading quotes (pre-trade transparency) and publishing the price, volume and time 
of all trades in listed shares (post-trade transparency), even if executed outside of regulated 
Exchanges22. 
                                                 
19 MiFID available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02004L0039-
20110104&from=EN 
20 Carole Gresse (2012), Market Fragmentation in Europe: Assessment and Prospects for Market Quality, Driver 
Review DR19, Government Office for Science 
21 Best Execution under MiFID: Questions & Answers, CESR, 2007 available at: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/07_320.pdf  
22 Non-Equity Market Transparency: Questions & Answers, CESR, 2007 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/esme/answerstoquestions_en.pdf 
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Summarizing, the phenomenon of high frequency trading dates back and owes its success to a 
set of rules issued by the US before and Europe afterwards. 
These rules, implemented with the purpose to increase competition among venues, investors 
protection and trading transparency, have facilitated the introduction of more modern trading 
techniques utilizing technologies such as algorithms and trading speed in order to exploit the 
fragmentation of the trading industry and to enjoy of fully electronic alternative trading 
platforms in which such high frequency trading techniques may be more easily carried out.  
 
1.4. Electronic Trading Drivers  
The emergence of computerization in financial markets has favored the use of specific drivers 
employed with the aim to facilitate the interaction among traders and trading venues and trading 
venues among them via an electronically manner, and incentivized by the increasing market 
fragmentation and the new European and US regulations. 
Such drivers have been an important success key for Algorithmic and High Frequency Trading 
and in particular are represented by technology systems such as: 
• Smart Order Routing; 
• Direct Market Access and Sponsored Access. 
 
1.4.1. Smart Order Routing (SOR) 
The obligation to execute orders at the NBBO in US and at the Best execution price in Europe, 
in conjunction with the market fragmentation of the trading venues in place during the last 
years, has led the creation of a technological infrastructure, called Smart Order Routing, able 
to guarantee to the traders a fast and simple access to the best available price in any market and 
any time. 
This procedure is agreed with the “Order Protection Rule” stating that the markets have to 
create, maintain and reinforce rules and procedures in order to avoid mechanisms such as the 
“trade-through” which entail the performing of trades at worst prices than protected prices23. 
The best execution price requirement has resulted in the need to connect regulated markets and 
ECNs (or MTFs), but also in the development of tools able to analyze prices and the relative 
quantities of securities on each trading venues. 
                                                 
23 See note 16 
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The Smart Order Routing is the system that allows real-time analysis of all traded financial 
instruments’ quotations and, through a set of steps, enables to guarantee the best price execution 
to the investor24. 
 
The figure 1 represents an example of the Smart Order Routing process. An investor issues an 
order to buy 1000 shares at the current best price (a market buy order). The instrument is 
currently traded in three different trading venues, each of which has its own trading book where 
appears the actual bid/ask quotations. The Smart Order Routing compares all markets and, since 
the incoming order is a buy order, it routes the order where there is the lowest ask price. The 
first venue has an ask price of €100 for 100 shares, the second venue has an ask price of €98 
for 600 shares and €100 for 20 shares, while the third venue has an ask price of €99 for 400 
shares and €101 for 50 shares. Therefore, the order will be sent to the second venue and 
executed for 600 shares at €98 and the remaining quantity will be routed to the third venue 
where executed for 400 shares at a price of €99. In this way, the investor will obtain an average 
price of 
600
1000
∗ €98 +
400
1000
∗ €99 = €98.4, that is the best possible execution price.  
The Smart Order Routing system, therefore, constitutes a guarantee for retail investors to 
receive the current best execution price for an instrument traded.   
 
1.4.2. Direct Market Access (DMA) and Sponsored Access (SA) 
In most markets, the trading access is restricted to registered market members; hence, those 
members are the only ones permitted to perform trading directly by interacting with the order 
                                                 
24 Peter Gomber, Björn Arndt, Marco Lutat, Tim Uhle (2011), High-Frequency Trading, Goethe Universitat 
Frankfurt Am Main, 19-20 
Figure 1: Smart Order Routing - basic principle. Source: Ende and Lutat, 2010. 
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book of the trading venues. They are specifically brokers-dealers and market making firms 
leading to their primary role as market access intermediaries for other investors25.  
The Direct Market Access is a service offered by some brokers that enables, through an 
information technology infrastructure, to sophisticated private traders (i.e. high frequency 
traders) the placement of buy and sell orders directly on the trading venues’ books without 
being a registered market member26. Thus, high frequency traders utilizing this infrastructure 
are able to control the way a trading transaction is carried out rather than passing the order to 
the broker for execution; however, DMA procedure guarantees to broker the conduction of pre-
trade risk checks. 
Another possibility for the buy side to access a marketplace is granted by the Sponsored Access 
(SA). A SA is very similar to the DMA except for the fact that the investor does not use the 
broker’s infrastructure but it routes his orders to the execution venue using the broker’s 
membership ID27. Unlike DMA, the broker who enables a Sponsored Access to their clients 
can conduct pre-trade risk checks only if the execution venue provides such a system and 
service to the broker, and in this case, we speak of “filtered Sponsored Access”. 
In the case of “unfiltered (or naked) SA”, on the contrary, the broker only receives a drop copy 
of each order that the investor has sent to the trading venue, and his checks will be done using 
this information28; therefore, the order execution is not more dependent by the broker’s risk 
checks because it is inspected after submission.  
Direct Market Access and Sponsored Access allow to investment firms and private traders 
similar benefits to those of the membership, but with lower costs and maintaining the anonymity 
with respect to the market and other participants. 
The main advantage of unfiltered Sponsored Access over Direct Market Access refers to the 
huge reduction in the timing of order submission because of the lack of broker’s pre-trade 
checks; in fact, high frequency traders are more attracted by this type of market access practice 
in order to perform their trading strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 See note 24, 9 
26 Id 
27 Id 
28 Id 
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2. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING DEFINITIONS AND FEATURES 
 
2.1. The need of defining High Frequency Trading 
Before determining the impact of high frequency trading on capital markets, it is necessary to 
provide a definition of the phenomenon by identifying also its characteristics and strategies. 
Given that HFT is a trading practice which is relatively recent and it is still evolving, either 
authors and regulators have different opinions on describing it and consequently it exists a 
distortion on the classification of the traders that belong to the high frequency trading category.  
In this chapter, we will provide several definitions in order to have a general view of this 
innovative trading type and accordingly being able to classify the specific features belonging 
to high frequency traders. 
The first thing to keep in mind is that high frequency trading is a trading method resulting by 
an evolution and differentiation of other trading techniques. 
First of all, high frequency trading belongs to the great family of electronic trading which 
generally is referred to the ability of transmitting orders electronically, usually via computer 
networks29. 
In addition, high frequency traders make a massive use of automated algorithms for order-
execution processes as well as for high-frequency portfolio allocation decisions; this entails that 
are classified as algorithmic traders30. 
Furthermore, high frequency trading is catalogued as a sub-category of algorithmic trading 
systems, inasmuch as it contains further specific features, for example low-latency order 
executions, short position holding times and no positions held overnight, which have implied 
the birth of this new trading practice and the subsequent success. 
After these considerations, we can say that High Frequency Trading is a distinct trading practice 
that is catalogued as 1) an electronic trading that 2) employs algorithms and 3) uses high-
frequency infrastructures and strategies.   
Figure 2 illustrates the differences among traditional traders, algorithmic traders and high 
frequency traders in terms of order execution speed and position holding period. 
As we note, high frequency trading diverges from other traders because of the less time 
necessary to execute orders and the lower position holding period. 
                                                 
29 Irene Aldridge (2010), High-Frequency Trading: A Practical Guide to Algorithmic Strategies and Trading 
Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 16   
30 Id 
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Figure 2: HFT versus AT and traditional long-term investing. Source: Aldridge, 2010 
Taking into account these assumptions, we begin to deal with the Algorithmic trading 
phenomenon in order to frame the starting point of the high frequency trading definition and 
understand the differences that incur between the two trading techniques. 
 
2.2. Definitions of Algorithmic Trading 
The academic literature on Algorithmic Trading (AT), also called “algo trading” or “black box 
trading”, is quite extensive due to the importance role that is playing in the trading system. 
The definitions range from the very general "computerized trading controlled by algorithms" 
(J. Prix, 2007), or that according to which: "in algorithmic trading (AT), computers directly 
interface with trading platforms, placing orders without immediate human intervention. The 
computers observe market data and possibly other information at very high frequency, and, 
based on a built-in algorithm, send back trading instructions, often within milliseconds”. (A. 
Chaboud, 2009). 
A legal definition of Algorithmic Trading (AT) technique, is provided by the article 4(1) (39) 
of MiFID II31 that defines it as: “a trading in financial instruments where a computer algorithm 
automatically determines individual parameters of orders such as whether to initiate the order, 
the timing, price or quantity of the order or how to manage the order after submission, with 
limited or no human intervention, and does not include any system that is only used for purpose 
of routing orders to one or more trading venues or for the processing of orders involving no 
determination of any trading parameters or for the confirmation of orders or the post-trade 
processing of executed transactions”. 
                                                 
31 MiFID II available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065&from=EN 
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Therefore, by definition, especially MiFID, an AT is not solely identified as an automatic 
execution and electronic routing of orders (like “traditional” electronic trading) but further, 
trading is carried out by specific algorithms (called algos) which, through pre-set trading 
instructions, automatically determine when, where and how to execute orders in the 
marketplace without human intervention, so by extremely speeding-up the transactions and by 
dropping the emotional and behavioral component of the human traders.  
Trading algorithms generally specify timing, pricing, quantity and routing of orders by 
continuously monitoring market conditions with the purpose to promptly react and exploit the 
current trading situations. 
Definitions provide a general classification of several characteristics belonging to algorithmic 
traders; some of these are familiar for the high frequency traders, too. 
 
2.3. Characteristics of Algorithmic Trading 
As high frequency trading is a subset of algorithmic trading family, there are common 
characteristics that are valid for both trading techniques.  
Common characteristics of AT and HFT 
1) Used by professional traders 
2) No human intervention 
3) Pre-designed trading decisions 
4) Observing market data in real-time 
5) Determining individual parameters of orders 
6) Automated order submission 
7) Automated order management after submission 
8) Direct market access 
Table 1: Common characteristics of AT and HFT. Source: Gomber, 2011. 
The main common characteristic of HFT and AT is represented by the use of fast computers 
and complex ad-hoc algorithms to automatically make trading decisions, submit orders, and 
manage those orders after submission32. 
High Frequency Traders (HFTs) and Algorithmic Traders (ATs) are characterized for the 
employment of informatics devices extremely sophisticated in terms of hardware and software. 
Software can be “in-house” where HFT and AT firms utilize huge investments in technologies 
                                                 
32 Terrence Hendershott, Ryan Riordan (2011), Algorithmic Trading and Information, 2 
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and informatics engineers in order to implement copyright algorithms that are used exclusively 
by them; software “tailor-made”, that is designated ad-hoc for HFT and AT firms needs by a 
third programmers; and software “out of the box” namely commercial applications with very 
low customization and cheaper compared the others software categories33. By means of such 
algorithms, HFTs and ATs can execute complex computations and issue orders toward the 
trading platforms in split seconds.   
They leverage technology and algorithms from end-to-end of the investment chain, from market 
data analysis and the operation of a specific trading strategy to the generation, routing, and 
execution of orders and trades34. 
In order to be able to elaborate and analyze millions of data, perform appropriate trading 
strategies and be competitive, algorithmic traders, and subsequently high frequency traders, 
have continuously needed to heavy investments in the strengthening and updating of their 
trading algorithms; indeed, it is in place a real “algos war” among the various algorithmic 
traders, where the competition is based on the development of the “perfect” algorithm able to 
be more profitable with respect to the competitor traders35. The battle for supremacy in 
algorithmic execution uses an assortment of mathematics, programming, communications and 
computing hardware capabilities due to regularly adjust algorithmic code to reflect the subtle 
changes in the dynamic market and to the possible reverse engineering carried out by rival 
firms36. 
As it regards the automated management of orders after submission, it refers that already 
implemented orders might be modified or cancelled out by ATs and HFTs if in the meantime 
the underlying’s market conditions have changed or even just for testing the trading reactions 
of other traders. Such practice is considered one of the most controversial and criticized issue 
emphasized by the other market participants, who argue that the intensive submission and right 
after cancellation of orders may cause a significant breakdown of the market stability. 
The last important common feature of ATs and HFTs invokes the ability of issuing orders 
toward the various trading venues via a direct market access and/or a sponsored access by 
exploiting the technological infrastructure of their brokers, which permits them to execute 
orders directly without passing to broker and without being a member of the trading venues and 
then reducing the costs and the timing of trading. 
                                                 
33 Valeria Caivano, Salvatore Ciccarelli and Giovanna Di Stefano (2012), Il Trading ad Alta Frequenza: 
Caratteristiche, Effetti, Questioni di Policy, CONSOB Discussion Papers No. 5, 8 
34 Anuj Agarwal (2012), High Frequency Trading: Evolution and the Future, Capgemini, 6 
35 Scott Patterson (2013), Dark Pools: The Rise of A. I. Trading Machines and the Looming Threat to Wall Street, 
RH Business Books.   
36 Charles Duhigg (2006), Artificial Intelligence Applied Heavily to Picking Stocks, N.Y. TIMES 
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On the other side, there are characteristics of AT that are not commonly associated with the 
HFT methods.  
Exclusive characteristics of AT  
1) Agent trading  
2) Minimize market impact (for large orders) 
3) Goal is to achieve a particular benchmark 
4) Trading holding periods of days/weeks/months 
5) Executing an order through time and across markets 
Table 2: Exclusive characteristics of AT. Source: Gomber, 2011. 
ATs are typically Agent traders, it essentially means that they don’t trade for their own account 
purposes but on the contrary, they perform trading activities on their client’s behalf in exchange 
of a trading commission; therefore, ATs are a type of intermediaries that exploit their 
technological advances, as using the algos, in order to execute their clients’ orders granting 
them the best execution which may be reached in terms of speed and price.  
Thus, the principal goal of using non-HFT algorithmic trading techniques concerns the 
achievement of a specific target set by the client (e.g. buying a determined number of securities 
shares in a limit time at a specific price) by means of the intelligent implementation of orders 
through time and across venues thanks to the exploitation of their modern equipment. About 
that, one of the most used AT activities is the execution of large orders on behalf of institutional 
investors, such as mutual fund portfolios; specifically, if an investor decides to sell (buy) a large 
block of stocks and submits the whole block for execution all at once, it should significantly 
decrease (increase) the price in order to encourage other market participants to absorb the 
increased supply (demand)37 but alternatively, investor can use algorithms that take the block 
of stocks and slice it into many small orders that are submitted one by one into different trading 
platforms for execution.  
This trading procedure usually requires to establish or liquidate positions with time horizons of 
days or even weeks due to the need to alleviate the impact of a large order submission in the 
market. 
Nevertheless, a wide variety of algorithms could be used: for example, some look for arbitrage 
opportunities, including small discrepancies in the exchange rates between three currencies; 
                                                 
37 James Angel, Lawrence Harris, Chester S. Spatt (2010), Equity Trading in the 21st Century, Marshall Research 
Paper Series, 37-38  
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some seek optimal execution of large orders at the minimum cost; and some seek to implement 
longer-term trading strategies in search of profits38. 
 
2.4. Definitions of High Frequency Trading 
High-frequency trading (HFT) represents the most sophisticated technological trading 
technique employed in the financial activities; since it is a phenomenon that is newer with 
respect to AT, the concerning literature is scarcer and evolving. 
There is not a universal and univocal way to define it but it exists a general consensus in the 
considering HFT as a trading practice (and not a single trading strategy) conducted through 
supercomputers that give the capability to execute a high number of trades within milliseconds 
or microseconds39.    
More specifically, HFT can be defined as a form of AT characterized by high speeds, high 
turnover rates and high order-to-rate ratios that leverages high-frequency financial data and 
electronic trading tools40. 
US and EU regulators are trying to furnish a more specific identification of the HFT 
phenomenon, given the great importance that is covering on the securities market landscape. In 
fact, by most accounts, it has grown substantially over the past ten years; in the early 2000s, 
HFT still accounted for fewer than 10% of equity orders, but this proportion was soon to begin 
rapid growth. According to data from the NYSE, trading volume grew up by about 164% 
between 2005 and 2009 for which high-frequency trading might be accounted41. 
Estimates hold that it accounts for roughly 55% of trading volume in US equity markets and 
about 40% in European equity markets and more considerably, HFT has grown in futures 
markets, e.g. foreign exchange and interest rate futures with ceilings of 80% of volume42. 
U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission defines High Frequency Trading on its Concept 
Release on Equity Market Structure43 (2010) as “a practice that refers to professional traders 
acting in a proprietary capacity that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades 
on a daily basis and characterized by: 
                                                 
38 Alain Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson, Clara Vega (2009), Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic 
Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance 
Discussion Papers n° 980, 1 
39 Rena S. Miller, Gary Shorter (2016), High Frequency Trading: Overview of Recent Developments, 
Congressional Research Service, 1 
40 See note 29 
41 Charles Duhigg (2009), Stock Traders Find Speed Pays in Milliseconds, New York Times 
42 See note 35 
43 SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure (2010), 45-46, available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-61358.pdf 
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1) the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer programs for 
generating, routing and executing orders; 
2) the use of co-location services and individual data feeds offered by exchanges and 
others to minimize network and other types of latencies; 
3) very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions;  
4) the submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission; and 
5) ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying 
significant, unhedged positions over-night)”.    
Article 4(1) (40) of European MiFID II44 describes a high-frequency algorithmic trading 
(HFAT) technique as “an algorithmic trading technique characterized by: 
1) infrastructure intended to minimize network and other types of latencies, including at 
least one of the following facilities for algorithmic order entry: co-location, proximity 
hosting or high-speed direct electronic access; 
2) system-determination of order initiation, generation, routing or execution without 
human intervention for individual trades or orders; and 
3) high message intraday rates which constitute orders, quotes or cancellations”. 
Both MiFID and SEC attribute to HFT specific features that are not present in the definition of 
AT; such exclusive characteristics represent the main hallmark and competitive advantage of 
HFT with respect to other traders.  
 
2.5. Characteristics of High Frequency Trading 
In order to better understand the definitions of HFT provided by regulators, it is necessary to 
extrapolate the main characteristics specifically related to HFT identification. 
They can be summarized in: 
Specific characteristics of HFT 
1) Proprietary trading 
2) Low-latency requirements 
3) Use of co-location/proximity services and individual 
data feeds 
4) Very high number of orders 
5) Very short order holding periods (seconds/minutes) 
                                                 
44 See note 31 
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6) Profit for buying and selling  
7) Very low margins per trade 
8) Focus on high liquid instruments 
9) No overnight positions (flat position) 
10) Very high order-to-trade ratio  
Table 3: Specific characteristics of HFT. Source: Gomber, 2011. 
HFT deeply diverges with respect to the more general AT, either in terms of technology adopted 
and trading strategies used. 
Unlike ATs, the most of HFTs are Proprietary traders: they are private firms utilizing only their 
own capital for their trading activities45. This implies that the trading strategies of the HFTs are 
not associated to the will of the client but they are defined by themselves with the only purpose 
to profit. 
The fact that this trading practice is properly called high frequency trading entails that HFT 
activities are based on a huge number of orders issued in the marketplace in a unit of time 
(which can reach to more than 5,000 per second)46. For this reason, although HFTs are a 
minority of total traders, HFT constitutes most of the total trading volume of the venues where 
it is employed; in the United States in 2009, HFT firms represented 2% of the approximately 
20,000 total firms operating, but accounted for 73% of all equity orders volume47. 
HFTs are not only identified by the high volumes and high speed of executions, but also by the 
high percentage of modifications and cancellations of orders; HFT management after order 
submission is significantly more aggressive compared non-HFT firms, due to the more 
frequency of such adjustments. The increasing number of cancellations of orders already 
submitted leads to a high order-to-trade ratio, that represents the percentage of how many orders 
are issued with respect to the number of orders effectively executed. Estimates claim that almost 
all the submitted orders by HFT systems do not reach an actual execution; only 1% of the total 
orders would result in a trading contract48. 
Another typical characteristic of HFT activities is constituted by the engagement of trading 
positions on financial instruments for a holding period that does not exceed the trading day49; 
HFTs prefer to liquidate their entire portfolios on a daily basis rather than carrying positions 
overnight especially for two reasons: the former is represented by the high levels of risk of 
                                                 
45 Larry Harris (2003), Trading and Exchanges: Market microstructure for practitioners, Oxford University Press 
46 Valeria Caivano, Salvatore Ciccarelli & Giovanna Di Stefano (2012), Il Trading ad Alta Frequenza: 
Caratteristiche, Effetti, Questioni di Policy, CONSOB Discussion Papers No. 5, 8  
47 Rob Iati (2009), The Real Story of Trading Software Espionage, The TABB Group 
48 Andrea Greco (2011), Giro di Vite Consob sul Trading ad Alta Frequenza, la Repubblica, 4 November  
49 See note 46 
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overnight positions because of the more volatility favored by the extension of global trading 
activities to 24-hour cycles; while the latter is concerning to the potential smaller profitability 
due to the interest that has to be paid, referred to as an overnight carry rate (usually slightly 
above LIBOR rates), in order to maintain overnight positions50. 
HFTs move in and out of short-term positions at high volumes and high speeds (high-turnover 
rate) looking at capturing only a fraction of a cent in profit on every trade51 but considering that 
they trade with an exorbitant frequency, even a very small but almost always present profit per 
trade can result in a substantial overall gain.  
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)52 noted that those 
engaging in HFT typically utilize strategies for both buy and sell trades in extremely large 
number of stocks, options, futures, currencies, exchange trade funds, as well as other financial 
instruments but HFTs show a preference on trading in a very liquid markets and financial 
instruments; in effect, the HFT operations require the possibility to close the holding positions 
very quickly. The more liquid financial instruments are those from which you can rapidly 
disinvest because have a market capable to absorb large orders with a little economic impact53. 
Summarizing, the main characteristics of HFT and related success factor concern the ability of 
performing its trading operations with an extremely speed and consequently with a high 
frequency which are fundamental components of all HFT strategies, but how are HFTs able to 
be very much faster than other types of traders? The answer is recognized in the so-called low-
latency requirements, that are fulfilled in particular thanks to the infrastructure employed by 
HFTs, both in terms of hardware/software capabilities and ultra-low latency network systems, 
in order to minimize as far as possible, the timing of incoming, elaboration of information and 
the execution and the transfer of orders up to time intervals of milliseconds and even 
microseconds. 
 
2.5.1. Low-Latency Requirements 
In the capital market context, latency is referred as the necessary time to the implementation of 
a series of operations needed to transform an economic decision in an actual trading (order 
execution) 54.  
                                                 
50 See note 29, 2 
51 Id 
52 Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency, IOSCO 
(2011) available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD354.pdf 
53 See note 46, 8 
54 Alfonso Puorro (2013), High Frequency Trading: una panoramica, Questioni di Economia e Finanza n° 198, 
Banca d’Italia, 10-11 
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There are several aspects of the trading process in which the latency has to be taken into 
consideration: 
i. the speed with which HFTs receive the information from the market and process it 
(analysis of the data and operational reaction). For example, the ability to analyze in 
real time the bigger possible amount of data and be able to transform the flow of 
information in investment choices; 
ii. the time that elapses between the processing of the data and the transmission of the order 
to the broker; 
iii. the time between receiving the order by the broker and sending it to the trading venue; 
iv. the period that the order takes to arrive on the market by the time it is released by the 
broker; 
v. the time between the reception of the data by the market and the disclosure of the data 
to all participants in the market55. 
A high-frequency system requires the shortest possible time to cover all the steps of the trading 
process; a time-interval that the technological process has led until few milliseconds (low-
latency).  
The first step of the trading process is accomplished by high-speed computers and complex 
algorithms that enable of rapidly compiling market information and making instant decisions 
with no real-time human intervention. 
HFT firms use modern multi-core processors which make data processing much faster as there 
are exactly several processors working on different tasks at the same time, resulting in a 
significant increase in the overall system speed56. 
In addition, HFTs avail themselves of totally automated algorithms which, if well-designated, 
are able to take trading decisions in the same time as the information is analyzed. 
As we have seen in the first chapter, HFTs can overstep the third and the fourth point of the 
trading process through the direct market access or the sponsored access granted by their broker 
and therefore by minimizing the concerning latency. 
The last issue of the latency process, associated to HFT liability, regards the time that elapses 
from the trading decision to the transmission of order toward the trading venue. It objectively 
depends by two physical factors: the distance between the two points of connection and the 
transfer speed. 
                                                 
55 Id 
56 See note 29, 13 
31 
 
In order to minimize this type of latency, HFTs have improved their network systems and have 
co-located their proprietary servers.  
There is a physical limit of reducing the distance latency given by the speed of light, about 
300,000 kilometers per second or equivalently 3 microseconds per kilometer, that expresses the 
theoretical top speed reachable in nature. Such transmission speed is potentially accessible and 
approachable considering a linear and without physical obstacles data travel from a starting 
point to an arrival point. 
About that, common network connections utilized by the normal users are not suitable for HFT 
purposes inasmuch the tortuous route needed to connect all the private houses would slow down 
the transmission speed and it may run into frequent connection stability problems; for this 
reason, HFTs have used huge investments in ultra-low latency private infrastructures able to 
connect directly their computer servers towards the several trading venues located worldwide. 
Michael Lewis on its book “Flash Boys”57 tells about the construction of an important network 
system infrastructure called “Spread Networks” that aimed at offering internet connectivity 
between Chicago and New York at ultra-low latency (very close to the speed of light), high 
bandwidth and high reliability using dark fiber, privately operated fiber network that connects 
directly point-to-point. 
“Spread Networks” was installed in 2009, running 827 miles from Chicago (home to Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, where futures and options are traded) to Carteret, New Jersey (home to 
the NASDAQ data center) along a route as close to straight as possible; the estimated round-
trip along the dark fiber line from Chicago to Carteret would be reduced from 17 to 13 
milliseconds. By this project, HFTs engaging such network could enjoy small but important 
reductions in latency that helped them to close trades before their competitors, in particular 
through low-latency arbitrage strategies, wherein searching out price discrepancies between 
future contracts in Chicago and their underlying equities in New York.  
Another important aspect, regarding latency network, is concerning the necessity to plot out 
certain optimal points between geographically separate exchanges, in order to obtain the least 
amount of time for information to travel between them. For instance, the optimal point to exploit 
the price difference between the NYSE and the LSE was found to be a spot in the mid-Atlantic 
Ocean. According to some researchers and given that infrastructure in the form of undersea data 
cables already exists, such floating trade centers could be a possibility in the future58. 
The other fundamental component of reducing latency which is peculiar of the HFTs entails the 
so called “co-location”. 
                                                 
57 Michael Lewis (2014), Flash Boys, W. W. Norton & Company 
58 See note 29, 13-14 
32 
 
Intuitively, transfer latency does not only depend by the engineering used to transfer 
information the fastest possible but the travel time is also influenced by the distance among two 
connection points. This means that in a hypothetical race between two operators using the same 
private cable network and competing in the same market for the same instruments, the one 
located closest to the trading venue server will always arrive first with respect to the farther 
one. 
Hence, in order to be faster than competitors, HFT firms have decided to locate own computer 
servers (or their broker server) in the same premises where an exchange’s computer servers are 
housed; for example, Wall Street servers are located in Carteret, NJ and in the proximity many 
HFT firms have rent a slot called “rack” where positioning their proprietary servers59. This 
enables HFT firms to access into trading book of the exchange where are co-located always 
before the rest of the investors.  
Co-location has become a very lucrative business for same exchanges, which charge HFT firms 
millions of dollars for the privilege of “co-location access”. For the huge demand of co-location, 
some stock exchanges have expanded their data centers substantially, for instance the NYSE 
Euronext data center in Mahwah, NJ is almost 398,000 square feet compared to 46,000 square 
feet of the old NYSE building60. 
HFT firms can exploit the proximity factor even contemporaneously in more different exchange 
platforms around the world as in NY, London, Singapore through a multiple co-location 
infrastructure. 
If the trading platform does not offer this type of commercial service, a third party can substitute 
such business via a “central proximity hosting”, in which the hired spaces don’t belong to the 
trading venues but in the same way are located very close to them61. 
 
2.6. How to Identify High Frequency Traders? 
From an analytical perspective, the absence of a unique definition of HFT phenomenon makes 
it difficult to achieve a precise identification of HFT firms. The literature employs a number of 
approaches to identify HFTs leading to different results in assessing the level of HFT activity 
in the securities markets. 
We describe different approaches used in the literature. These fall into two broad categories: 
1) direct approach; 
                                                 
59 See note 46, 10-11 
60 NYSE website, “Co-location: Nyse Euronext’s US Liquidity Center” 
61 See note 52 
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2) indirect approach62. 
The direct approach to identify HFTs relies on the identification of market participants either 
based on:  
- their primary business; and/or 
- the use of services to minimize latency63. 
The information on HFT activity as primary business is obtained by the trading venues in which 
market participants operate64.  
Such method focuses on pure HFT firms which are flagged by trading venues as HFT firms and 
it does not cover HFT activity carried out by other non-HFT firms, such as investment banks.    
Furthermore, primary business method may not include HFT activity by HFT firms that exploit 
another trading venue membership (direct market access and sponsored access), unless the 
broker reports the HFT firms as clients65. 
These considerations translate on an underestimation of HFTs because HFT activities by other 
non-HFT are not counted and on the other side, it could also exist an overestimation of the 
phenomenon inasmuch as not all activities carried out by HFT firms may be HFT; however, it 
is more likely that the underestimation element is dominating. 
The second direct method relies on information about the use of low-latency infrastructures, 
e.g. the use of co-location and proximity services or access to fast data feeds66. 
Such method does not require any knowledge of the firm’s primary business but the HFT 
identification is only based on the use of services to minimize latency. Incorrectly, this method 
could include brokers whom trading as agent traders who may use co-location services to offer 
best execution strategies to their clients; therefore, by basing only on this parameter, it would 
result on an overestimation of the HFT firms67.  
Conversely, the indirect approach used to identify HFT firms is based on the operating trading 
activities performed by market participants. 
Examples related on these trading activities are identifications regarding: 
- intraday inventory management; 
- lifetime of orders; 
- message traffic (including order-to-trade ratios); 
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- identification of strategies68. 
Each indirect approach does not have to be taken separately because all reported characteristics 
are useful to identify HFT activity as a whole. 
A peculiar characteristic of HFT refers to the maintaining of an average flat position during all 
the trading day (i.e. HFTs are neither net sellers or net buyers) and the detention of no-overnight 
inventories; an indirect identification of HFT is the estimation of intraday inventory 
management through mock-up data. A market participant will be recognized as HFT firm 
whether utilizing an intraday inventory management compliant to HFT features.  
Nevertheless, identification based on intraday inventory management will tend to identify some 
HFT strategies (market-making) and may not identify other HFT strategies69. 
An alternative indirect method consists in looking at the lifetime of orders, i.e. holding period 
of positions before the order is executed, modified or cancelled. 
As reported, HFTs are characterized by the rapidly discharge of opened positions in 
seconds/minutes compared to other traders. Classification based on lifetime of orders finds 
several problems such as the difficulty to analyze each order management for all securities 
traded and for all traders and the definition of a calibrated timing threshold that characterizes 
HFT activity. 
Another proxy is based on OTR ratio but it is rather a measure of message traffic than a measure 
of HFT because it strongly depends by the different strategies adopted by the HFTs. 
The last indirect method of identification is related to the strategies used by HFTs but it is less 
suited to identify the overall level of HFT activity in a market given the very different types of 
strategies adopted by HFTs but it may be useful on the determining the distinction between for 
example market making HFT strategies and opportunistic ones (momentum strategies) by 
identifying the HFT firms who contribute to market stability70.   
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3. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING STRATEGIES 
 
3.1. Introduction to HFT Strategies 
General information about HFT techniques is not sufficient to give a fair judgement of the 
behavior of HFT activity. Considering only HFT characteristics from a general perspective, it 
does not provide a relevant opinion on the effect of HFT phenomenon on capital markets. 
For this purpose, it is necessary to identify all the possible trading strategies implemented by 
HFT operators, inasmuch HFT practice does not represent a unique trading strategy but it 
constitutes a technological mean used to employ a very diverse range of strategies. 
Why is it important to distinguish among different trading strategies performed by HFTs? 
Concept Release on Equity Markets of SEC71 explains that the implementation of a specific 
strategy implies a diverse effect on market structure; it may be harmful or beneficial for market 
structure performance and for interests of long-term investors, too. It is possible to reliably 
identify strategy implications through, for example, metrics such as adding or taking liquidity, 
or trading with (momentum) or against (contrarian) prevailing price movements. 
HFT trading strategies are so heterogeneous because there are different traders utilizing HFT 
techniques, which usually have very sophisticated ad-hoc algorithms and technology 
specialized to specific trading strategies. 
There is a multitude of different institutions with different business models that use HFT and 
there are hybrid forms, e.g. broker-dealers which run their proprietary trading books applying 
HFT techniques72. Hence, in the assessment of HFT, it is very important to take a functional 
rather than an institutional perspective because the main purpose remains the evaluation of the 
HFT methods, and not of the different types of users73. To achieve a level playing field, all 
operators that use HFT based strategies should be taken into consideration independent of 
whether HFT is their core or an add-on technology to implement trading strategies74; it includes 
HFT proprietary firms, investment banks and hedge funds leveraging HFT technology to profit. 
Despite it exists a very wide range of trading strategies used, the common element of all of 
them is represented by the HFT ability to issue, modify and cancel out thousands of trading 
orders at very high speed and by the timing advantage of the low-latency component which 
allows them to arrive first both in terms of data information and market access.  
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In fact, HFTs can always beat the competitors regarding the speed and can implement ad-hoc 
trading strategies made possible by the time priority75. 
Another important feature of HFT is constituted by the nearly continuous trading activity, which 
permits to high frequency operators to adapt their systems to the different market developments 
in real-time and to take promptly decisions about issuing, cancellations and modifications of 
orders and consequently adopt different trading strategies76. For instance, HFT algorithms can 
timely assess the liquidity of the market and the associated trading risk in order to decide the 
steps to follow for an appropriate trading strategy.  
HFTs may act both actively as “price taker” and passively as “liquidity provider”, that is they 
can issue immediately marketable orders and orders that are currently not matched but 
positioned on the trading book waiting for matching. 
By means of these considerations, there are many different trading strategies adopted by HFTs; 
all strategies exploit HFT infrastructure with the aim to make profit but they can have opposed 
effects in terms of market liquidity intended as the cumulated combination of 1) proportion of 
buying and selling orders on the trading book (limit orders); 2) proportion of incoming buying 
and selling orders crossing orders on trading book (market orders) and 3) volumes associated 
with buying and selling orders77. Liquidity instability would result in unfair prices and high 
volatility. 
We start on analyzing algorithmic trading strategies, even if not all AT strategies are necessarily 
high frequency but it is useful to frame the nature of algorithmic methods employed to perform 
trading. 
 
3.2. Algorithmic Trading Strategies 
AT techniques are an instrument used by professional traders to execute trades of other traders 
granting them the best execution; then, AT strategies do not pursue a mere profit goal but 
algorithms are ad-hoc pre-set by ATs for executing precise trading instructions drafted by the 
client.  
As we have seen, most of non-HFT algorithmic strategies aim at minimizing the market impact 
of large orders by slicing them into several smaller orders and by spreading out across time and 
venues defined by a pre-set benchmark. 
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According to a classification drawn up by Almgren (2009)78 with further information from 
Johnson (2010)79, there are four generations of algorithms.  
 
3.2.1. First Generation Execution Algorithms 
First-generation algorithms focus exclusively on benchmarks that are set up on market 
generated data and are independent from the actual order book situation at order arrival80. In 
this category, we recognize the following algorithms: 
• Participation Rate Algorithms: they are programmed to participate in the market up to 
a predetermined volume; for instance, an algorithm tries to participate by trading up to 
5% of the volume in the target instrument, with the purpose large orders harder to be 
detected for other traders, until it has built or liquidated the desired position81. Therefore, 
such algorithms reflect the current market volume in their orders. Variants of these algos 
may add execution periods during which orders are submitted to the market or 
maximum volumes or prices. 
• Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) Algorithms: they split a large order into slices 
that are sent to the market in equally distributed time lapses82. For example, the 
algorithm could set to buy 6,000 shares within one hour in blocks of 1,000 shares, 
resulting in 6 orders for 1,000 shares every 10 minutes. 
• Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) Algorithms: they try to match or beat the 
VWAP, a price benchmark defined as the average trade price of a specific period where 
each trade price is weighted by the size of the associated trade and calculated following 
the formula: 𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃 =
Dollar (Euro) Volume
Total Volume
=
Σ𝑛𝑣𝑛𝑝𝑛
Σ𝑛𝑣𝑛
 where pn is the execution price and 
vn is the size, over a specified time interval83. Large orders have a great impact on VWAP 
given that trades are being weighted per their size. VWAP algorithms are constructed 
basing on the historical volume profiles to estimate the target period volume patterns. 
By resuming, the first-generation algorithms are used aiming at reaching a specific trading 
benchmark, such as volume, trading period and price as figure 3 illustrates. 
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Figure 3: First Generation Algorithms. 
 
3.2.2. Second Generation Execution Algorithms 
Second-generation algorithms generally are used to minimize the implementation shortfall 
indicator84. 
The quotation midpoint at the time of decision to trade is the price benchmark that algorithms 
should match or beat. 
Implementation shortfall algorithms attempt to minimize the market impact of a large order 
execution in terms of potential negative price movements during the execution process (timing 
risk). To hedge against this type of risk, these algorithms predetermine an execution plan based 
on historical data, and split the order into as many as necessary but as few as possible sub 
orders85. 
Sub orders will be scattered over a period which is just long enough to dampen the market 
impact of the overall order, much shorter than TWAP and VWAP needs86. 
There is a trade-off between minimizing market impact and timing risk because the necessary 
time to alleviate the market impact could be long and vice versa, whether the timing is short, 
the market impact of order is bigger. 
 
3.2.3. Third Generation Algorithms 
Third-generation algorithms are more sophisticated than the first and second generation. 
Almgren defines them as adaptive algorithms because they follow an approach based on re-
evaluation and adjustment of their scheduling processes during the execution phase and are not 
only determined by pre-set programs. This procedure makes such algorithms adaptive to 
changing market conditions.  
                                                 
84 See note 72, 23 
85 Id 
86 See note 79 
First Generation 
Algorithms
Benchmark: 
Volume
Participation Rate 
Algorithms
Benchmark: 
Trading Period
TWAP
Benchmark: Price VWAP
39 
 
3.2.4. Fourth Generation Algorithms 
Fourth-generation algorithms, also called newsreader algorithms, are very different than 
previous categories because are not related to the minimization of the market impact for large 
orders but they are more closely connected to high frequency algorithmic strategies. 
These newsreader algorithms have been designed to detect, through statistical methods and text 
mining techniques, the impact of news announcements on the market87. They rely on high-
speed market data, further favored by low-latency news feeds provided by exchanges and news 
agencies88. 
Non-HFT algorithmic trading strategies are relatively easy to predict and detect, and 
consequently other participants may take their relative countermeasures to contrast them; HFTs 
have adopted specific strategies to take advantage of predictable algorithms. 
Unlike non-HFT algorithmic traders, HFTs have developed and engaged other trading 
strategies with respect to simple use of algorithms. 
 
3.3. High Frequency Trading Strategies 
The potential number of trading strategies used by HFTs is almost infinite; in fact, HFT 
represents a powerful instrument in the hands of HFT firms that permits the engagement of very 
heterogeneous strategies to achieve their profit purposes.  
HFT strategies are so various as trading algorithms are as well; strategies reflect the behavior 
of algorithms that are constantly updated to exploit new economic conditions and then they 
may assume different conducts depending of current market events. 
However, the basis point of all HFT strategies is associated to the employment of their low-
latency specific attributes and ad-hoc algorithms necessary to implementation of their awesome 
speed advantage translated in very fast order execution at a very high frequency.  
Basically, most of HFT debate strategies are nothing new and are well known in the market 
landscape, even if they are being executed using better technology and at greater speed89. 
Figure 4 shows a classification of strategies carried out by HFTs which is based on 
complementary information from Concept Release on Equity Markets Structure of SEC (2010), 
Gomber et al. (2011), and Puorro (2013). 
                                                 
87 See note 72, 24 
88 Id 
89 Sylvain Friederich and Richard Payne (2011), Computer Based Trading, Liquidity and Trading Costs, 
Government Office for Science, 7 
40 
 
Concept Release on Equity Markets Structure identifies four macro-categories of trading 
strategies employed by HFT firms corresponding to: 1) liquidity providing; 2) (statistical) 
arbitrage; 3) directional and 4) structural strategies.  
In addition, all macro-categories have several sub-categories that may represent very different 
ways of doing trading with specific effects both in terms of HFT profits and resulting market 
impact; therefore, it is important to describe each of them to provide a fair assessment of all 
types of performed strategies. 
Figure 4: High Frequency Trading Strategies. 
 
3.3.1. Liquidity Providing Strategy 
One of the most common HFT strategies is to act as liquidity provider or passive trader. 
HFTs can replicate the activities of traditional market-makers, i.e. they place orders to buy (as 
well as sell) using limit orders that are above (below) the current market price in the case of 
selling (buying). These orders are called non-marketable because are resting orders that provide 
liquidity to the marketplace at specified prices. 
The great difference with respect to traditional market-makers is that HFTs are not bound to be 
registered as market-makers of the exchanges and therefore subject to corresponding market-
making obligations, such as the continuous two-sided quotes, minimum quantity, maximum 
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spread and quotation timing90; consequently, they can freely choose how to be counterpart of 
incoming orders and when and whether to operate. About that, it is in place a debate whether 
HFT firms engaging in market-making activities should submit to traditional market-makers’ 
obligations, also urged by MiFID II that requires to market-making HFTs to undergo the related 
obligations.  
HFT liquidity providers have two basic sources of revenues: 
i) profits from the spread between bid and ask quotations (spread capturing); and/or  
ii) incentives from trading venues in the form of reducing transaction fees or even by 
granting “rebates” (rebate driven)91. 
 
3.3.1.1. Spread Capturing 
Spread Capturing is a HFT strategy that is closer to traditional market-making activity inasmuch 
liquidity provision core activity guarantees a profit from spread between bid and ask prices by 
continuously buying and selling securities on both sides of the trade92. Earnings are provided 
by lower prices at which market-makers can buy and by higher prices at which they can sell. 
HFTs do this automatically, by inputting the order limits into their algorithms and letting the 
computers do the work93. 
In this type of activity, HFTs, by issuing thousands of orders on daily basis, will gain a lot of 
money even if the spread is minimal in fact they are called “scalpers”. In addition, low-latency 
advantages permit to ensure the time priority on trading books, by obtaining that their quotes 
are inserted systematically before and consequently executed sooner of non-HFT market-
makers. 
Since they are not subject to market-making obligations, HFT market-makers can freely 
abandon the market in turbulence periods of high volatility by deeply reducing the associated 
risk. In fact, in the case of sudden rising of volatility, HFT systems can cancel out their orders 
very quickly, and reduce the potential losses. 
 
3.3.1.2. Rebate Driven 
Rebate Driven strategies are built around particular incentive schemes of certain exchanges and 
ECNs. To attract liquidity providers and react to market competition resulting by the 
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fragmentation of securities markets, some trading venues have adopted asymmetric fees: 
members removing liquidity from the market (price takers or aggressive traders) are charged 
for a higher fee for trading, while traders who provide liquidity to the market (price makers or 
passive traders) are charged for a lower fee or even receive a rebate for trading94.  
This incentive scheme is finalized to promote the liquidity provision in the marketplace. 
More competition in liquidity provision implies a cutting down of bid-ask spread and then also 
of the profits for market-makers on spread capturing; on the other side, liquidity providers will 
receive a rebate for their liquidity service that will compensate the spread profit reduction. 
Figure 5 shows the just mentioned revenue sources for HFT liquidity providing strategies. 
 
Figure 5: Revenues sources for HFT liquidity providing strategies. Source: Gomber, 2011.  
 
3.3.2. Statistical Arbitrage Strategy 
Arbitrage is the practice where a trader takes advantage of price differences of identical or 
similar financial instruments on different markets or in different forms. Such price differences 
may occur for different trading reasons but they represent a form of market inefficiencies. 
Price discrepancies among identical instruments do not find an economic reason except for a 
temporary inefficiency in the markets where they are traded and despite the economic theory 
claims that such inefficiencies are rare and immediately adjustable, opportunities to conduct 
arbitrage frequently exist but typically are present only for very short periods (fractions of a 
second) in the modern capital markets95. 
The presence of several Exchanges and specifically, Alternative Trading Systems (or 
Multilateral Trading Systems), where same securities are traded, has potentially increased the 
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possibility to perform arbitrages, since the odds to have different trading prices, even for tiny 
periods, between correlated instruments is very high. 
Statistical Arbitrage is a popular strategy among market participants which is related to the 
statistical mispricing of one or more assets based on the expected value of these assets 
calculated through a computational and empirical approach96.  
Statistical arbitrageurs try to identify similar instruments (depending on common fundamental 
valuation factors) that are inconsistently priced relative to each other according to their expected 
value patterns and, once identified, they buy the cheaper and sell the more expensive one97. 
They profit if the cheaper instrument appreciates and the expensive one depreciates, if the 
cheaper instrument appreciates faster than the expensive one, or if the expensive instruments 
depreciates faster than the cheaper one98. 
High frequency systems can recognize securities mispricing through their information 
technologies without a human intervention and the rapidity factor enables the identification and 
subsequent exploitation of the arbitrage before other non-HFTs. 
Sub-categories of statistical arbitrage are identified in market neutral and cross arbitrages. 
 
3.3.2.1. Market Neutral Arbitrage 
Market neutral arbitrage strategy implies the contemporaneous holding of long positions in 
assets, which are considered undervalued and, at the same moment, of short positions in closely 
related assets, which are perceived overvalued99. The detention of opposed holding positions 
allows an overall offsetting of market movements, that is, gains and losses compensate each 
other by obtaining a so called “delta neutral portfolio”100. When prices of correlated instruments 
normalize in the estimated expected values, HFT firm liquidates the positions to obtain a profit.  
Unlike traditional pair trading, HFTs use market neutral arbitrage with a portfolio of a hundred 
or more instruments, that are carefully selected by common broad elements and constantly 
monitored by algorithmic trading models that apply a frequent portfolio turnover to eliminate 
the exposure market risks. 
 
3.3.2.2. Cross Asset, Market & ETF Arbitrage 
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Cross Arbitrage is referred to profit from price discrepancies among assets and markets. With 
current market fragmentation, an instrument is likely traded in more trading venues and each 
of them can have a specific price. Cross market arbitrageurs can generate profit by buying the 
asset in the venue where it is valued lower and simultaneously selling it on another venue where 
it is priced higher101. Likewise, arbitrageurs can profit from inefficiencies across assets: for 
instance, if an option is priced too high with respect to its underlying, they can sell the option 
and buy the underlying. In the same way, arbitrage is applicable to exchange trade funds by 
exploiting price discrepancies between ETF and its underlying. 
 
3.3.3. Directional Strategy 
Directional strategies generally involve establishing a long or short position in anticipation of 
an intra-day price movement of a particular direction, upward or downward102. 
Nevertheless, there may be a wide variety of short-term strategies that anticipate such a 
movement in prices, because typically the up or down of prices may occur for different trading 
reasons. 
Directional traders usually trade aggressively, by taking market liquidity, and aim at earning 
profits from short market movements/trends. 
Some directional strategies may be as straightforward as concluding that a stock price 
temporarily has moved away from its “fundamental value” and establishing a position in 
anticipation that the price will return to such value103 (sentiment oriented trading); conversely, 
other strategies may be parasitical, by anticipating other traders that will affect prices such as 
large traders (front-running trading). 
 
3.3.3.1. Momentum Trading 
Momentum Trading strategies look for sudden movements of trading prices in a specific 
direction; momentum trader can foresee the future pricing trend through a technical or news 
analysis. 
Momentum Trading on Technical identifies patterns which indicate that prices differ from their 
fundamental value; patterns come from quotes, prices and volumes.  
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Momentum Trading on News is the practice represented by the possibility to take advantage of 
the effect that news and macroeconomic data may exert on the behavior of financial instrument 
prices104. 
The fundamental requirement for performing such strategy is constituted by the need of 
disposing of informatic systems and algorithms, such as newsreader algorithms, able of 
analyzing thousands of data and, at the same time, able of taking the relevant trading operations. 
In fact, high frequency systems can associate to the incoming news and market data, specific 
short trading effects, such as the related trading impact on securities markets in terms of 
increasing or decreasing prices and volatility105; consequently, HFT momentum traders can 
adopt specific strategies, before the development of the directional movement, with profit 
purposes. 
This strategy relies more on short-term movements rather than fundamental values of stocks 
and hence, momentum trader attempts to assess the future micro-trend of a stock, starting from 
news and/or technical analysis, and depending on predicted price direction, it decides to take 
an advance long/short position in order to trade out as soon as the prices will go up/down. 
 
3.3.3.2. Liquidity Detection Strategy 
An important type of directional strategies is acting as “liquidity detector”.  
Liquidity detection strategy aims at flushing out order patterns that other market participants, 
as passive traders, leave in the market, specifically that ones, once launched, allow HFTs to 
make profit and/or to hedge their trades by being counterpart106. 
Liquidity detector traders act as price takers because they benefit from liquidity that other 
traders offer in the market. 
More specifically, liquidity detection refers to the activity where algorithmic traders analyze 
through specific mechanisms some key levels detected by algorithms in order to check the 
presence of particular types of orders in the trading books107. These orders are typically: stop 
orders (orders with a stop instruction to stop orders execution until price reaches a stop price 
specified by the trader) and large orders (orders considered too large to be executed all at once 
because inclined to affect the liquidity of the market). 
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Liquidity detectors are specialized in discovering slices of large orders which may be in the 
form of hidden orders (orders not fully displayed) and/or orders submitted by an algorithmic 
execution (such as first-generation algorithms). 
Stop orders, as stop loss orders or take profit orders, have a significant disadvantage represented 
from being easily predictable; for this reason, HFTs, through a technical analysis, can detect 
the presence and behavior of such orders and whereupon they can take their associated liquidity 
at low prices108.  
Liquidity detection systems are also called “algo-searchers” because their target is to test the 
presence of such orders, through the issuing of market orders, to trigger their execution and 
therefore by activating their liquidity on the market. 
HFT liquidity detectors can gather further orders information typically by “sniffing out” other 
algorithms, “pinging” in order books or dark pools109. 
For instance, a pinging strategy permits to discover the full sizes of undisclosed limit orders by 
submitting large marketable orders with fill-or-kill instructions attached that trade if the size is 
present, and if it is not, their orders are cancelled out110. 
 
3.3.3.2.1. Quote Matching  
A possible way to exploit the liquidity detection of large orders is by means of a “quote 
matching” practice described by Harris (2003).  
Quote matchers are front-runners who trade in front of large traders, that they have detected, to 
try to extract option values of their large orders111. 
If the detected large order is a limit buy order, quote matcher places its order on the same side 
with higher limit to position ahead on the limit order book112. 
Quote matching strategy permits to profit, if prices move upwards, by the full extent of the price 
changes; and otherwise if prices fall, quote matcher can hedge its opened position by being 
counterpart of the large limit order.  
Quote matchers profit at expenses of passive large traders: they take the liquidity that otherwise 
would have gone to the large traders. 
This strategy is parasitic trading because HFT quote matchers profit only when they can prey 
on other traders (large traders); they do not make prices more informative, and they do not make 
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markets more liquid and some applications of order anticipator strategies are considered 
illegals. 
 
3.3.3.2.2. Momentum Ignition 
One of the most sophisticated liquidity detection techniques is represented by the so called 
“momentum ignition”.  
Momentum ignition is a strategy in which a HFT firm initiates a series of orders and trades 
(along with perhaps spreading false rumors in the marketplace) aimed at causing a rapid price 
move either up or down113. 
Trader, who acts as momentum ignitor, places many orders very quickly (on the same side) to 
obtain a large position on a security by causing a sudden increase of volatility that may induce 
other traders into more aggressive trading and/or may trigger the execution of stop orders that 
emphasize the directional price movements114.  
By establishing an early position, HFT firm attempts to profit when it subsequently liquidates 
the position after it has spurred the evolution of price movement on the expected side115.  
Figure 6 shows an example of the implementation of HFT momentum ignition strategy occurred 
on 13th July, 2012 in Daimler share listed on XETRA (Deutsche Borse AG.). 
 
Figure 6: Momentum Ignition Example. Source: Credit Suisse AES Analysis. 
A momentum ignition strategy is composed by three phases: 
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1) a sudden spike in volume with no price move; 
2) a large price move with high volume; 
3) price reversion and low volume. 
In the first phase, momentum ignitor takes a large pre-position with no price change; this ignites 
other participants to trade aggressively in response, causing a price move and high volume; 
therefore, he trades out by obtaining a profit and finally, price returns to the pre-ignition value. 
The phase with high volume and large price move is mainly due to the trigger of stop orders (in 
the example stop loss order) that once triggered, they release all their intrinsic liquidity that 
accelerate the price trend; in fact, momentum ignitor, if detects the presence of such orders, can 
“gunning the market” in order to activate their executions, in particular by igniting other traders 
to trade more aggressively. 
Summarizing, momentum ignitor induces other traders to pursue a precise price direction in 
order to close its pre-position at a better price.   
Momentum ignition strategy is defined as a market manipulation strategy because causes prices 
to move towards a specific direction inducted by the ignitor and in particular, ignitions 
provoked by a very high number of orders with many subsequent cancellations, called 
“spoofing” strategies, are considered very harmful and illegal activities; hence, market 
regulators are employing a lot of anti-spoofing efforts aiming at limiting induced volatility but 
it is very difficult to prove that a trader is actually gunning the market116. 
 
3.3.4. Structural Strategy 
Structural strategies are activities exclusively carried out by HFT firms, which attempt to 
exploit structural vulnerabilities in the market or in certain market participants117. For example, 
by obtaining the fastest delivery of market data through co-location arrangements and 
individual trading center data feeds, HFT firms may profit by identifying market participants 
who are offering stale executions at stale prices118.  
Strategies in this category are the more controversial and more discussed HFT trading practices 
because typically are conducted to take advantage of less evolved traders and generally are not 
beneficial for market quality. 
Following, we describe the most widely used structural strategies: latency arbitrage and flash 
trading strategies. 
                                                 
116 Rena S. Miller, Gary Shorter (2016), High Frequency Trading: Overview of Recent Developments, 
Congressional Research Service, 6-7 
117 See note 71, 52-53 
118 Id 
49 
 
3.3.4.1. Latency Arbitrage 
Latency arbitrage is the activity where HFTs attempt to take advantage of small, even tiny, price 
differences for stocks between various trading venues resulting from an infinitesimal time 
differences in the trading prices that they report on the same securities119. 
Unlike statistical arbitrage, latency arbitrage is applicable solely if you have a system able to 
satisfy the low latency requirements. 
For this reason, latency arbitrage is a natural application for HFTs because requires an ultra-
advanced technology to exploit it; in fact, only a high frequency system, thanks to its speed 
advantage, can recognize an arbitrage opportunity in the same moment when occurs and, once 
identified, it succeeds to fully take advantage of the spread arbitrage before than other traders 
can even recognize it. 
The identification of latency arbitrage opportunities is purely based on very fast access to 
market allowed by direct data feeds and co-located infrastructures that minimize as much as 
possible the reaction times. Spread Networks is a typical example of infrastructure installed for 
low-latency arbitrage purposes, which permits HFTs to discover discrepancies in the prices 
between New York and Chicago before all other market participants. 
More properly, latency arbitrage exploits disparities in the price at which equivalent securities 
can be traded in different markets; such disparities can arise in different ways, most directly by 
the fragmentation of securities markets across multiple exchanges. US securities regulators 
have attempted to mitigate such fragmentation through the formulation of Regulation NMS, 
which mandates cross-market communication and the routing of orders for best execution at 
NBBO; order streams indicating the best buy and best sell available for all trading venues are 
constantly publicly reported by an entity called the Security Information Process (SIP)120.   
However, the speed advantage created by co-location, sophisticated technology and direct 
access to raw data feeds from trading platforms enable HFTs to construct their own trading 
order books before they are publicly available from the Security Information Processor (SIP) 
quote121. 
Figure 7 shows the latency differential between a HFT and the SIP system: given order 
information from exchanges, the SIP takes some finite time, say δ milliseconds, to compute and 
disseminate the NBBO; while a more computationally advanced trader, as a HFT, can process 
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the order stream in less than δ milliseconds and then, out-compute the SIP to derive the NBBO*, 
a projection of the future NBBO that will be seen by the public122. 
By anticipating future NBBO, a HFT system can apply cross-market arbitrage by jumping 
ahead of incoming orders to pocket a tiny but sure profit. 
 
Figure 7: Latency differential. Source: Wah, 2013. 
According to Arnuk and Saluzzi (2009), orders placed by institutional algorithms driven by 
volume weighted average price (VWAP) formulas are more subject to latency arbitrage because 
they adjust automatically if the spread shifts upwards or downwards. 
Here’s an example of how an HFT trading computer takes advantage of a typical institutional 
algo VWAP order to buy ABC stock123: 
1. The market for ABC is currently $25.53 bid / offered at $25.54. 
2. Due to Latency Arbitrage, an HFT computer knows that there is a buy order that in a 
moment will move the NBBO quote higher, to $25.54 bid /offered at $25.56. 
3. The HFT speeds ahead, scraping dark and visible pools, buying all available ABC shares 
at $25.54 and cheaper. 
4. The institutional algo gets nothing done at $25.54 (as there is no stock available at this 
price) and the market moves up to $25.54 bid / offered at $25.56 (as anticipated by the 
HFT). 
5. The HFT turns around and offers ABC at $25.55 or $25.56. 
6. Because it is following a volume driven formula, the VWAP algo is forced to buy 
available shares from the HFT at $25.55 or $25.56. 
7. The HFT makes $0.01-$0.02 per share at the expense of the institution. 
Therefore, HFT latency arbitrageurs, through their speed advantage, can take advantage of 
incoming orders that will move the NBBO and by front-running them, they will profit by being 
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counterpart; this trading is called predatory because impairs the prices at which other traders 
(e.g. buy side execution algorithms) are able to trade. 
 
3.3.4.2. Flash Trading 
Flash Trading is a very controversial practice that enables HFTs to have a right of first refusal, 
for specific types of orders, granted by some trading venues. 
Flash Trading comes from a loophole of the obligation of “Trade-Trough Rule” of NMS, stating 
that all orders must be executed at the best execution and whether not present in a specific 
trading venue, such orders must be routed to the trading platform with the current NBBO.  
Specifically, once an incoming market order cannot be executed against available liquidity at 
the marketplace where it is issued, it is flashed to its market participants before directly being 
routed away124. For the duration of the flash (usually few milliseconds) the order is displayed 
within the marketplace at the current NBBO and if a market participant executes against it, the 
order is not routed; since such orders are flashed for few milliseconds, HFTs are the only market 
participants able to accept them. 
Figure 8 shows a simple example of the functioning of a flash trading system: a client B sends 
to the market B a buy market order but it cannot be immediately executed because the 
marketplace B does not hold the NBBO, and before being routed it towards market A which 
instead holds the NBBO, it is flashed and executed at the NBBO with the flash trader. 
     
Figure 8: Flash Trading example. Source: Gomber, 2011. 
The consequences of the just reported flash trading transaction are positive for Client B that 
trades its market buy order at the NBBO, for Market B that closes out the trade without routing 
to Market A, and even for HFT firm that, in the case of acceptance of the flash order, implies 
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algorithms have identified a possible trading opportunities to exploit; however, on the other 
side, Client A sees its limit order that is not filled and Market A does not close a possible trade 
in its marketplace; therefore, flash trading limits the inter-market connections. 
Subsequently, flash trader, after trading against flash order, can take advantage of possible price 
arbitrage opportunities or other financial benefits, including fees and rebates for using different 
exchanges or ATSs (since flash trading can be applied with several trading venues). 
In this way, HFT firms by exploiting an information advantage, even for a fraction of a second, 
can obtain a substantial risk-free profit125. 
Hence, flash trading may be considered as an extreme case of latency arbitrage and furthermore, 
represents a constant source of other traders’ order information126. 
 
3.4. Considerations on High Frequency Trading Strategies 
Summarizing, HFT represents the usage of very sophisticated technologies, i.e. high frequency 
systems and algorithms, for applying a wide range of trading strategies and thus, it is not 
recognized in a single strategy. Traders leveraging HFT can employ the traditional trading 
strategies (such as market making strategy), likewise proprietary strategies allowed thanks the 
low-latency requirements (such as low-latency arbitrage strategy).  
Since HFT trading strategies are very heterogenous, the assessment of HFT phenomenon should 
be analyzed considering all possible strategies carried out by HFT firms. 
In fact, some trading strategies could likely be beneficial for the whole market system, while 
others may be considered structurally harmful and aggressive. This distinction is fundamentally 
important for regulators that should identify HFT implications and subsequently decide on 
approval, limitation or prohibition of a type of strategy.  
US and European regulators must take into consideration a lot of components for a fair 
judgement of HFT strategies because such decisions contribute to determine the market 
developments under many aspects such as market liquidity and efficiency of the price formation 
process. 
Therefore, it is important that any strategies that have a negative impact on market integrity and 
that enable for market abuse are thoroughly investigated; this is especially important if HFT as 
a technology eases the implementation of these strategies, makes them more profitable or 
creates an uneven and unfair playing field among market participants127. 
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4. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND MARKET QUALITY 
 
4.1. Introduction to Literature Review 
High frequency trading is attracting more and more attention not only because it is an important 
participant on the capital markets considering that almost all trading venues register as the 
majoritarian activity performed on their marketplace, with trades carried out by HFTs reaching 
the 50% of the total, but academic and expertise community is further interested in determining 
the implications and consequences of the usage of HFT techniques on trading market structure 
in particular after the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010 which has put the spotlight on some 
aggressive HFT practices.  
The attention on HFT practice is also manifested by the fact that it is relatively recent and there 
are no clear ideas on how HFT firms exactly operate, what strategies may employ in different 
scenarios and what impact they have on the overall market quality. The opaqueness of the 
knowledge exists because they use proprietary algorithms together with the high speed of 
execution for their trading and specifically, HFTs are reluctant to disclosure relevant 
information on how they carried out their trading activities. 
For these reasons, the most prominent questions regarding HFT can be summed up to: “Is high 
frequency trading beneficial or harmful to the financial system as a whole?”. Researchers have 
tried to answer to this question under different economic aspects, highlighting perspectives 
mainly focus on market quality parameters, such as bid-ask spread, transaction costs, liquidity, 
volatility, or price discovery; other researchers concentrate on profitability of HFT firms and 
their relationship with traditional traders; still others take attention on HFT behavior during a 
severe market disruption such as the Flash Crash128. These market characteristics significantly 
affect other market participants when making trading decisions129. 
Broadly, there is not a consolidated and homogenous judgment of HFT because it is a trading 
technique that may be employed in different ways with very heterogeneous trading strategies. 
In addition, the fact that HFTs trade in a continuously manner in a very high range of securities, 
such as equities, bonds, currencies, and derivative products, and in markets dislocated 
worldwide implies that the evaluation of the phenomenon is limited to the analyzed situation. 
The empirical evidence on the impact of HFT on markets is rather scarce and incomplete due 
both to a limited availability of appropriate datasets and to the empirical and theoretical 
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difficulties raised by the exercise; an analysis of the effect of HFT activity on markets faces 
two fundamental problems: 1) disentangling the impact of HFT from other factors is very 
complicated, with related endogeneity issue and 2) HFT is employed in many different 
strategies, each potentially having different impacts on the markets130. 
Especially concerning HFT strategies which are assessed as predatory trading practices 
inasmuch structurally prone to negatively affect the markets, the literature is extremely poor.  
Nevertheless, even activities that are generally considered beneficial for market quality (e.g. 
market-making improves liquidity and statistical arbitrage improves price efficiency) are 
questioned by opponents of HFT because of the way in which they are performed131. 
In fact, some studies report that HFT practice yields global positive effects on the market quality 
because it brings benefits in terms of liquidity, informational efficiency, and low volatility; 
others, instead, highlight the possibility of a deterioration of quality values specially, induced 
by the creation and/or exacerbation of highly turbulent trading session periods with related high 
probability of systemic risks132. HFT may pose, indeed, significant risks for market stability 
and integrity because the strategies adopted by algorithmic traders are more interrelated than 
those used by traditional ones133. Moreover, whether market conditions result unstable, HFT 
attitude can further exacerbate sudden movements in prices provoking disorder in transactions. 
Discordant evaluations on HFT phenomenon are also due to different models used for 
estimating HFT activity because HFT firms are not uniformly identified considering that there 
are several approaches, direct or indirect, for the HFT identification or there are theoretical 
models that consider HFT firms as informed traders and others as uninformed ones; hence, also 
the consequences of HFT activity could result contradictory.  
For these reasons, reporting several studies performed by diverse authors that consider different 
market quality aspects results necessary in order to have a larger evaluation of the phenomenon 
and not restricted to a specific assessment or context. 
 
4.2. Market Quality 
Market quality is a broad concept that generally is referred to the ability of a market of 
performing financial trades in a fair manner and efficiently, by ensuring to traders the best 
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possible execution. Understanding the effects of HFTs on market quality is important, as the 
latter will ultimately determine long-term investors’ welfare and the cost of capital for firms134. 
In this section, for market quality, we take into consideration dynamics such as, liquidity, price 
discovery and volatility because are the market parameters more considered by the academic 
literature and empirical studies. 
The role of literature is to evaluate the effects of HFT techniques and the behavior of HFT firms 
on market quality in order to try to discern the beneficial and/or harmful aspects. 
Normally, improvements/deteriorations in market quality are recognized by: 
• Increasing/decreasing of liquidity parameters; 
• Improvement/worsening of price discovery process; 
• Lowering/rising of volatility. 
 
4.2.1. Liquidity 
Liquidity refers to the ability for market participants to trade large size orders quickly, at a low 
cost, when they want135.  
Generally, a liquid market is a market with many bid and ask offers, low spreads and low 
volatility.  
Everyone likes liquidity: traders like liquidity because it allows them to implement their trading 
strategies cheaply; exchanges like liquidity because attracts traders to their markets; regulators 
like liquidity because liquid markets are often less volatile than illiquid ones136. 
Liquidity contains several dimensions inside including: immediacy, width (or market breadth), 
depth and resiliency. High order turnover velocity and volumes, narrow bid-ask spreads, low 
transaction fees and resilient prices are all measures which have traditionally been positively 
associated with liquid markets137. 
Figure 9 shows the dimensions of market liquidity and their properties in terms of price and 
quantities for submitted orders. Hence, the market breadth determines the cost of doing a trade 
including bid-ask difference and trading commissions, the depth specifies the order size at a 
determined price, while the resiliency illustrates the market reversibility in terms of price and 
quantity138.     
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Typically, there exists a trade-off among the various liquidity dimensions; for instance, whether 
a trader searches immediacy by sending a market order instruction, probably will incur in worst 
prices for a specific quantity, with respect to spend more time in trade execution with a limit 
order instruction139. 
 
Figure 9: Aspects of market liquidity. Source: Bervas, 2006. 
Nevertheless, liquidity constitutes a reliable indicator of market health status but all the 
dimensions must be overall considered because a sole dimension cannot evaluate the whole 
liquidity parameter; for example, the only value of trading volumes, referred to depth, is not a 
reliable indicator of liquidity because excessive volumes on the one side of limit order book 
may cause a widening of bid-ask spread; and on the other side, the only bid-ask spread is not a 
fair evaluation of liquidity because if the instruments traded are only one, the market cannot be 
certainly defined as liquid. 
Anyway, the most considered dimension of liquidity, generally, is the bid-ask spread that 
represents the difference between the prices quoted for an immediate sale (bid) and an 
immediate purchase (ask) for one security. 
Implications of high frequency trading on market liquidity has become subject to a high level 
of discussions for academics, experts, and regulators. 
Firstly, there is to bear in mind that HFT firms require trading in venues that are already enough 
liquid to be able to quickly enter and exit from trading positions in order to limit their exposure 
to market risk; but, will markets remain liquid with the entrance of HFT?140. 
Literature tried to provide a response to this question and in general, failed to find a significant 
negative correlation between HFT and market liquidity, at least in a global context. 
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Normally, HFT is commonly believed to supply significant liquidity in the marketplace through 
an increase of trading volume, and globally by a reduction of implicit and explicit transaction 
costs for investors; however, these effects may vary significantly depending on whether HFT 
firms engage primarily in passive activity (market-making contributes to liquidity provision) or 
aggressive activity (opportunistic strategies absorb liquidity) and, also considering that their 
behavior can suddenly change because of running market conditions.  
In addition, there exists a wide opinion that HFT has globally contributed to add liquidity in a 
high range of instruments, through different markets and at higher speed. 
However, some market participants question whether HFT firms provide liquidity to the market 
on a consistent basis, i.e. whether they continue to do so during turbulent conditions or whether 
they withdraw from the market, since HFTs not always rely on contractual market-making 
obligations, and further, whether certain predatory strategies have a corruptive impact on 
market liquidity that could lead to an unexpected systemic fragility, such as flash crashes141. 
 
4.2.2. Price Discovery 
Harris (2003)142 defines the price discovery process as the process of determining the price of 
a stock in the marketplace through the interactions of buyers and sellers which respectively seek 
the lowest available price and the highest available price; in this mechanism, the best buyers 
meet the best sellers and the market discovers the price of the negotiated security. 
An efficient market should fully reflect all available information into asset prices in order to 
convey the fair value into their traded securities.  
The incoming news and market information then, constantly, condition the dynamics of price 
formation, consequently, more informed traders or faster as the case of HFTs, can take 
advantage of such information and assist in improving price discovery by imposing adverse 
selection costs on uninformed or slow traders143. 
Historically, financial markets relied on intermediaries, such as traditional market makers, the 
privilege access to the market in order to facilitate the incorporation of information on prices 
by providing immediacy to outside investors144; however, the rise of automation has moved this 
role on the HFT firms’ hands that, unlike traditional human market makers, are not granted 
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privileged access to the market and are not obliged to follow the traditional obligations of 
market makers145. 
Furthermore, when investors traded stocks on the basis of information about firm fundamentals, 
in equilibrium, stock prices converged to their fundamental values; anyway, when most trades 
are based on statistical and often short-lived correlations in stock returns, and investors do not 
hold stocks for the investment purpose (HFTs typically do not carry any position overnight), 
the presence of efficient pricing becomes more questionable146.  
Literature defines the contribution of HFT on price discovery and price efficiency as 
ambiguous. 
On one side, an important role that is attributed to HFT firms is that they have contributed to 
price across different trading venues, a function that is particularly important in a fragmented 
market environment, through statistical arbitrage activity that facilitates the fair price 
circulation, if well estimated. 
On the other side, without the intervention of HFTs, probably the arbitrage opportunity would 
be equally exploited, although slightly less rapidly; it is not clear that a decline from, say, 30 
seconds to 5 milliseconds in price discovery process is extremely valuable for society147; while, 
the technological advantage of HFTs seems to discourage well-informed slow traders to operate 
on transparent trading venues preferring dark pools148.  
Besides, in situations where HFT firms employ directional strategies, for example, acting as 
momentum trader on news or even worse as momentum ignitor, their behavior might exacerbate 
a short-term price movement even though fair value of the security was not been affected by 
new information, resulting in a worsening of price formation. 
 
4.2.3. Volatility 
Volatility is the tendency of prices to unexpectedly change in short time intervals149. Mostly, 
prices change in response to new information about security values, because of aggressive 
behavior of market participants and due to liquidity imbalances between supply and demand 
sides. 
High volatility values are typically connected to instability, uncertainty, and turmoil of the 
markets and imply the possibility to trade with impaired prices. 
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Speculative traders may benefit from price volatility because represents opportunities to 
conduct trading arbitrages and other aggressive strategies when prices go to desired direction150. 
Regulators are extremely concerned about market volatility and particularly, in cases of extreme 
volatility where prices suddenly rise and fall dramatically from fundamental values in a matter 
of seconds.  
One of the more used topics by opponents of HFT concerns the assertion that this type of trading 
entails a negative effect for the volatility of the markets because who engages in HFT 
exacerbates the price fluctuations in uncontrolled way and helps to provoke the creation of flash 
crash deriving by volatility burst. 
Specifically, the causal link between HFT and volatility seems to act in two ways: on one hand 
HFT may be more profitable in context of high volatility and, on the other hand, HFTs massive 
participation may affect volatility and enhance large price variations151.  
The academic literature has put many forces in researching a correlation between market 
volatility and HFT techniques under different points of view; however, finding a correlation is 
not a simple issue because of reverse causality and HFTs probably act differently in normal 
times with respect to periods of turmoil. 
It follows that results provided by several studies are very discordant; contradictory findings 
are not surprising because HFT, by nature, is a trading technique that is prone to adapt and react 
to different situations in different ways and specifically, HFTs may perform, in some 
circumstances, activities that mitigate volatility, and in others, predatory strategies that may 
exacerbate price changes. 
 
4.3. Theoretical models on market quality 
Academic literature developed several theoretical models aiming at deriving some conclusions 
about HFT activity and behavior of HFTs in terms of market quality aspects, bearing in mind 
that usually different model assumptions imply different results, too. 
The first theoretical model that faces the impact of HFT on market quality can be found in 
Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010)152 where, with their “benchmark model”, simulate an electronic 
trading market populated by slow traders (humans) with the subsequent entrance of a HFT 
(machine). The HFT machine is considered as an uninformed trader, following the classical 
notion that a market maker does not possess any superior information and its distinction, with 
respect to traditional traders, is only constituted by the speed of execution and cancellation of 
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orders. The authors detect that the presence of HFT implies that prices are more concentrated 
around the mean (i.e. have lower volatility) and they find an improvement of forecastability of 
transaction prices. Furthermore, they register a rise of trading volume and a reduction in 
intertrade duration, i.e. the time span between two trades, in direct proportion to the share of 
humans that change the speed of their orders in the presence of the machine. 
Hoffman (2011)153 extends a theoretical trading model where investors, mainly due to growing 
presence of automation, differ greatly in speed with which they can react to the announcements 
of investment related news and adjust their positions accordingly. Such an advantage allows 
HFTs to access the best quotes available for the trade, while institutional investors cannot do 
so. Consequently, this leads to a lower expected profit for institutional investors and their 
overall expected utility is lower than if they were competing with investors of identical 
opportunities. Concerning market quality, Hoffman argues that even though the use of HFT 
algorithms could have some positive externalities, such as improved market liquidity, this 
comes at the cost to be paid by institutional investors. 
Foucault et al. (2011)154 construct a theoretical model showing that HFTs actually create 
informational asymmetries and increase adverse selection costs. The authors argue that by being 
computationally more efficient than other investors, HFTs exploit the advantage that enables 
them to constantly outperform slower market participants. As a result, HFTs secure higher gains 
to themselves and at the same time increase adverse selection costs. To avoid informational 
asymmetries, other investors have to either leave the market or invest in costly technologies 
similar to ones used by HFTs. It is also argued that in a rare and non-anticipated market event 
such as the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, programmed algorithms are slower in adjusting than 
human investors. Therefore, algorithms can potentially trigger further excessive price changes 
and harm the market.  
Cartea & Penalva (2011)155 implement a theoretical model assuming three types of traders: 
liquidity traders (LTs), professional traders (PTs), and high frequency traders (HFTs). Their 
findings support that HFT increases liquidity in markets and makes trades cheaper for other 
traders. On the other hand, activity of HFTs seems to increase volatility of stock prices and 
trading volume; however, this is not due to the higher amount of stock traded, but because of 
strategies adopted by HFTs.   
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4.4. Empirical studies on market quality 
The recent evolution of the usage of HFT in capital markets worldwide has induced the 
proliferation of a lot of empirical studies debating the phenomenon; however, empirical 
analyses present some issues and considerations that must be taken into account. 
Firstly, the potential ideal dataset for an exhaustive empirical analysis should contain 
information both from trade and order books at the millisecond level and additionally, an 
identifier of each trader, specifically pointing out the ones trading on high frequency basis. Such 
data would allow the researcher to observe each HFT’s strategy across stocks and over time, 
and then evaluate the impact of HFT on a market as whole156. 
Nevertheless, such massive amount of information is not always available and anyway, would 
require a huge computational analysis effort; therefore, empirical studies may be subject to 
assumptions and HFT proxies in order to perform the research.  
Consequently, the lack of an exact measure of HFT activity is one of the causes for the high 
heterogeneity in the results reached by the empirical economic literature. 
Finally, the empirical studies typically examine only a relatively small amount of HFT activity 
inasmuch the current literature does not reveal a great deal about the extent or effect of the HFT 
arbitrage and structural strategies because HFT datasets generally are limited to specific 
markets or products, they provide little opportunity to assess HFT strategies that simultaneously 
seek to capture price differentials across different products and markets157.  
 
4.4.1. HFT direct approach  
Empirical studies that employ the direct approach utilize proprietary datasets provided by 
trading venues which identify as HFTs those market participants whose primary business is the 
HFT carried out on proprietary basis. For instance, researches on US equity markets use data 
provided by Nasdaq to academics. These data report aggregated trades for 26 firms identified 
as HFTs by Nasdaq in 120 randomly selected stocks (divided into large, mid, and small 
capitalization) listed on Nasdaq and the NYSE (over the period 2008 and 2009, and one week 
of 2010). Nasdaq categorizes a firm as a HFT whether: it engages in proprietary trading only; 
it uses sophisticated trading tools and co-location services; its net position is often zero; its limit 
orders tend to be short-lived; and has lower trades per orders ratio. By construction, the Nasdaq 
                                                 
156 Bruno Biais & Thierry Foucault (2014), HFT and Market Quality, Bankers, Markets & Investors n° 128 
157 US Securities and Exchange Commission (2014), Equity Market Structure Literature Review. Part II: High 
Frequency Trading,  
62 
 
sample excludes HFT desks from broker-dealers such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, or 
Merrill Lynch158. 
For evidence purposes, however, HFT direct approach can present some significant 
shortcomings. First of all, it does not include trading activity carried out by HFT desks of 
investment banks that may underestimate the phenomenon; and another drawback entails that 
the use of aggregated data allows to categorize traders only as HFTs or non-HFTs, and for each 
trade, the data can identify whether the aggressive (liquidity taking) or the passive (liquidity 
providing) side of the trade was HFT or non-HFT, but cannot distinguish HFTs in different 
groups according to, for instance, the size of their inventories, or the frequency with which they 
post competitive quotes etc.; as a result, the inferences about the effects of HFTs’ trades or 
orders on market quality will depend on the predominant strategy in the sample159. 
One of the first empirical analyses, and more exhaustive, is provided by Brogaard (2010)160 
using the Nasdaq sample, where investigates the relationships between HFT activity and the 
impact it has on the main market quality characteristics such as liquidity, price efficiency and 
volatility, as well as, assesses other important implications of HFT behavior on market 
microstructure.  
Findings suggest that the overall HFT’s impact on the market, in general, has to be considered 
positive. Specifically, Brogaard finds that HFTs make up a large majority of all trades (77%), 
and they supply as much liquidity as they demand. They are an integral part of the price 
discovery process and price efficiency than do non-HFT activity. They tend to make more 
money in volatile days but they dampen intraday volatility. Furthermore, the author states that: 
HFTs’ strategies are more correlated with each other than are non-HFTs’, they tend to engage 
in a price-reversal (contrarian) strategy, i.e. they buy (sell) stocks whose prices have been 
declining (increasing) in the last 10 to 100 seconds, they result very profitable, and there is no 
evidence that HFTs withdraw from markets in bad times or that they engage in abnormal front-
running of large non-HFT trades (no quote matching strategies). 
With the same dataset, Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2013)161 focus on the implications 
in terms of pricing process. By applying a state space model, they decompose price movements 
into permanent and transitory components and relate changes in both to HFTs. The permanent 
component is interpreted as information, whereas the transitory component as pricing errors or 
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noise. The space model incorporates the interrelated concepts of price discovery (how 
information is impounded into prices) and price efficiency (the informativeness of prices). 
Results show that HFT aggressive trades (market orders) facilitate price efficiency by trading 
in the direction of permanent price changes and in the opposite direction of transitory pricing 
errors, both on average and on the highest volatile days. They further find that HFT aggressive 
trading imposes adverse selection costs on non-HFT passive traders, raising questions about 
whether the informational efficiency gains outweigh the direct and indirect adverse selection 
costs imposed on non-HFTs, given that HFTs predict price changes occurring only a few seconds 
in the future. Finally, authors find that passive HFT trades (limit orders) are adversely selected, 
as well as negatively associated with permanent price impact and positively associated with 
transitory price impact. 
Sarah Zhang (2013)162 studies the role of HFTs and non-HFTs in processing hard and soft 
information with related implications in price discovery, by using the already mentioned 
proprietary HFT dataset provided by Nasdaq. In the model, “hard” information is quantitative 
and refers to index prices, while “soft” information is qualitative and refers to textual news. 
Evidences show that HFTs dominate non-HFTs in processing hard information shocks and lead 
price discovery in the short run (within a period of 10 seconds); while non-HFTs analyze better 
soft information, and facilitate the incorporation into prices for a longer amount of time (up to 
two minutes).  
Other empirical studies utilize non-US markets proprietary datasets. Jarnecic & Snape (2010)163 
use trade and quote data from the London Stock Exchange on 2009 for their research. Like 
Nasdaq dataset, this set label all activity by participant type: high-frequency participants, 
traditional market makers, three types of institutional members (i.e. small, large and investment 
banks) and retail brokers. Authors detect that HFT activity varies widely across stocks and is 
more prevalent in large capitalized stocks with high on-market competition, high price volatility 
and strong off-exchange competition but less prevalent in stocks with high tick sizes and 
informed order flow. Concerning market quality results, authors indicate that HFT participants 
both contribute and demand liquidity in almost even proportions, and that their activity is more 
likely to dampen than increase volatility. 
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Bershova & Rakhlin (2012)164 examine data on aggregate HFT and long-term institutional 
investor trading volume that was routed through a single, large multiple-service broker with a 
significant presence in the Tokyo and London equity markets during the first two quarters of 
2010. The authors classify HFT clients as those that use the broker’s ultra-low latency 
infrastructure. The dataset did not permit volume to be classified as aggressive or passive. They 
show that the increase in short-term intraday volatility and in trading costs due to HFT is more 
than offset by the narrowing of bid-ask spreads. 
Caivano (2015)165 concentrates on the impact of HFT on stock price volatility over the period 
2011-2013 on Italian equity market. Author identifies HFTs according to two methods: the first 
one, based on public information on the trading strategies of market participants (pure HFTs), 
the second one includes also the main investment banks since they carry out some proprietary 
trading with HFT. Potential endogeneity is controlled through an instrumental variable 
approach (the introduction of a new trading HFT-friendly platform on 2012 known as 
millennium). Empirical findings demonstrate that an exogenous increase of HFT activity has 
caused a statistically and economically significant increase in price volatility on Borsa Italiana. 
A further part of literature has only access to proprietary datasets that identify the wider 
category of Algorithmic Trading; we report some empirical examples.   
Hendershott & Riordan (2011)166 analyze 30 DAX stocks on the Deutsche Borse in January 
2008; the DB provided order data on Algorithmic Trading. Authors find that AT consumes 
liquidity when it is cheap and provides liquidity when it is expensive. AT contributes more to 
the discovery of the efficient price than human trading. Authors state that these results 
demonstrate that AT closely monitor the market in terms of liquidity and information and react 
quickly to changes in market conditions. Furthermore, they do not find evidence of AT 
exacerbating volatility during periods of market turbulence.   
Chaboud et al. (2009)167 obtain AT data from EBS on the three most-traded currency pairs: 
euro-dollar, dollar-yen, and euro-yen from 2006 and 2007. Using a Vector Autoregressive 
approach, they estimate the contributions of algorithmic trades and human trades to the variance 
of returns over a 30 minutes horizon. Overall, they find evidence that the presence of more 
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algorithmic trading is associated with lower exchange rate volatility. On the contrary, human 
trades contribute more to price discovery than algorithmic trades. 
 
4.4.2. HFT indirect approach 
The studies based on the indirect identification of HFT activity estimate HFT firms according 
to their operational features, through the analysis of data on submitted orders and the speed at 
which these orders are submitted. The most of HFT proxies are based on: 1) intraday inventory 
management; 2) lifetime of orders; 3) message traffic; and 4) identification of strategies168.  
One drawback of this approach is that focusing on few features could bring to select only a 
subset of HFT strategies, resulting in a partial view of the phenomenon; and some proxies may 
also capture the activity of ATs operating at lower frequencies (like for instance brokers using 
algorithms to execute orders at low costs for their clients)169. 
Frank Zhang’s (2010)170 investigation represents the first study that indirectly examines the 
HFT role on capital markets, and in contrast to other studies like Brogaard (2010)171, which 
analyze intra-day effects of HFT on market quality, Zhang focuses on long-term effects because 
considered more important for investors. He uses a large sample of US firms during 1985-2009 
and classifies investors into three categories: institutional investors, individual investors, and 
high-frequency traders. Author, specifically, determines HFT as all short-term trading activities 
by hedge funds and other institutional traders following three assumptions: 1) no-HFT existed 
before 1994; 2) HFTs do not carry any position overnight; and 3) they have extremely short 
holding periods. He finds that HFT is positively correlated with stock price volatility after 
controlling for firm fundamental volatility and other exogenous factors. In more details, HFT 
is found to lead stock prices overreaction to news as it hinders the incorporation of information 
about fundamentals into asset prices. The detrimental effects on volatility are higher for large 
cap stocks and during market turbulences. Moreover, consistently with the hypothesis that 
HFTs mainly take advantage of large trades typically carried out by institutional investors, 
stocks with high institutional ownership seem to suffer more the negative impact of HFT. 
Kirilenko et al. (2011)172 provide an analysis of a particular market that was affected by an 
important disruption in terms of market quality performance, in order to figure out the possible 
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responsibilities associated to HFT. They use audit-trail data and examine the trades in the E-
Mini S&P 500 stock index futures market around the period of the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010. 
Specifically, authors concentrate on the period of extreme volatility occurred in the US financial 
markets that day, that is, a short period of 30 minutes during which stock market indices, stock 
index futures, and ETFs registered a decline of unanticipated magnitude (about 9%) and, shortly 
after, almost totally recovered.  
Through their analysis, Kirilenko et al. (2011) define HFTs as intermediaries who 1) 
individually participate in a very high number of transactions during the day; 2) have a low 
inventory at the end of the day; and 3) experience relatively low variations in their inventory 
positions. Findings suggest that HFTs did not trigger the Flash Crash, but their responses led to 
the creation of a “hot-potato” volume effect, as the same positions were passed rapidly back 
and forth among same HFTs, that exacerbated market volatility, removed the market liquidity, 
and accelerated the downside pressure.  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2010)173 investigate the low-latency trading activity and its impact on 
market quality measures. The dataset used contains order-level Nasdaq data during June 2007, 
a ‘nominal’ market period, and October 2008, a volatile and uncertain period. The high number 
of submissions, cancellations and executions determines the proxy used for low-latency trading 
activity; in addition, authors do not consider agency algorithmic traders as low-latency traders. 
The empirical findings suggest that low-latency activity improves market quality in both 
periods, more specifically, short-term volatility is observed to be lower and market liquidity 
improved, with decreasing quoted and effective spreads and increasing displayed depth in the 
limit order book.  
Hendershott et al. (2011)174 examine a sample of NYSE stocks and use the rate of electronic 
message traffic, which includes electronic order submissions, cancellations, and trade reports, 
as proxy for AT. The data used is from 2001 through 2005 during which in 2003, the NYSE 
became a fully automated stock exchange. The results suggest that, for large stocks in particular, 
AT narrows spreads by reducing adverse selection and increasing the amount of information in 
quotes as compared to trades. These indicate that AT does causally improve liquidity and 
enhances the informativeness of quotes and prices.  
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Hagströmer and Nordén (2013)175 use member-level data from NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm for 
30 stocks listed on this market in August 2011 (high volatility period) and February 2012 (low 
volatility period) and categorize HFTs as traders engaging in proprietary trading only and using 
algorithms in their trading strategies. More interestingly, they decompose HFTs in two 
subgroups according to strategies: market-makers, who provide liquidity to other participants, 
and opportunistic traders, who use more directional or arbitrage strategies. They find that 
market makers constitute the lion’s share of HFT trading volume (63‐ 72%) and limit order 
traffic (81‐ 86%) and that have higher order-to-trade ratios and lower latency than opportunistic 
HFTs. Using an event study based on changes in minimum tick size, authors find that market-
making activities are good for the overall market quality in the sense that they reduce short-
term volatility and provide liquidity consistently with their limit orders. Conversely, 
opportunistic HFTs supply significantly less liquidity, especially for stocks with low market 
capitalization, low trading volume, high volatility, and large spreads, but both statistical 
arbitrage and momentum strategies mitigate intraday price volatility. 
 
4.5. Summary of Academic Literature Review 
Academic literature contributed to develop many researches aiming at assessing the 
implications of HFT phenomenon in terms of market quality aspects, as liquidity, volatility, and 
price discovery. These studies spread either in form of theoretical models and empirical 
analyses. 
The theoretical contributions reach often contrasting results strictly depending on the basic 
assumptions used to develop the model, such as the degree of information attributed to HFT 
firms or the type of pre-determined intrinsic HFT strategies. 
Much more useful appear the empirical studies, that mostly, are designed as event studies that 
analyze structural breaks introduced either by a change to regulation or by a development of a 
HFT friendly technology, or focus on particular phenomena of market turbulence176.   
However, even empirical findings turn out very discordant mainly due to different 
identifications of HFT techniques and participants and different markets and periods taken into 
account in the analysis.  
We register a lack of literature for diverse HFT strategies, especially for structural and inter-
market ones, due to the difficulty to obtain relevant data and because of the tough issue of 
analyzing and processing high-frequency information. 
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For this reason, some empirical studies could only discern HFT activity among passive and 
aggressive, by registering that the former, overall, leads to more beneficial effects to liquidity 
parameters, while the latter is more likely to improve pricing discovery and efficiency. 
Summarizing, the majority of the reported studies carries a positive contribution of HFT on 
market quality but there are some important exceptions that constitute a strong opposition to 
HFT. 
More in detail, liquidity parameters, such as bid-ask spread, trading volume, and immediacy 
prove to be improved, except in situations of markets in turmoil where an excessive trading risk 
is likely to trigger HFT algorithms that automatically decide to stop providing liquidity or even 
take the remaining one. 
Pricing discovery, involving the incorporation of information into prices, is registered to be 
favored with the introduction of HFT technologies in the markets, although this process might 
result too fast and aggressive by leading to imposition of heavy adverse selection costs to slower 
traders that may decide to abandon the market. 
More conflicting are the volatility implications; empirical findings agree to maintain that intra-
day volatility is a fundamental requirement for HFT to trade because they can identify more 
profit opportunities when prices move more rapidly. The reverse correlation is less distinct 
inasmuch HFTs may both mitigate the pricing movements or exacerbate it, mainly depending 
on the predominant adopted strategy and on the current conditions of the markets because, for 
instance, in a flash crash context, the behavior of HFTs has been demonstrated to generate a 
“hot-potato” effect that led a volatility burst. Conversely, in other quieter situations, HFT 
empirically alleviated the volatility of prices. 
In conclusion, despite empirical evidence generally suggests that HFT tends to improve market 
quality, there have been many observations that prove some potential detrimental impacts of 
HFT on market quality, specifically, a number of aberrant stock market behaviors that occurred 
in the HFT era, such as extreme intraday price volatility, that would seem associated to the 
proliferation of such trading technique. 
Consequently, the next step is to debate about the potential distortive HFT effects on markets, 
specifically concerning market integrity, and possible systemic risks caused by HFT, by 
reporting the adopted or potential countermeasures to contrast them, in order to completely 
evaluate the phenomenon. 
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5. RISKS OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 
 
5.1. Introduction to Risks of High Frequency Trading 
An accurate examination of the role of HFT phenomenon in modern capital markets requires 
also a deep analysis about potential controversies, risks and new challenges posed by this new 
form of trading. Such discussion has raised increasing attention for market participants, market 
operators and especially for supervisory authorities that must strive to decide on potential new 
provisions which might become necessary if HFT demonstrates to represent a relevant risk for 
fairness, and market integrity. 
Critics and opponents relieved some concerns whether HFT plays a role in exacerbating market 
fragility; whether it may heighten the market’s systemic risk; whether it enhances or harms the 
quality of those markets; whether certain kinds of HFT strategies may constitute an illegal form 
of trading; whether HFT helps foster a system of two-tiered trading markets that benefits certain 
traders at the expense of others; and whether the presence of HFT has been to the detriment of 
non-HFT investors and investor confidence in the securities markets.177 
 
5.2. Two-Tiered Markets 
A challenge posed by HFT is the need to figure out whether HFT firms’ sophisticated speed 
technologies, essentially represented by low-latency infrastructures, result in an unfair 
advantage over other market participants, and the extent to which it is allowed that HFTs have 
information that others do not have. 
About that, in order to be faster than other traders, HFT firms often pay for the right to access 
two pieces of technology for market trading centers: 1) direct market access and 2) co-location, 
which permit to have, respectively, real-time market quote and trading data fractions of a second 
before the data reach other investors, and the possibility to minimize transmission times through 
the right to place their servers in the same data centers in which an exchange’s market data 
systems are located178. 
This has led to charges that HFTs are unfairly advantaged vis-à-vis other traders because an 
informational advantage of just a fraction of a microsecond can be enough to get a better price, 
even for a later-placed order179. 
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For some HFT opponents, such private low-latency advantage is believed unlawful, because on 
one hand, the market regulators forbid firms to release fundamental information to a subset of 
investors (insider trading) but, on other hand, they allow market centers to sell data feeds 
directly to certain subscribers, thus creating a tiered system of investors180. 
Proponents, however, say that securities markets have always been characterized by differential 
on tiered access to securities trades, going back to the time when floor traders had favored 
access to stock orders181. 
Market centers highlight that the benefits of direct feeds and co-locations are available to 
anyone willing to pay for the services.  
Others, however, argue that the cost-benefit trade-off for investing in these tools and 
capabilities is likely to be much more favorable for organized, strongly capitalized traders, 
given that the low latency benefits come from very large volumes of trades per day182. 
The competitive advantage becomes even more pronounced when trading venues allow HFT 
firms to engage in “flash trading” activity, inasmuch HFTs have the possibility to see resting 
orders inside limit order books before all other traders and hence, have a right of first refusal. 
Critics of the practice contend this creates a two-tiered market in which HFT firms can unfairly 
exploit other traders, through a legalized front running conduct183. 
Market centers offering such service (e.g. Direct Edge), defend their activities affirming that 
flash technology democratizes access to the non-displayed market and in this regard, removes 
different “tiers” in market access; additionally, any market subscribers can be a recipient of 
flashed orders184. 
Regulators never implemented the banning of flash trading, nonetheless, starting from 2011, 
many exchanges and alternative trading systems have stopped voluntarily to offer this 
disputable practice185.  
 
5.3. Phantom Liquidity 
It is globally considered and empirically tested that HFT offers substantial liquidity to the 
marketplace mainly through passive market making activity, which involves the submission of 
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non-marketable orders (i.e. limit resting orders) which offer the opportunity to trade at specified 
prices.  
However, some observers wonder whether market liquidity provided by HFT firms is 
qualitatively comparable to the liquidity provided by traditional market makers.  
A severe criticism about this issue is represented by the assertion that generally HFT liquidity 
lacks depth because of the relatively small size of quotes and the fact that they have no 
affirmative market-making obligations, i.e. are not obliged to offer liquidity in various 
circumstances, like specialist dealers do186.  
This implies that, in the financial jargon, the liquidity offered by HFT is dubbed as “phantom 
liquidity” or “flickering quotes”, due to its penchant for rapidly posting and then subsequently 
cancelling orders187. 
Consequently, the available liquidity for given securities may often be less than what may 
appear to be the case, in the sense that it could vanish very quickly from limit order trading 
books during periods of high market stress188.  
After all, even in quiet market scenarios, limit order books can quickly empty and prices can 
crash simply due to the speed and numbers of orders flowing into the market and due to the 
HFT ability to instantly cancel submitted quotes189.  
This has generated a negative impact of the market information quality, since the true level of 
market liquidity is different from its perceived level, inasmuch liquidity could disappear at any 
moment, forcing other traders to accept worst prices and not those they made into account190.  
Concerning the massive number of quote cancellations performed by HFT firms, observers 
allege that there may be legitimate reasons for cancelling orders to adjust them to new market 
conditions (such as in certain HFT arbitrage strategies where the liquidity previously shown 
completely disappears as soon as the relevant orders from the arbitrage trade are executed on 
one of the platforms), but entering orders without any actual intention to execute or have them 
executed is prohibited. If there is not such intention, this means HFT party in question is giving 
an incorrect or misleading signal for supply of, or demand for, the specific financial 
instrument191. 
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Figure 10 shows how is strongly increased the ratio between cancelled orders and actually 
executed orders in recent years on Nasdaq quotations. The trend of such ratio passed from under 
10 at the beginning of 2002 to over 30 by the end of 2009192. 
 
Figure 10: Cancellation/Execution Ratio. Source: NASDAQ ITCH data. 
The boundless use of cancelled orders is reportedly associated with manipulative strategies or, 
aimed at providing a deceptive framework of the current market conditions in order to capture 
more profitable trading opportunities. 
 
5.4. Market Manipulation 
Market integrity could be undermined by acts of manipulation or attempts thereof, fraud, 
disruptive trading, unlawful trade practices, such as pre-arranged trading and wash trading. 
Such risks are not new to financial markets, but automated trading can provide traders with new 
tools to engage in such unlawful conducts, for many reasons, including creating false 
impressions of market depth, trading volume, and prices193. 
In fact, HFT firms may adopt several manipulative strategies that involve the massive and 
abusive use of quote cancellations, and hidden orders.   
Booming manipulative practices include aggressive versions of momentum ignition strategies, 
where a HFT participant attempts to induce others to trade artificially high or low prices. 
Examples of this activity consist of “spoofing”, “layering”, and “smoking” strategies194.   
Spoofing consists in the trading practice where the spoofer, whose real intent is to sell (or buy) 
a stock, places a limit order to buy (or sell) that are above (below) the best bidding (asking) 
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price, which are not meant to be executed, but the only intention is to scare other traders into 
buying (selling) at a high (low) price, in order to profit from the bargain prices195.  
 
Figure 11: Illustration of Spoofing. Source: The Wall Street Journal. 
Layering is a form of spoofing in which a trader on one side of the order book inserts multiple 
hidden orders, while on other side places a large quantity of displayed orders with different 
price limits. This is designed to create the impression of increasing pressure on other side of the 
order book. Consequently, HFT can exploit the higher speed to cancel the displayed orders 
before execution and then, execute the hidden orders at advantageous prices196.   
Smoking strategy involves the placement of particularly alluring quotes, attracting slow market 
orders, but rapidly revised on to less generous terms, even before slow counterparties in the 
transaction can be aware of the changing scenario197. 
Concerns are related, also, for the potential implementation of illegal forms of quote matching 
strategies, which is, an order anticipation strategy directed at extrapolating liquidity by trading 
ahead of large traders. An unlawful practice is the front running activity which means profiting 
by placing one’s own orders ahead of a large order based on knowledge of that impeding order. 
However, the line between the quote matching applied by HFTs and illegal front-running can 
be very nuanced; for example, it is prohibited the trading when in possession of material non-
public information about a large trader inclined to trade shortly afterwards, but it is allowed the 
employment of sophisticated pattern recognition software to ascertain from publicly available 
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information the existence of a large trader, or the sophisticated use of orders to “ping” different 
market centers in an attempt to locate and trade in front of large buyers and sellers198.  
Furthermore, HFTs might perform other types of manipulative conducts, which are designed to 
impede other market participants to trade in a proper way; a widespread form of this conduct is 
called quote stuffing.  
Quote stuffing is the activity of quickly entering and then withdrawing large quantities of 
unwieldy orders in the aim of overloading and generating congestion for other market 
participants’ systems and therefore, impairing market access for slow traders. This gives free 
rein to fast traders to execute profitable trades at the expense of the rest of traders199. 
The figure 12 shows two situations of quote stuffing which occurred respectively on 2nd May, 
2012 on Heineken shares traded on Euronext (left-hand graph), and on 10th August, 2012 on 
Telefonica quotations traded on the Bolsa de Madrid (right-hand graph)200. Both examples are 
characterized by thousands of order submissions and subsequent cancellations on the ask 
market side201.  
 
Figure 12: Quote Stuffing situation. Source: Credit Suisse AES Analysis. 
 
5.5. Operational Risk 
Operational risk is of especial concern with automated trading given the strong use of high 
execution speed and the management of huge amount of trading data. Operational risks range 
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from malfunctioning and incorrectly deployed algorithms to algorithms reacting to inaccurate 
or unexpected data202.  
The heavy reliance on algorithms for trading decisions and execution may pose serious risk 
when one or more algorithms behave in an unexpected way. There is the risk that rogue 
algorithms, i.e. algorithms that malfunction and operate in an unintended way, may trigger a 
chain reaction and withdraw liquidity from the market or impair orderly trading203. 
Such risk is magnified by the dazzling speed at which most algorithmic HFT takes place that 
may lead one errant or faulty algorithm not only to rack up millions in losses for the executor 
in a very short period, but even more concerning, may generate irregular securities price 
movement, through submission of a series of wrong order instructions204.  
An example of the crushing effect that may generate a malfunctioning of HFT systems has been 
demonstrated on August 1, 2012, where an American global financial services firm, Knight 
Capital Group, deployed untested trading software which sent numerous erroneous orders in 
NYSE-listed securities into the market, by causing a major disruption in the prices of 148 
companies listed, thus, for example, shares of Wizzard Software Corporation went from $3.50 
to $14.76, in approximately 45 minutes of errant trade executions via a “rogue” algorithm, 
while KCP  registered a loss of $440 million205.  
It is therefore in the first place in interests of HFTs that the odds for this type of error are kept 
as low as possible; however, the quality of monitoring potential wrong order instructions is 
undermined by the need to operate with exceptional speed; in fact, by using “naked” sponsored 
access, HFTs have available the lowest latency timing, but at the expense of efficient pre-trade 
checks206. 
Therefore, to limit the exposure to erroneous trades and rogue algorithms, it is important that 
trading venues and intermediaries have systems and controls appropriate to a high frequency 
environment and that appropriate trading control mechanisms are in place to prevent excessive 
market movements when errors occur207. 
 
5.6. Systemic Risk 
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The use of HFT and, more generally, of AT may be more prone to trigger or exacerbate market 
systemic risks given that some strategies conducted by algorithms result much more correlated 
than those used by non-automated traders. A potential concern here is that because of this 
correlation, shocks that hit a small number of very active HFTs could detrimentally affect the 
entire market, until to touch also other trading venues since the intense cross-market activity of 
such traders208. Another criticism is that HFT firms are often very lightly capitalized, a factor 
that could generate failures, and handling the corresponding counterparty risk could be 
challenging, because HFTs tend to turn over their positions many times a day by interacting 
with various traders, while securities trade clearing systems tend to operate at a much slower 
rate. Combined these elements could generate systemic market disruptions209. 
Fueling this thesis, Jain et al. (2016)210 provide evidences that the introduction of a high-speed 
trading platform, nicknamed Arrowhead, launched in January 2010 in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (which reduced the TSE’s latency from six seconds to two milliseconds), led to a 
significantly increase of shock propagation risk by rising both autocorrelation and cross-
correlation in the order flow. Specifically, quote-stuffing risk as measured by the quotes-to-
trade ratio doubled; systemic risk of events such as flash crashes, also, increased with respect 
to the pre-high frequency scenario. The systemic risks associated with high frequency trading 
result from aggressive liquidity demanding behavior, whereas the systemic risks of high 
frequency quoting emanate from cancellation or absence of quotes from liquidity suppliers. 
In addition, authors notice, that in accordance with related empirical studies, the new platform 
improved liquidity parameters, such as spread, depth and the cost of immediacy.  
 
5.7. Flash Crashes 
The most frequent criticism and even fiercest about the potential risks derived by HFT activity, 
alleges that HFT is apt to play a leading role in situations of extreme market fluctuations, in the 
financial jargon dubbed as “Flash Crashes”.  
Due to these assertions, HFT gained prominence in the media after May 6th, 2010, the day of 
the occurrence of the Flash Crash, and is increasingly intensified with observations of ongoing 
mini-flash crashes that frequently have affected the securities and futures markets. 
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5.7.1. The Flash Crash of May 6, 2010 
On May 6, 2010, the prices of many US-based equity products and major equity indices in both 
the futures and securities markets (particularly the Dow Jones Industrial Average, DJIA), which 
were already down of 4% relative to the previous day close, dropped again a further 5-6% in a 
couple of minutes before recovering to their previous values211. 
Many of the almost 8,000 individual equity securities and ETFs traded that day suffered 
declines in price ranging from 5% to 15% before rebounding and recovering most, if not all, of 
their losses in a short period of time212.  
Over 20,000 trades across more than 300 securities were executed at prices more than 60% 
away from their values a few minutes before; these trades were executed at extreme prices, 
some for pennies and others for 100,000$ or even more, before bouncing back to their original 
levels213. 
Finally, the turbulent trading day ended with the futures and securities markets suffering a loss 
of only 3% from their prior day close214. 
The nearly 1,000-point DJIA’s plunge was historical, representing the largest intra-day decline 
in its history. The whole event had been dubbed the “The Flash Crash”, given the sudden and 
striking fall in prices215. 
Afterwards the event, many questions are arisen, mainly focused on the role of HFT and the 
behavior of HFT firms during this outstanding occurrence. 
On September 30, 2010, the SEC and the CFTC issued a joint report on the market events of 
May 6, 2010, which clarified the chain of events that led up to the Flash Crash. The report 
described the trigger, the traders’ behavior, and the market framework during the disruptive 
event. 
The report detailed how an undisclosed large institutional trader executed a single trade, which 
consisted of a large sell order worth about $4 billion through an automated execution algorithm 
(but not through HFT) at a time when the markets were already extremely stressed216. The order 
of E-Mini S&P 500 (a stock market index futures contract traded on Globex, the CME’s 
electronic platform) contracts initially exhausted available buyers, including HFTs, who began 
to aggressively sell them. The report, which largely focused on market structure and liquidity 
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concerns, did not place blame on HFT for the crash217. Rather it raised questions about the 
ability of HFT to provide continuous market liquidity. The report also observed that HFTs “in 
the equity markets, who normally both provide and take liquidity as part of their strategies, 
traded proportionally more as volume increased, and overall were net sellers in the rapidly 
declining broad market along with most other participants”218.  
 
Figure 13: Equity Indices and Equity Index Futures, May 6, 2010. Source: Preliminary Findings of May 6, 2010. 
 
Reconstruction of the facts 
The SEC-CFTC report divided the Flash Crash event of May 6 into 5 phases. 
During the first phase, from the open through about 2:32 pm, prices were broadly declining 
across markets. This was due to the disturbing news regarding the European debt crisis; 
specifically, you noticed a rise of the premiums for buying protection against default (Credit 
Default Swaps) by the Greek government on their sovereign debt. Furthermore, around 1 pm 
EST, the Euro started a sharp decline against both the U.S. Dollar and Japanese Yen219.  
This negative market sentiment was already affecting an increase in the price volatility of some 
individual securities by reaching levels above the common ones, and by 2:30, selling pressure 
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had pushed DJIA down about 2.5% and buy-side liquidity in the E-Mini had fallen by over 
50%, and in the S&P 500 SPDR Exchange Trade Fund (SPY) by 20%220. 
In the second phase, from 2:32 through 2:41, the broad markets began to lose another 1-2% 
triggered by a large fundamental seller who initiated a program to sell a total of 75,000 E-Mini 
contracts via an automated execution algorithm based on the trading volume (9% execution rate 
over the previous minute) without taking into consideration neither price nor time221. 
The algorithm was executed extremely rapidly, in just 20 minutes, because of high trading 
volume that affected markets222. 
Three types of buyer absorbed this large sell pressure: HFT firms and intermediaries in the 
futures markets, fundamental buyers in the same markets and cross-market arbitrageurs who, 
by purchasing the E-Mini future contracts and selling SPY or individual equities in the S&P 
500, transferred this sell pressure to the equities markets223. 
Therefore, HFTs were the buyers of the initial batch of orders submitted by the sell algorithm 
and then, they built up temporary long positions of about 3,300 contracts but only temporarily 
because as well known, HFTs don't take sizable inventory positions in one direction in their 
common strategies224. 
During the third phase, between 2:41 and 2:45.28, volume spiked upwards and the broad 
markets plummeted a further 5-6% to reach intra-day lows of 9-10%225. 
In these few minutes, HFTs started to aggressively sell E-Mini contracts to reduce their 
temporary net long positions, by competing for taking liquidity with the large fundamental 
seller, who responded to the sudden increased volume by increasing the rate at which it was 
feeding the orders into the market226. 
Remarkably, from 2:45.13 and 2:45.27, HFTs traded over 27,000 contracts generating a “hot-
potato” effect due to repeated buying and selling among them but by net buying only 200 
contracts. As a result, buy-side market depth in the E-Mini, already very low, fell to less than 
1% of its morning level depth and the price of E-Mini plummeted by 1.7% in just 15 seconds227. 
                                                 
220 Report of the Staffs of The CFTC and SEC to the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues 
(September 30, 2010), Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010, 1-2 
221 Id, 2 
222 Id, 2 
223 Id, 3 
224 Id, 3 
225 Id, 9 
226 Id, 3 
227 Id, 3-4 
80 
 
In the fourth phase, from 2:45.28 to 3:00, broad market indices started to recover while at the 
same time many individual securities and ETFs underwent extreme price fluctuations and 
traded at prices as low as one penny or as high as 100,000$228.  
At 2:45.28, trading on the E-Mini was paused for 5 seconds by a circuit breaker called the CME 
Stop Logic Functionality in order to prevent a cascade of further price declines. During the halt 
trading, sell-side pressure was partly alleviated and thus, buy-side interest increased229.  
At 2:45.33, trading resumed and the E-mini as well as the SPY started to recover, while the sell 
algorithm program continued to execute until 2:51 p.m. as the prices were rapidly increasing230. 
Nevertheless, a second liquidity crisis took place in the equities markets caused by the break of 
automated trading systems used by market makers and other liquidity providers in reaction to 
the sudden price declines. These built-in pauses are designed to prevent automated systems 
from trading when prices move beyond pre-defined thresholds. In response to this situation, 
some of these traders widened their quote spreads, others reduced offered liquidity, and a 
significant number withdrew completely from the markets231. 
Between 2:40 and 3:00, as liquidity completely evaporated in a number of individual stocks, 
participants issuing market orders found not immediately available liquidity resulting in trades 
being executed at irrational prices as low as one penny or as high as $100,000. These trades 
occurred as a result of so-called “stub quotes”, which are generated by market makers at levels 
far away from the current market in order to fulfill continuous two-sided quoting obligations232. 
In the fifth and last phase, starting at 3:00, prices of most individual securities significantly 
recovered and trading resumed in a more orderly fashion233. Indeed, by 3:08, accelerating 
demand from both opportunistic and fundamental buyers lifted the E-Mini prices back to nearly 
their pre-drop level234.  
 
The role of High Frequency Traders  
The analysts of SEC and CFTC tried to study the role of the 12 major HFT firms that traded in 
the equities on May 6, 2010, in order to figure out their degree of participation during the Flash 
Crash. 
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Based on analysis of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) data, HFT activities 
increased significantly from 2:43 to 2:46, during the period in which the broad indices were 
rapidly declining, while in the other minutes from 2:00 to 3:00, they traded in lower scale235. 
Six of the twelve HFTs scaled back their trading when the broad indices hit their lows at about 
2:46 pm. Specifically, two HFTs largely stopped trading at 2:47 and remained inactive through 
the rest of the day; four other HFTs appear to have each significantly curtailed trading for a 
short period of time from as little as one minute (from 2:46 to 2:47) to as long as 21 minutes 
(from 2:57 to 3:18)236. 
Globally, HFT firms were primarily sellers on May 6; a portion of this selling of securities 
could be attributable to cross-market strategies in which they contemporaneously buying a 
future product and selling ETFs or stocks; in addition, HFTs may have engaged in cross-product 
strategies of buying ETFs and selling stocks237. 
HFT firms sold more aggressively during the rapid price decline in the period ending 2:45, 
removing significant buy liquidity from the public quoting markets238. 
 
Lessons learned after the Flash Crash 
One key lesson learned by means of the Flash Crash is that under stressed market conditions, 
the automated execution of a large sell order can trigger extreme price movements, especially 
if the automated execution algorithm does not take prices and time into account. Moreover, the 
interaction between automated execution programs and HFT strategies can quickly erode 
liquidity and result in disorderly markets. As the events of May 6 demonstrate, especially in 
times of significant volatility, high trading volume is not necessarily a reliable indicator of 
market liquidity239. 
In addition, the nature of cross-market trading activity between derivatives and securities 
markets performed by HFTs may contribute to a propagation of a crash and thus, to systemic 
risks240. 
Another important lesson is that many market participants employ their own versions of a 
trading pause based on different combinations of market signals; in fact, a market liquidity 
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crisis can develop if many market participants withdraw at the same time resulting in trades that 
could be executed at stub prices241. 
As experienced by the CME’s Stop Logic Functionality that triggered a halt in E-Mini trading, 
pausing a market can be an effective way of providing time for market participants to reassess 
their strategies, for algorithms to reset their parameters, and for an orderly market to be re-
established242. 
 
5.7.2. Mini-Flash Crashes 
In the aftermath of the Flash Crash event, several observers, including officials of the CFTC 
and SEC, noticed that so-called mini-crashes, which are significant and precipitous drops in the 
prices of individual securities but which do not reach the level of the 2010 Flash Crash, appear 
to be fairly common and ongoing feature of the current capital market. 
Mini Flash Crashes are abrupt and severe price changes involving equities, bonds, foreign 
exchanges, and derivatives that occur in an extremely short period, typically in milliseconds, 
with a subsequent rapid recovery.  
The discovery of Mini Flash Crashes and related public attention was made possible thanks to 
the researches of Nanex Llc., a firm employed in the high-frequency trading analysis, that 
performed a thorough study of the US stock markets in the aftermath of the May 6th Flash Crash, 
ascribing chiefly these crashes to HFT activity.  
Nanex has provided, also, a meticulous definition for a Mini Flash Crash attributing the 
following conditions: 
(i) It must tick down (up) at least 10 times before ticking down (up); 
(ii) Price changes must occur within 1.5 seconds; 
(iii) Price change has to exceed 0.8%243. 
Such mini-crashes may occur both in the upside and downside, even though the down-crashes 
are much more concerning for public attention; generally, down-crashes are labeled as “flash 
crashes”, while up-crashes are dubbed as “flash dashes”244. 
Mini Flash Crashes have occurred in the history very frequently with the introduction of 
automation in the financial markets. Herein, we report some remarkable episodes. 
                                                 
241 Id, 6-8 
242 Id, 6-8 
243 Anton Golub, John Keane, and Ser-Huang Poon (2012), High Frequency Trading and Mini Flash Crashes, 
SSRN, 5-6 
244 Id 
83 
 
The 23th of April 2013, DJIA registered a 143 point fall (about 1%) in few minutes following 
a false tweet posted by hackers on Associated Press twitter, about a white-house bombing that 
left Barack Obama injured, shown in the figure 14245. 
 
Figure 14: AP's False tweet. 
This dramatic news led automated algorithms’ HFT to immediately withdraw buy limit orders 
and to submit marketable sell orders to forerun the bearish trend. Thus, the Dow Jones 
plummeted and as soon as the information was denied, HFTs closed their short positions and 
the market recovered within a few minutes246. 
 
Figure 15: AP Tweet Flash Crash on April 23, 2013. Source: FactSet, MarketWatch. 
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Flash Crashes have affected many of the most capitalized stock equities in the world during the 
recent years; notorious examples are Google on 22nd April 2013247, which dropped more than 
3% in about ¾ of a second before reversing course a second later and Apple on 1st December 
2014248, where stock lost over 3% in one minute, falling as much as 6.4 percent in the following 
minutes before recovering quickly. Both flash crashes were characterized by spike volumes and 
thinning liquidity during the price downfall where it would seem HFTs have played a 
determining role. 
They hit also US government bonds, which are normally seen as safe and stable investments; 
on October 15, 2014249, US Treasuries and related markets experienced one of their largest 
intraday changes in yields in the past 25 years. Yields on 10-year bonds fell by 37 basis points 
before rebounding quickly. 
Gold price experienced a flash crash and a flash dash in the same day on 13th September 2012250, 
trading was so furious that CME circuit breakers triggered and halted the futures contract twice.  
Gold underwent additional mini flash-crashes afterwards; on 6th July 2014251 for instance, it 
collapsed by 4% in just under 100 milliseconds and a year and half later, the CME decided to 
fine a HFT firm for having caused, in that situation, a mass entry of order messages which 
resulted in “a disruptive and rapid price movement”. 
For regulators and academic researchers, the main attention of a Mini Flash Crash episode is 
constituted by the possible causes that have triggered out its occurrence and the consequent 
actions taken by market participants during the falling down in prices and the successive 
recovery, in order to adopt suitable measures to restrain their appearances and to reveal potential 
unlawful and manipulative behaviors carried out by traders. 
Concerning the causes, there is not a univocal explanation about the ignition of a Mini Flash 
Crash inasmuch a fast dropping in price may be due of several conjunctions.  
Golub et al (2012)252 find that they are the result of regulation framework and market 
fragmentation, in particular due to the aggressive use of Intermarket Sweep Orders (ISO)253 and 
Regulation NMS protecting only top of the book; they find strong evidence that mini-flash 
crashes have an adverse impact on market liquidity and are associated with fleeting liquidity. 
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In practice this manifest as a burst of trades from one exchange, as remaining orders rips through 
the book due to the lack of depth of the book protection. 
Johnson et al (2012)254 suggest that such crashes are likely be a result of interaction between 
several trading algorithms, or a positive feedback loop induced by market environment, and are 
not simply the product of some pathological regulatory rule for crashes. 
Some critical observers, such as Nanex firm, have suggested that a contributing factor behind 
some of these mini-crashes is HFT.  
Indeed, HFTs appear to play a relevant role in these mini-flash crashes as happened in 2010 
Flash Crash. First, they may all react at the same time to market signals by placing buy or sell 
market orders that might consume most of current liquidity, by triggering sharp price 
movements as stop limit orders get hit by market orders from HFTs. Second, their ability to 
rapidly leave the market and cancel pending orders as soon as market conditions are extremely 
turbulent, it facilitates the possibility of a sudden market destabilization. 
SEC officials have responded that those who “try to use instances of mini-flash crashes as clear 
and incontrovertible evidence of the problems with high-frequency trading, high-speed 
markets, fragility, and impending doom…may be looking in the wrong places”. Instead, the 
officials attributed such developments to various kinds of human errors, including inadequate 
risk management practices in which there has been a “lack of checks and balances”255. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
254 Neil Johnson, Guannan Zhao, Eric Hunsader, Jim Meng, Amith Ravindar, Spencer Carran, and Brian Tivnan 
(2012), Financial Black Swans Driven by Ultrafast Machine Ecology, SSRN 
255 Gary Shorter, Rena S. Miller (2014), High-Frequency Trading: Background, Concerns, and Regulatory  
Developments, Congressional Research Service, 30 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
6. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING REGULATION 
 
6.1. Regulatory Activity and Discussion  
Regrettable recent market events such as flash crashes, manipulative conducts and cases of 
runaway algorithms have elicited regulators to meditate on and to take special notice of HFT. 
Policymakers started to develop a number of initiatives, consultations and proposals aimed at 
more strictly regulating HFT. Such task is mainly entrusted to regulatory authorities directed at 
supervising capital markets in the equities and futures context. 
In the US, the SEC is the authority with the assignment to oversee HFT for securities markets 
and the more limited securities-related derivatives; while, the CFTC supervises trading on 
futures exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and International 
Exchange (ICE)256. Moreover, since capital markets are particularly fragmented and inter-
connected, regulatory initiatives are often characterized by the coordination and joint activity 
among regulators of both equity and equity derivative markets. 
In Europe, HFT regulation is part of Directive MiFID II257 adopted on 2014 by EU Parliament 
with the support of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which, however, 
needs to be implemented by the individual EU members within 2018 in order to be conform to 
the different member states’ regulatory framework. 
  
6.2. HFT Regulation in the US 
In the aftermath of Flash Crash event, SEC and CFTC commenced adopting a number of HFT-
related programmatic regulatory initiatives intended to provide for investor protection and to 
maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets in a high-frequency framework. The developments 
also help better monitor HFT activity to stem potential disruptive impact on the US trading 
system. 
 
Co-location 
In June 2010, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proposed a rule which was 
intended to assure equal and fair access to co-location/proximity hosting services. The CFTC 
argues that these services offer a significant competitive advantage for high frequency traders 
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and therefore have to be equitably accessible. To ensure fair and open access for all traders, the 
regulator proposed that marketplaces and third parties listing significant price discovery 
contracts (SPDCs)258 should implement uniform fees for co-location and associated services 
and that their cost is not used as a means to deny access to some market participants by pricing 
them out of the market. Furthermore, the CFTC wanted to increase the latency transparency 
and therefore proposed to make available to the public information about the longest, shortest, 
and average latencies. Lastly, the regulator’s intention was to secure that sufficient co-location 
space was available and to ensure that shortages in co-location space could not impair fair 
access259. 
 
Stub Quotes  
A Stub Quote is an offer to buy or sell a stock at price so far away from the prevailing market 
that it is not intended to be executed, as an order to buy at a penny or an offer to sell at $100,000. 
During the Flash Crash, market makers used stub quotes to nominally comply with their 
obligations to maintain a two-sided quotation; however, the sudden loss of liquidity due to 
traders withdrawing, led to their executions at that time.  
Following the Flash Crash episode, the SEC has imposed a ban on placing stub quotes, by 
preventing that trades are executed at irrational prices and reducing the need that quotations be 
then broken if the markets become particularly volatile260. 
The new adopted rules require market makers in exchange-listed equities to maintain 
continuous two-sided quotations during regular market hours that are within a certain 
percentage band of the NBBO261. 
 
Circuit Breakers 
Circuit breakers (or impediments to trade) are a tool designed to reduce the risk of a cascading 
price collapse by temporarily halting trading in presence of excessive price volatility.  
They were introduced for the first time following the “Black Monday” market crash of October 
19, 1987.  
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However, before the 2010 Flash Crash, they were exclusively conceived on market-wide basis 
and triggered only by very large price movements, i.e. they halted trading in all exchange-listed 
securities throughout the US markets in the case of serious market decline percentage thresholds 
in reference to DJIA benchmark. 
In order to prevent mini-flash crashes and to deal with periodic illiquidity in markets, the SEC 
and CFTC, therefore, updated the preceding market-wide circuit breakers and introduced a limit 
up-limit down mechanism for individual securities. 
The updated market-wide circuit breakers have reduced the market decline percentage 
thresholds necessary to trigger a circuit breaker, have shortened the duration of the resulting 
trading halts, and have changed the reference index used to measure a market decline, passing 
from DJIA to S&P 500 Index262. 
In 2012, the SEC adopted a “limit up-limit down263” mechanism to address extraordinary 
market volatility in individual securities. The mechanism is intended to prevent trades in 
individual exchange-listed stocks from occurring outside of a specified price band, set as a 
percentage level above and below the average price of the stock over the immediately preceding 
five-minute trading period. The price limit bands are 5%, 10%, 20% or 75% depending on the 
price of the stock, and are doubled in size during the often more volatile opening and closing 
periods of the trading day. Once triggered, trading in a stock will be paused for a minimum of 
five minutes on all nationwide markets if the NBBO price matches one of the upper or lower 
band limits for at least 15 seconds264. 
 
Naked Access 
Before the Flash Crash, many HFT firms gained special access to securities exchanges through 
“naked access”, a process through which registered brokers allowed the firms to basically 
piggyback on their direct access to securities market. The arrangement enabled HFT firms to 
reduce their trade latency while avoiding the various risk checks and capital requirements, 
which they would have needed to comply with had they been registered traders265.  
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In November 2010, the SEC adopted a “Market Access Rule266”, by obligating registered 
brokers to put in place risk management controls and supervisory procedures to help prevent 
erroneous orders, ensure compliance with regulatory requirements, and enforce pre-set credit 
or capital thresholds, which essentially prohibited HFT firms from receiving naked access. 
 
Regulators’ Access to Information 
In 2011, the SEC adopted the “Large Trader Reporting Rule267”, which imposed an 
identification and reporting obligations for large traders. 
Large traders are recognized according to volume and/or value traded, and therefore include 
also traders employing rapid algorithmic systems for quoting and trading in huge volumes.  
Such rule empowered regulators to obtain relevant information in 1) assessing the impact of 
large traders’ activity on the securities markets; 2) reconstructing trading activity following 
periods of unusual market volatility; and 3) analyzing significant market events for regulatory 
purposes268.  
This monitoring activity has been further supplemented by the implementation of a 
“consolidated audit trail system”. 
The Consolidated Audit Trail System Rule269, adopted in 2012, is aimed at giving regulators 
the ability to monitor trading activity and analyze atypical events across the fragmented US 
securities markets.  
The rule requires US securities exchanges to establish a market-wide system for collecting and 
for accurately identifying every order, cancellation, modification and trade execution for all 
exchange-listed equities and equity options270.  
With the audit trail in place, SEC is able to receive real time access to most of the data needed 
to reconstruct a market dislocation such as a flash crash. 
In 2015, the SEC took steps toward a registration requirement for certain HFT brokers-dealers, 
which requires them to register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a 
self-regulatory organization which acts as the front-line regulator for broker-dealers271.  
FINRA’s registrants are subject to examinations, various disclosure requirements, and rules 
governing various aspects of their conduct.  
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Systems Compliance and Integrity  
In November 2014, the SEC adopted the Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (SCI) 
which created new, enforceable standards for maintaining and testing the trading systems used 
by securities exchanges and brokers. Specifically, the rules are designed to: reduce the 
occurrence of systems issues, improve resiliency when systems problems do occur, enhance the 
SEC’s oversight and enforcement of securities market technology infrastructure272.  
 
Anti-Spoofing Efforts 
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to expressly prohibit 
certain disruptive trading practices, commonly known as “spoofing”, that represent bidding or 
offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution273.   
Applying such a provision on spoofing to the HFT world, however, can be challenging, because 
usually high-speed computers and algorithms automatically generate many bids and offers in a 
millisecond, and cancel them quickly, therefore it can be difficult to ascertain at time whether 
such automated trading practices rise to the level of spoofing. 
Nevertheless, the CFTC and the SEC have used their new anti-spoofing authorities in a number 
of recent enforcement actions.  
For example, in 2015, the SEC reached a $1 million settlement with Briargate Trading LLP, a 
HFT firm because between 2011 and 2012, Briargate was charged with orchestrating a scheme 
that involved placing sham trades called spoof orders for the purpose of creating “the false 
appearance of interest in stocks” to manipulate their prices274. 
 
6.3. HFT Regulation in the European MiFID II 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II adopted specific rules to subject HFT and 
other forms of AT to particular scrutiny as they entail some risks to the capital market structure. 
Specifically, Article 17 sets rules on subject of algorithmic trading, including also the sub-
category of HFT. 
It introduces requirements to be met by investment firms that apply AT and HFT in relation to 
internal systems and controls; imposes duties regarding information and records on these 
parties; and imposes specific requirements on investment firms that apply AT and HFT as 
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market makers. It sets, further, obligations for brokers that provide direct electronic access to 
HFT firms. 
In addition, article 48 disciplines some responsibilities that trading venues which operate with 
HFT firms must follow in subject of systems resilience, circuit breakers, fee structure and low-
latency infrastructures. 
 
HFT internal systems and controls 
MiFID II introduces requirements for internal systems and controls to be met by investment 
firms that engage in AT and HFT. 
The internal systems and controls of the HFT firm must be such that they ensure that the firm’s 
trading systems are resilient and have sufficient capacity, are subject to appropriate trading 
thresholds and limits, and prevent the sending of erroneous orders or the systems otherwise 
functioning in a way that may create or contribute to a disorderly market275. 
Such investment firm, moreover, shall have in place effective business continuity arrangements 
to deal with any failure of its trading systems and shall ensure its systems are fully tested and 
properly monitored276. 
The detailed requirements have been set out by ESMA in draft regulatory technical standard277. 
In particular, it specifies requirements for the resilience of trading systems of investment firms 
which involves testing the algorithms, monitoring and, where necessary, changing the 
algorithms used, annual stress testing, incorporating a kill functionality so that all resting orders 
can be cancelled in the event of an emergency, monitoring for the prevention and identification 
of potential market abuse, carrying out pre-trade controls on order entry, carrying out post-trade 
controls. 
 
HFT information and records 
Investment firm that engages in AT and HFT has certain duties regarding information and 
records that have to be communicate to the competent authority of its Member State and to the 
trading venues at which it is member or participant278. 
The competent authority may require the investment firm to provide, on a regular and ad hoc 
basis, a description of the nature of its AT and HFT strategies, details of the trading parameters 
                                                 
275 Article 17 (1) of European MiFID II 
276 Id 
277 ESMA/2015/1464, Regulatory Technical and Implementing Standards, Annex I MiFID II / MiFIR (28 September 2015), 
201–46 
278 Article 17 (2) of European MiFID II 
93 
 
or limits to which the system is subject, a description of the key compliance and risk controls 
that it has in place, and information about the testing of its systems279.  
Investment firm that, specifically, engages in high-frequency algorithmic trading technique 
must store in an approved form accurate and time sequenced records of all its placed orders, 
including cancellations of orders, executed orders and quotations on trading venues and shall 
make them available upon request280.   
 
HFT market makers 
MiFID II introduces specific requirements for investment firms engaged in AT and HFT in 
pursuance of a market making strategy defined as involving posting firm, simultaneous two-
way quotes of comparable size and at competitive prices relating to one or more financial 
instruments on a single trading venue or across different trading venues281. 
The investment firm must, taking into account the liquidity, scale and nature of the specific 
market and the characteristics of the instruments traded, carry out this market making activity 
continuously during a specified proportion of the trading venue’s trading hours with the result 
of providing liquidity on a regular and predictable basis to the trading venue282.  
Nonetheless, the obligation to make public bid and offer prices on a continuous basis is not 
absolute, in fact in exceptional circumstances the market maker is no longer obliged to do so. 
These include circumstances of extreme volatility, political and macroeconomic issues, system 
and operational matters, and circumstances with contradict the investment firm’s ability to 
maintain prudent risk management practices283. 
 
Direct Electronic Access 
MiFID II imposes rules for providers of direct electronic access (DEA), regarding controls, 
information, and relationship with their clients. 
An investment firm that provides DEA must have in place effective systems and controls which 
ensure a proper assessment and review of the suitability of clients using the service, that clients 
using the service are prevented from exceeding appropriate pre-set trading and credit 
thresholds, that trading by clients using the service is properly monitored and that appropriate 
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risk controls prevent trading that may create risks to the investment firm itself or that could 
create or contribute to a disorderly market284. 
The DEA provider shall monitor the clients’ transactions in order to identify infringements of 
rules, disorderly trading conditions or conduct that may involve market abuse and that is to be 
reported to the competent authority285. 
The controls applied to sponsored access shall be at least equivalent to those applied to direct 
market access286. This entails that any form of sponsored unfiltered access is forbidden in the 
EU, as well.  
 
HFT and trading venues 
MiFID II also specifies rules for the trading venues interacting with AT and HFT. 
Generally, trading venues must have in place effective systems, procedures and arrangements 
to ensure their trading systems are resilient, have sufficient capacity to deal with peak order and 
message volumes, are able to ensure orderly trading under conditions of severe market stress, 
are fully tested to ensure such conditions are met and are subject to effective business continuity 
arrangements to ensure continuity of their services if there is any failure of their trading 
systems287. 
Furthermore, they must have in place effective systems to reject orders that exceed pre-
determined volume and price thresholds or are clearly erroneous288. 
Trading venues must be able to temporarily halt or constrain trading if there is a significant 
price movement in a financial instrument on that market or a related market during a short 
period and, in exceptional cases, to be able to cancel, vary or correct any transaction289. 
However, if HFT and AT traders are connected to these trading venues, the internal systems 
and controls are subject to additional requirements; trading venues must have systems to limit 
the ratio of unexecuted orders to transactions that may entered by a HFT firm, and be able to 
slow down the flow of orders if there is a risk of their systems capacity290. 
Additionally, a trading venue must ensure that its fee structure is transparent, fair and non-
discriminatory and that does not create incentives to place, modify or cancel orders or to execute 
transactions in a way which contributes to disorderly trading conditions or market abuse291.  
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For trading venues allowing co-location services, in order to ensure orderly and fair trading 
conditions, it is essential that they provide such co-location services on a non-discriminatory, 
fair and transparent basis292. 
 
6.4. Ideas and Proposal Measures 
In parallel with the adopted measures or about to, further discussions have raised the need of 
more pressing policies to heavily tighten HFT activity, or at least to disincentivize its more 
aggressive conducts.  
Some of such proposals have been implemented by single countries or trade exchanges, 
registering discordant results in terms of cost-benefit analyses for the entire market. 
Below, we report a number of the potential HFT regulatory proposals that have become part of 
the public policy discourse. 
 
Order Cancellation Fees 
Some observers argue that by imposing penalty charges for excessive order cancellations, HFTs 
would be discouraged from posting orders they do not intend to execute or using cancellations 
as a part of manipulative strategies, since penalty fees would render such activities 
unprofitable293.  
Additionally, such fees would discourage the most flagrant excessive cancellations which come 
along with higher volatility and would result in a consistent reduction in order messages that 
would prevent overload in the exchange computer systems294.  
Opponents to the proposal respond that mostly order cancellations are the result of the rapid 
reaction to new information and is often a way for HFT market makers to minimize the risks of 
offering prices to other traders, and therefore, an imposition on that orders would likely reduce 
the provision of liquidity, thus reducing market depth295. 
Both US and EU regulators have called for the imposition of some cancellation fees. For 
example, MiFID II suggests that regulated markets should impose a higher fee for placing an 
order that is subsequently cancelled than an order which is executed and to impose a higher fee 
on participants placing a high ratio of cancelled orders to executed orders296. 
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CFTC’s 2013 Concept Release has solicited greater system safeguards to protect trading against 
potential abuses or disruption unique to electronic trading. Among such measures, it includes 
controls related to order cancellation protocols with the introduction of an extra fee for 
excessive cancellations297. 
However, such impositions have been only incompletely enforced in barely some exchanges: 
on Nasdaq and Direct Edge, on Borsa Italiana and Deutsche Boerse exchanges.   
 
Minimum Resting Times 
Under this scheme, HFT limit orders must remain in the trading book and then cannot be 
cancelled within a pre-determined minimum time span, say 50 milliseconds298.  
Some argue that such a requirement would be another means of curbing what many perceive to 
the problematic and excessive use of cancelled orders by HFTs.  
Minimum resting times obligation is intended to increase the likelihood that viewed quotes 
being available to trade and therefore to make the order book dynamics more transparent. In 
addition, longer order exposure times would create more liquidity and would reduce price 
variance in the market. Lastly, the slow-down of markets might favor participation, especially 
if some traders (e.g. small retails investors) feel that high speed makes market unfair and hurts 
market integrity299. 
Detractors, however, argue that such a protocol would hinder HFT firms to provide liquidity 
during times of high volatility because it would be particularly expensive to post limit orders 
considering the impossibility to cancel “stale” orders. Conversely, this measure would not affect 
HFT liquidity demanders with the result to attract more aggressive HFTs in the market300. 
 
Affirmative Trade Obligations 
Some suggest that consideration be given to imposing certain affirmative trade obligations on 
these HFT firms who are not registered broker-dealers and thus are not legally obligated to step 
in and provide needed liquidity, particularly during market disruptions similar to the Flash 
Crash where the market liquidity is particular scarce.  
An imposition in such sense, it would render, in effect, HFTs as market-makers even though, 
they unlike specialists do not enjoy the various privileges that come with them, such as the 
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access to information about order flows, the right to make decisions after others make their 
decisions, the ability to create the market quote, the ability to create and exercise certain look-
back timing options, and the right to collect brokerage commissions from executing system 
order flow301.   
Supporters claim that HFTs, thanks to their shorter latency, have already an important 
competitive advantage and the imposition of an affirmative market-making obligation is only a 
measure for limiting the potential negative effect that their market withdrawal could generate 
during extreme volatility events. 
 
Financial Transaction Tax 
A financial transaction tax is a fee on HFT trades as a way of limiting that kind of trading and 
its perceived negative consequences. 
MiFID II has called regulated markets for the introduction of a financial transaction tax for 
traders operating a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique in order to reflect the 
additional burden on system capacity302. 
So far different schemes and levels of taxes have been implemented all over the world. 
Examples are the stamp duty in the UK, the French financial transaction tax on HFT and the 
pricing scheme introduced on NYSE Euronext303.  
In 2013, Italy imposed a tax on trades on Italian financial markets that are generated by a 
computer algorithm that automatically determines the decisions related to relevant orders or 
metrics. The tax rate was fixed to 0.2% of the transaction value with an additional fee of 0.02% 
for any portion of changed or cancelled daily orders in less than half a second where the ratio 
exceed 60% of the total number of submitted orders304.   
The tax was reportedly introduced due to concerns that the growth of HFT in Italy could 
potentially have an adverse impact on the integrity and quality of Italian financial markets, 
particularly with regard to volatility and liquidity. 
Nevertheless, an empirical analysis carried out by Ruhl and Stein (2014)305 showed how an 
introduction of a transaction tax in Italian financial markets has led to an increase in volatility 
and quoted spreads, in the opposite direction when compared to the assumed intention of 
regulators. 
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A Kill Switch 
A kill switch procedure would permit the suspension of an individual HFT firm’s trades 
following erroneous trades or an excessive trading volume. Some regulators have argued in 
favor of a such a protocol as a way of thwarting large-scale market events in which HFT has 
played a leading role. In the recent regulation developments, there appeared to be widespread 
agreement that a kill switch could be useful, but that it would require multiple layers and 
thresholds to ensure that it would not be used at inappropriate times. There were, however, 
concerns over how and when such mechanisms would be implemented and whether market 
stakeholders would be willing to “pull the trigger” during market disruptions306. 
Proponents suggest that both HFT market participants and trading venues should have the 
capability to cancel working orders and interrupt trading activity under certain problematic 
market conditions. Furthermore, trading platforms should have clear, objective policies and 
procedures detailing circumstances that warrant use of a kill switch, based upon experience 
about their HFT market participants’ trading style and strategies307. 
 
6.5. Considerations on HFT Regulation Developments 
HFT Regulation initiatives carried out by competent authorities both in the US and EU are 
chiefly aimed at imposing a limitation of the verified and perceived negative effects and risks 
of such trading activity, as cases of registered manipulative conducts and exacerbation of 
market volatility. The need of a deeper regulation of HFT phenomenon has been considered 
necessary for the preservation of market integrity and fairness and for a better investor 
confidence. However, it must be kept in mind that a too strict HFT regulatory regime could 
produce, instead, the opposite effect, intended as a strongly deterioration of the beneficial 
effects in terms of market quality obtained thanks to the proliferation of HFT technologies and 
strategies. 
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7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POUND FLASH CRASH 
 
7.1. Introduction of the Pound Flash Crash  
The empirical analysis covered in this work concerns the study of a mini-flash crash 
phenomenon that affected the British Sterling on Friday 7 October 2016, where the Pound 
depreciated by around 9% versus the Dollar during early Asian trading in less than a minute, 
before quickly recovering much of the move. The registered free-fall touched a historical 
minimum of $ 1.1450 (according to Thomson Reuters data), which represented the lowest 
reached level by the British currency since March 1985. 
 
Figure 16: GBP/USD Flash Crash. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
Figure 16 shows the chart of the continuous minute-by-minute low prices for GBP/USD 
quotations during 6 and 7 October. It is possible to note the sudden and temporary decline 
occurred in GBP values against the US Dollar during the overnight period between 6th and 7th 
of October. Specifically, the exchange rate quotation at 01:08 am CET abruptly collapsed down, 
passing from a value of 1.2596 to 1.15 in just one minute, a tumble of 8.7 percent magnitude. 
The following minutes saw a rapid price recovery with the value that fluctuated around at $ 
1.24 for the rest of the trading day. At the end, the British Sterling was down 1.4% as London 
closed for the weekend. 
Such empirical behavior is typical of the mini-flash crashes theory claiming that they occur all 
of a sudden with a large-scale but with a subsequent quick recovery (a large v-shaped 
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movement). As other similar occurrences, it cannot be fully explained by incoming news and 
economic data, but typically, it is characterized by unusual high trading volumes relative to 
liquidity measures in the event time window. In addition, the speed at which it has unfolded 
might suggest a determinant role played by automated and high-frequency trading, even though 
it is not so simple to prove such assertions. 
The choice of such event is due to the fact that it occurred recently and for this reason, it was 
possible to gather some high-frequency data (precisely with one-minute time frame) for an 
empirical analysis of the phenomenon; in addition, it constitutes a typical example of how mini-
flash crashes are becoming very frequent in modern automated financial markets and may hit, 
in case of particular market and trading conditions, also those markets whose size and liquidity 
is generally considered as a protection against such events, as the foreign exchange market.  
The analysis in this study is mainly focused on a post-examination of the phenomenon. In 
particular, the specific dynamics of the event, the idiosyncratic factors that have contributed to 
its occurrence, the general context of the Sterling, and considerations about potential 
consequences for market participants and market stability are reported. 
 
7.2. The GBP Foreign Exchange Market 
Before looking in details at the moves of 7 October, it is necessary to provide context on the 
foreign exchange market characteristics, how it works and what are the differences with respect 
to equities markets. 
Firstly, foreign exchange market (FX or Forex) is the largest financial market in the world in 
which participants are able to buy, sell, exchange and speculate on currencies. 
It is characterized by a wide fragmentation of trading, with vast majority of trading performed 
in over-the-counter markets based on cash-for-cash transactions, primarily via risk transfer in 
principal-to-principal bilateral trading arrangements for: payment for goods and services 
abroad, investing in overseas assets, hedging foreign currency exposures, and active 
management of portfolios, including for speculative purpose308. 
The FX has enticed retail currency traders from all over the world because of its several benefits. 
One of the benefits of trading on currencies is its massive trading volume, which covers the 
largest asset class globally. This implies that Forex traders are provided with high liquidity, 
then bid-ask spreads are generally tight and levels of volatility are narrow. 
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Unlike equities markets, Forex trades 24 hours a day, five and half days a week and all over the 
world, due to the operative continuity incurring from Asian trading opening to US trading 
closing. 
Trading in major currencies is carried out by a multitude of platforms that aggregate and 
advertise liquidity from providers to consumers, although price discovery is thought to 
primarily rely on a smaller number of key venues. Some platforms are simply matching buyers 
and sellers, other operate as exchanges309. 
Figure 17 illustrates the market shares for the major FX electronic trading platforms. 
 
Figure 17: FX spot volume by electronic trading platform. Source: MarketFactory. 
There are often differences across platforms in costs, rule books, latencies, and connectivity. 
Typically, there are no compulsory requirements for spot FX platforms to have trading halt 
mechanisms: for instance, two of the main spot FX electronic broking platforms (EBS and 
Thomson Reuters Matching) do have some pre-trade controls, but not circuit breakers, although 
CME futures exchange does. Each participant is therefore responsible for its own risk 
management and controls310.  
Importantly, unlike equities markets, there is no formal obligation for market-makers to provide 
liquidity. To that end, each price-maker controls its own trading presence, in effect establishing 
their own bespoke circuit breaker, widening spreads or even withdrawing completely311.  
Regarding the market in question, the GBP/USD is the British Pound and US Dollar currency 
pair or cross quotation. The currency pair tells how many US Dollars (the quote currency) are 
needed to purchase one British Pound (the base currency). 
Trading on GBP/USD is also known as the “cable”, a term deriving from the 19th century as 
transactions between the Pound and Dollar were executed via transatlantic cable. 
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The “cable” value is affected by factors that influence the value of the British Pound and/or the 
US Dollar in relation to each other. For this reason, the interest rate differential between the 
Bank of England (BoE) and the Federal Reserve (Fed) affects the value of this quotation. For 
example, when the Fed intervenes in open market activities to make the Dollar stronger, the 
value of the GBP/USD cross could decline, ceteris paribus. 
Another important factor that can affect the value of the currency pair is the political 
uncertainty; if the governance of a country is at risk of undergoing substantial change, this 
situation could make investors less likely to demand its currency by preferring the safer one. 
 
7.3. A Flash Event in Three Stages 
The Sterling flash crash of 7 October 2016 has been deeply diagnosed by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) who has released a report312 into their investigation on the event 
in order to shed light on the market microstructure dynamics and to try providing an explanation 
about the nosedive observed in the Pound. 
According to the BIS report, the event can be broken down into three different stages. 
First, the early phase of the move that lasted for a matter of seconds, during which Sterling 
depreciated rapidly from 1.26 to around 1.24 against the Dollar in response to a significant 
selling flow, but in an orderly fashion and with broad participations on key venues. 
Second, a period of about ten minutes of extreme dysfunction that saw Sterling fall further, 
rebound and then trade in a wide range. This phase involved lower volumes and narrower 
participation, pointing to a greater role for the actions of individual market participants as a 
driver of the sharp movements. 
Third, the gradual recovery over the hours that followed, as liquidity returned to the market.  
Stage 1: Shortly after midnight British Summer Time (BST), equivalent to Continental 
European Time (CET) minus one hour, on 7 October, trading volumes picked up sharply and 
Sterling began to depreciate against Dollar.  
Over a period of around eight seconds, from 00:07:03 to 00:07:11 BST, Sterling fell from 
1.2600 to 1.2494, based on the Reuters mid-price313 (figure 18). During this time, there was a 
surge in volumes (figure 19), with the vast majority of executed trades representing so-called 
“aggressive” sales of Sterling, pointing to a very significant imbalance in order flow. Despite 
the magnitude of the move and the volumes transacted, GBP/USD bid-offer spreads remained 
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little changed until around 00:07:14 BST and measures of the price impact of transactions over 
this period were relatively low (figure 20)314. 
At 00:07:13 BST, the Financial Times published an article entitled “Hollande demands tough 
Brexit negotiations” on its website. Market participants noted that this release would have been 
interpreted as somewhat Sterling-negative by exacerbating the current volatility (figure 18). 
Stage 2: At 00:07:15 BST, the CME triggered its velocity logic mechanism, which paused 
trading for 10 seconds on the futures exchange, in response to the large moves in the preceding 
two seconds (figure 22). At this point, bid-offer spreads in the spot market widened 
significantly315. 
After reaching 1.24 on Reuters, at 00:07:15 BST, GBP/USD accelerated its fall. From this point 
onwards, and particularly past the 1.22 level, price gapping between trades is increasingly 
visible (figure 18). And by 00:07:34 BST, 19 seconds later, GBP/USD had reached 1.20 and 
the move exhausted the resting sterling bids across a variety of electronic trading platform’ 
order books (figure 21)316.  
While bids quickly returned to the market, overall depth in the order book remained extremely 
low for several minutes. Those wishing to trade could only execute in relatively small sizes at 
prices at a wide spread to the implied mid-price (figure 20). For example, on Reuters prices as 
low as 1.1491 in GBP/USD traded at 00:07:41 BST, which represented a fall of almost 9% from 
the pre-event level of 1.26 (figure 18). Other platforms reported transactions at even lower 
prices317.  
During this period, it is likely that the trading activity of individual participants could have had 
a significant impact on market functioning and prices traded, given the lack of depth. Indeed, 
UK supervisory data point to a significant increase in certain market participants’ share of 
trading activity as others withdrew, suggesting a role for idiosyncratic factors in diving the 
extreme dysfunction observed as Sterling traded at levels well below 1.20 against the Dollar. 
Among such participants, we cannot exclude the possibility of an important role played by 
automated and high-frequency traders. 
It is worth noting that some of the trades executed during this period were subsequently torn up 
or had their prices revised, but this was often the consequence of bilateral agreements or specific 
contractual arrangements as there is no single methodology for determining the low in FX 
markets. Market contacts suggested they did not fell able to co-ordinate in determining a low 
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price (which is relevant for certain derivatives contracts) as they feared this would breach 
competition and/or conduct requirements318. 
The minima reached in Sterling were extremely short-lived but the market dysfunction lasted 
for several minutes registering high levels of volatility and wide spreads. 
Between 00:08:00 and 00:09:00 BST, GBP/USD traded on Reuters at levels between 1.20 and 
1.22, still a wide range (figure 18). Market functioning took longer to recover. Measures of 
market depth on Reuters remained volatile until nearly 00:20:00 BST, a period over which the 
CME triggered a number of further trading halts (figure 22)319.  
Shortly after the first pause in trading on the CME ended, at 00:07:25 BST, the futures price hit 
the daily lower limit of 122.17320. At this point, futures trading was floored at this price for a 
period of two minutes. Some transactions were completed on the CME over this period, despite 
the spot price continuing to fall on other platforms. But when prices had not risen by the end of 
the two-minute window, a two-minute trading halt was imposed at 00:09:29 BST. The market 
reopened at 00:11:29 BST with a new lower limit (just over 120), but conditions remained 
impaired. Finally, amid the continued heightened price volatility, a second velocity logic event 
was triggered at 00:11:57 BST, again halting trading for 10 seconds on the futures exchange321.  
Stage 3: Over time the market began to recover, although it is difficult to identify a clear shift 
to the recovery phase. By around 00:20:00 BST, prices in both the futures and spot market had 
settled around 2% lower against the Dollar than their levels immediately prior to the event, 
although relatively high trading volumes persisted for a period of three to four hours. Bid-offer 
spreads on Reuters remained wider than usual, but not at extreme levels, for the rest of the night. 
Broader spillovers were generally limited. UK governments bonds registered a relatively large 
move as trading opened on 7 October, but the moves were orderly. And there appeared to be 
little impact on risky asset prices. GBP/USD closed in London on 7 October 1.4% lower than 
on the previous day322.  
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Figure 18: Thomson Reuters Matching GBP/USD trades. Source: Bank of England calculations. 
(a) 00:07:15 BST: sharp price movements over a two-second window trigger a velocity logic event which pauses trading on 
the CME for 10 seconds. 
(b) 00:07:29 BST: the futures price reaches its lower limit of 122.17 (based on the change on the day). The exchange remains 
open, but transactions cannot take place below this price on the CME. A two-minute monitoring period begins. 
(c) 00:09:29 BST: as the futures price has not rebounded from the lower limit by the end of the monitoring period, a further 
two-minute trading halt is triggered on the CME. At 00:11:29 BST, the exchange reopens with a new (lower) price limit. 
 
Figure 19: Thomson Reuters Matching GBP/USD trading volumes. Source: Bank of England calculations. 
 
Figure 20: Thomson Reuters Matching GBP/USD sweep-to-fill costs. Source: Bank of England calculations. 
Sweep-to-fill costs are calculated as the weighted average spread required to buy or sell a given quantity of £5 million. Gaps 
in the series represent periods where there is insufficient depth in the order book to complete a transaction of this quantity in 
the respective direction.  
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Figure 21: Thomson Reuters Matching GBP/USD order book behavior. Source: Bank of England calculations. 
The blue and red circles represent resting bid and offer limit orders, respectively, in the order book. The black line represents 
the implied mid-price, and the intensity of the blue and red colors signifies the size of the order. 
 
Figure 22: CME GBP/USD futures volume (blue) and traded prices (red). Source: Bank of England calculations. 
(a) 00:07:15 BST: sharp price movements over a two-second window trigger a velocity logic event which pauses trading on 
the CME for 10 seconds. 
(b) 00:07:29 BST: the futures price reaches its lower limit of 122.17 (based on the change on the day). The exchange remains 
open, but transactions cannot take place below this price on the CME. A two-minute monitoring period begins. 
(c) 00:09:29 BST: as the futures price has not rebounded from the lower limit by the end of the monitoring period, a further 
two-minute trading halt is triggered on the CME. At 00:11:29 BST, the exchange reopens with a new (lower) price limit. 
(d) 
00:11:57 BST: a second velocity logic event is triggered by sharp movements over a two-second window, again pausing 
trading for 10 seconds.  
 
7.4. Descriptive Analysis of the Pound Flash Crash 
In this section, we perform a descriptive analysis of the Pound Flash Crash using GBP/USD 
minute-by-minute dataset obtained by Thomson Reuters Eikon data-provider. This data includes 
quotations from 09:00 am CET on Thursday 6 October 2016 to 04:30 pm CET on Friday 7 
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October 2016, for a total of 1891 observations. To illustrate and describe better the dimension 
of the Pound tumble, we mainly concentrate on low prices representing the minima values 
touched by the GBP/USD for every minute. Graphs and computations have been carried out 
through Matlab software. 
The first step for the analysis is to calculate the price changes, or returns, in order to perform 
some descriptive statistics. 
We compute the price changes of the GBP/USD quotations minute-by-minute according with 
the price returns standard formula:  
𝑅𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡
 % 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the exchange rate at time t and 𝑃𝑡−1 is that at time t-1, the prior minute.  
Since the dataset is composed by 1891 observations, the price changes are definitely 1890. 
Figure 23 illustrates the returns trend for the GBP/USD quotations under examination. The day 
preceding the crash, the Pound values were reporting a moderate falling trend with the passing 
of the hours, but without registering abnormal spikes in volatility measures; conversely, shortly 
after 1 o’clock CET, the Sterling dramatically plunged down in value by losing about 9 percent 
in a sole minute in an unexpected way if compared to the previous quasi-flat situation. During 
the flash event window, the returns reported an explosion of volatility with shocking price 
changes both on the up and down side, that lasted for several minutes and only after a few hours 
the situation appeared to stabilize even though, price fluctuations raised again in the afternoon.  
 
Figure 23: GBP/USD Flash Crash Price Returns. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
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In addition, Table 4 provides an excerpt of the prices and computed returns by using both 
closing and low prices. Specifically, it contains the flash crash values at 01:08 am (in bold type) 
and closer observations, respectively for the 5 minutes backwards and afterwards the 
breakdown. Numerically, the flash crash led to a price contraction of almost 9 percent in just 
one minute in terms of low quotations, and the three minutes that followed registered an 
averaged price oscillation of over 4 percent in absolute terms as the flash event triggered a very 
turmoil phase; while the near pre-crash situation reported a modest 0.0-point variation. 
Similarly, closing prices indicate, with a lower magnitude with respect to low prices, similar 
conclusions: a falling in prices of over 3% at 01:08, and a subsequent high price volatility from 
here on. 
Date Time (CET) Close Price Return % Low Price Return % 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
2016-10-07 
01:02 
01:03 
01:04 
01:05 
01:06 
01:07 
01:08 
01:09 
01:10 
01:11 
01:12 
01:13 
1.2609 
1.2608 
1.2610 
1.2605 
1.2608 
1.2602 
1.2190 
1.2126 
1.2039 
1.2108 
1.2059 
1.2131 
-0.0238 
-0.0079 
+0.0159 
-0.0397 
+0.0238 
-0.0476 
-3.2693 
-0.5250 
-0.7175 
+0.5731 
-0.4047 
+0.5971 
1.2608 
1.2605 
1.2606 
1.2605 
1.2604 
1.2596 
1.1500 
1.2006 
1.1450 
1.2020 
1.2049 
1.2113 
0.0000 
-0.0238 
+0.0079 
-0.0079 
-0.0079 
-0.0635 
-8.7012 
+4.4000 
-4.6310 
+4.9782 
+0.2413 
+0.5312 
Table 4: Prices and Returns around the Pound Flash Crash. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
Summary Statistics  
Starting from price returns, we can conduct some descriptive statistics useful to summarize 
features of the intraday Pound Sterling flash crash.  
We report some of the most used measures for time-series samples; specifically, measures of 
central tendency such as Mean, and measures of variability as the Standard Deviation, the 
Minimum and Maximum values, Skewness and Kurtosis. 
Price returns can be averaged over time to obtain a sample lower-frequency return estimate 
which denotes the returns performance of the considered period. We use arithmetic mean: 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 𝐸[𝑅] =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
Variation in sequential returns is represented by the volatility measure, and the standard 
deviation. Standard deviation is simply defined as the square root of the average squared 
deviation of the returns from its mean: 
109 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑆𝐷[𝑅] = √
1
𝑇 − 1
∑(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅])2
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
Skewness indicator measures whether the return distribution skews towards either the positive 
or the negative side of the mean.     
𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑆[𝑅] =
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅])
3𝑇
𝑡=1
(√
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅])2
𝑇
𝑡=1 )
3 
Kurtosis is a measure of fatness of the tails of the return distribution. The fatter the tails, the 
higher the chance to have an extreme positive or negative return. The standardized normal 
distribution, for example, has a kurtosis of 3. A distribution with positive excess kurtosis is 
called leptokurtic. 
𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝐾[𝑅] =
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅])
4𝑇
𝑡=1
(
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅])2
𝑇
𝑡=1 )
2 
Table 5 contains the summary statistics applied to low prices quotations, respectively, for the 
entire sample period, for the pre-flash crash period and for the post-crash. This is useful to give 
a framework about the changing price returns caused by the flash event both in terms of 
tendency and variability.  
Indicators confirm the trend and the observations made with the GBP/USD price returns. In 
fact, post-crash period was much more volatile compared to the pre-cash period, with a standard 
deviation 16 times higher. Accordingly, also the minimum and maximum returns are much 
higher, with a range of 9.6 in the post-period and of 0.26 in the pre-period.  
Furthermore, mean and skewness are positive, confirming that fact that in the hours after the 
flash event, the Sterling was recovering.  
Finally, values of kurtosis much higher with respect of 6 October indicated the high risk of the 
post-crash phase to obtain extreme observations, far away from the mean value.  
Therefore, the GBP/USD minute-by-minute low price returns of 6-7 October 2016 exhibited an 
opposite behavior before and after the flash crash, inasmuch the event triggered a phase of 
extreme turbulence. 
Sample Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Entire 
Pre-crash 
Post-crash 
1890 
967 
922 
-0.00076331 
-0.00094653 
0.00886530 
0.27844 
0.01708 
0.27646 
-8.7012 
-0.2128 
-4.6310 
+4.9782 
+0.0475 
+4.9782 
13.6794 
0.2603 
9.6092 
-13.431 
-2.5056 
5.6039 
632.75 
28.83 
269.19 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on 6-7 October. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
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Correlation of returns 
Another metric useful to describe distributions of returns is autocorrelation, which is a measure 
of serial dependence between returns and their lagged ones. For example, autocorrelation of 
order 1 is the correlation of 1-minute price return with 1-minute price return that occurred 1 
minute earlier, as well as, the autocorrelation of order 2 is the correlation of 1-minute return 
with 1-minute return that occurred 2 minutes earlier. The autocorrelation value of order p can 
be determined as follows: 
𝜌(𝑝) =
∑ [(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅])(𝑅𝑡−𝑝 − 𝐸[𝑅])]
𝑇
𝑡=𝑝+1
(∑ (𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅]))
𝑇
𝑡=𝑝+1
1
2 (∑ (𝑅𝑡−𝑝 − 𝐸[𝑅]))
𝑇
𝑡=𝑝+1
1
2
 
The autocorrelation function ranges from -1 to 1.  
High correlation, say 0.5 and higher, implies a persistent positive relationship between current 
and lagged observations. Low autocorrelation, say -0.5 and lower, in turn implies a persistent 
negative relationship. 
Autocorrelation allows us to check whether there are any persistent momentum/reversal 
relationships in the data. For example, it is a stylized fact that a large swing in the price is 
typically followed by a reversal, as the case of the Sterling flash crash. 
 
Figure 24: ACF of Returns on 6-7 October. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
Figure 24 shows the sample autocorrelation for the low prices of 6-7 October. As you can note, 
the current return is negatively correlated with respect to the first 1-minute lag return, by 
supporting the idea that of a reversal behavior of the returns during the flash crash event, that 
is in presence of a negative performance at a specified minute, it will be highly probable to have 
a positive return in the following minute. The second lag is conversely positively correlated, 
while the third is negative again. This further strengthens the reversal relationships in returns 
observed during that period. The conditional mean is also confirmed by the Ljung-Box test, 
which strongly rejects the hypothesis of no-serial correlation at the relevant lags. 
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After controlling the presence of serial correlation, we also test whether the financial series of 
the GBP/USD presents volatility clustering and persistence, i.e. large price changes tend to be 
followed by large price changes, while small price changes tend to be followed by small price 
changes, as preceding considerations appeared to identify.  
In order to test the presence of heteroskedasticity, we perform the Engle’s ARCH Test which 
assesses the presence of autocorrelation on squared residuals of the price returns of GBP/USD. 
The test strongly rejects the hypothesis of no ARCH effect, then the returns are conditionally 
heteroskedastic. 
 
7.5. Analysis of Liquidity during the Pound Flash Crash 
In this section, we report an analysis of intraday liquidity of the Sterling Flash Crash carried 
out by the Bank of England staff.  
Liquidity parameters help up to figure out better the market conditions during the 7 October 
compared to those on a normal day.  
First, liquidity conditions typically vary over the course of the trading day. Though the FX 
market is open for 24 hours a day during the working week, the majority of trading in GBP/USD 
takes place between 7 am and 5 pm UK time, with volumes highest when both the London and 
NY markets are open. Accordingly, this is when measures of liquidity appear to be at their 
strongest. 
Supporting this, Figure 25 shows a number of key measures of activity and liquidity averaged 
for each hour of the day, based on data from 3-6 October, the four days before the flash event. 
Despite occasionally large imbalances between buying and selling order flow and traded 
volume (left-hand panel) during 7-9 am and 1-5 pm BST, i.e. when the London and New York 
are open, this is when measures of liquidity (right-hand panel) are also the highest. Conversely, 
both trading volumes and liquidity measures are observed to drop off outside these core periods, 
particularly during the early hours of Asian trading, around midnight BST323. 
                                                 
323 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, 4-5 
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Figure 25: Intraday GBP/USD activity on Thomson Reuters Matching (3-6 October). Source: Bank of England 
calculations. 
Sweep-to-fill costs are calculated as the weighted average spread required to buy or sell a given quantity of Sterling versus the 
Dollar.  
Amihud measure calculates the price impact of individual trades as the ratio of the associated price move (measured since the 
last trade) to the traded volume. 
 
A statistical analysis by Bank of England staff provides evidence to suggest that liquidity, as 
measured for example by bid-ask spreads, is more sensitive to changes in realized price 
volatility and traded volumes at night, compared with during the day. The left-hand panel in 
figure 26 shows the sensitivity of bid-ask spreads to realized volatility, as measured by the price 
range per minute, estimated on data from 10:00 pm BST on 2 October to midnight on 6 October. 
The data are divided into two subsamples covering “daytime” (01:00 am-10:00 pm BST) and 
“night-time” (10:00 pm-01:00 am BST). An increase in intra-minute volatility of 10 pips during 
the day is associated with a 0.3 pips higher bid-offer spread, but during the night this rises to 
2.0 pips, even though the confidence interval is wider324.  
The 7 October flash crash took place during the night, when liquidity conditions appear to be 
more sensitive to price volatility. This may have played a role in amplifying the effect of the 
initial shock. The right-hand panel in figure 26 compares the actual move in bid-offer spreads 
(red line) with the path predicted by the stylized model estimated using “daytime” data (yellow 
line) and “night-time” data (blue line). This comparison suggests that the deterioration in 
liquidity observed during the first minute of the event, from 00:07 to 00:08 BST, was broadly 
                                                 
324 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, Appendix B 
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consistent with what might be expected at that time of night given the large price move. But 
after that, the observed increase in bid-offer spreads is greater than what the model predicts325.  
Movements in bid-ask spreads over the flash event window are likely in practice to have 
reflected a more complex interplay between market participants’ trading strategies, observable 
prices and order flows. Nevertheless, taking the model’s estimates at face value, it is reasonable 
to conjecture that the initial shock might have had a significantly smaller impact had it occurred 
during the day, given the large difference between the blue and yellow lines326. 
 
Figure 26: Estimating the drivers of market liquidity. Source: Bank of England calculations 
Market liquidity is calculated using 3-6 October 2016 data from Thomson Reuters Matching and the following equation: 
𝑏𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =∝  + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝜇  
 
 
Actually, on the night of 7 October, trading activity was significantly higher than usual. 
Volumes on Thomson Reuters Matching and CME were several hundred times their average 
overnight rate. Bid-offer spreads were significantly wider than their usual overnight average. 
And other measures of liquidity, such as sweep-to-fill costs327 and the Amihud328 measure, were 
also much higher than their normal overnight levels, indicative of lower liquidity. See figure 27 
for a comparison of these and other liquidity metrics on Thomson Reuters with respect to the 
average levels prevailing in the 3-6 October, while figure 28 shows the Amihud measure for 
CME futures exchange in comparison with the previous week and the following weeks329. 
 
                                                 
325 Id 
326 Id 
327 Sweep-to-fill costs are calculated as the weighted average spread (from the implied mid-price) required to buy 
or sell a given quantity (£5 million) of Sterling versus the Dollar. 
328 Amihud measure calculates the price impact of individual trades as the ratio of the associated price move 
(measured since the last trade) to the traded volume.  
329 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, Appendix B 
114 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Thomson Reuters Matching trading activity and liquidity metrics. Source: Bank of England calculations 
 
Figure 28: Liquidity in CME GBP/USD futures. Source: Bank of England calculations. 
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7.6. Triggers, Vulnerabilities and Amplifiers of the Pound Flash Crash  
A number of idiosyncratic factors are likely to have contributed to and amplified the moves of 
7 October, rather than to a single clean driver.  
Firstly, it is important to reiterate that this event occurred during a typically illiquid period of 
the trading day for Sterling, i.e. outside the currency’s core time zone, further impaired by 
regional bank holidays, including in China. Indeed, during this period, there is typically a 
shallower order book and a heightened sensitivity to increased volumes and/or volatility, which 
suggests that the market is more prone to register large price moves. The presence, in such time 
zone, of staff less experienced in trading sterling, with lower risk limits and risk appetite, and 
with less expertise in the suitability of particular algorithms for the prevailing market 
conditions, appears to have further amplified the movement330. 
Additionally, market contacts have indicated several further candidate triggers of the flash 
crash.  
Early commentary pointed to the publication of the Financial Times article on Hollande’s 
considerations about Brexit, where he claimed that the UK would have to pay the price for have 
choosing a “hard” Brexit, as the driver of initial Sterling depreciation. However, it is likely that 
this release has only added marginal weight to the move as it did not contain new information 
because the comments from former French President were made at a widely attended event 
earlier that evening and had features in similar form on a variety of well-known news websites 
prior to the FT article. 
Hence, other factors are more likely to have acted as trigger and amplifier of the flash crash. 
Potential candidates are for example, a so-called “fat-finger331” trade, a deliberate attempt to 
move the price lower during a typically illiquid period, or Asian retail trading in Sterling. 
Nevertheless, in each case market participants were unable to offer definitive evidence to 
substantiate these hypotheses, also for the lack of hard data. 
As well as the time of day, contacts have identified a confluence of potential preexisting 
vulnerabilities going into the event that appear to have amplified both the price movement and 
the deterioration in market functioning. Chief among these are dealers’ options-related hedging 
flows and client orders, including stop-loss orders. Both represent a source of mechanistic 
demand for liquidity in response to big changes in the level of the exchange rate332.  
                                                 
330 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, 11-13 
331 A fat finger error is a keyboard input error whereby an order to buy or sell is placed of far greater size than 
intended, for the wrong security, at the wrong price, or with any number of other input errors. 
332 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, 11-13 
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Dealers usually seek to hedge options positions by buying or selling the exchange rate pair (the 
underlying) in order to maintain a neutral position with respect to small further price 
movements, but for large price movements this can involve buying or selling large quantities 
of it. And this hedging may be undertaken in an automated manner, without respect to 
prevailing liquidity conditions or the potential market impact333.  
Similarly, retail traders can attach stop instruction to their orders to quickly sell or buy the 
exchange rate at certain price level in order to limit potential losses from large market 
fluctuations. Relatedly, retail FX clients can sometimes also be automatically stopped out by 
their brokers, mechanistically and without discretion, in the event of market losses causing them 
to no longer meet their margin requirements. Again, this has the potential to lead to trades being 
executed irrespective of the prevailing liquidity conditions and market impact334.  
In particular, the positioning at a similar price threshold of pre-determined instructions for 
selling Sterling in order to hedge options positions, and the execution of stop-loss orders as the 
currency depreciated have been an important driver for the sharp plunge in GBP/USD.  
UK supervisory data gathered from 12 of the most active dealers in the Sterling spot FX and 
options markets suggest that options hedging and, to a lesser extent, stop-loss orders may help 
to explain the significant order flow imbalance observed during the flash event. Figure 29 
displays the potential cumulative impact of these mechanistic flows. However, these data do 
not capture retail brokers and therefore may underestimate the role played by stop-loss orders 
left by such traders or automatic stop-outs335.  
Not all of this volume is likely to have been transacted given the level of dysfunction and the 
fact that options hedgers in particular may retain a degree of discretion. But, taken at face value, 
it represents a significant proportion of the total value traded during the event window and 
would constitute sizable volume even during the more active London trading hours336. 
The initial price move and sharp increase in selling flow on 7 October aligns closely with a 
breach of the 1.26 level in GBP/USD, potentially indicative of a role for mechanistic selling 
needs around this level. And it is striking to note that the largest net selling pressure observed 
in these data coincides with a fall in GBP/USD through 1.24, that is the point at which there 
was a significant pickup in price gapping and broader dysfunction337.  
                                                 
333 Id 
334 Id 
335 Id 
336 Id 
337 Id 
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Figure 29: Cumulative net potential selling from options hedging and client orders. Source: Bank of England calculations. 
Another important amplifier of the Sterling flash crash may have been the liquidity withdrawal 
of market-makers, who unlike equities market-makers have no obligation to provide liquidity 
in some circumstances.  
Typically, liquidity providers become naturally more cautious in pricing risk during bouts of 
volatility and they wide prices before ceasing quoting altogether when certain thresholds are 
breached, such as P&L limits, or when wide, stale or off-market pricing inputs are identified. 
Market makers exhibited a variety of responses to the increasing market dysfunction on 7 
October338.  
Some remained active throughout, with automated pricing widening for a time in recognition 
of the increased volatility, while others widened initially and then halted as protection 
mechanisms kicked in. Some firms withdrew first from voice trading, others from e-trading. 
Such halts lasted anywhere between two and thirty minutes. Some recommenced trading 
automatically when conditions stabilized, but many required management override. For some 
it was their algorithmic trading that restarted first (although often with human intervention to 
allow the restart), for others their voice activity. Those withdrawing liquidity cannot be readily 
categorized by type of institution, but various major dealers, principal trading firms and firms 
representing a retail client base confirmed that they withdrew liquidity provision from the 
market during the event339. 
Generally, the withdrawal of liquidity in response to these factors was rapid, though, given the 
time of the day, not necessarily unexpected. Said that, the complete erosion of resting orders to 
buy Sterling for very short periods was highly unusual. And the fact that the futures exchange 
was halted for a large proportion of the event may have further amplified the withdrawal of 
                                                 
338 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, 13-14 
339 Id 
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liquidity in the spot market, given the extent to which automated market-makers rely on the 
CME as an additional pricing source and hedging tool340. 
 
7.7. The Sterling Context prior the Flash Crash 
Beyond idiosyncratic factors that hit the Sterling during the 7 October, it is important to provide 
context on broader moves preceding the flash event in order to understand in which background 
the sudden price collapse happened. 
As a matter of fact, the British Sterling saw the 2016 as a year extremely turbulent with a 
persistent decline of its value with respect to other global currencies. Specifically, the Pound 
has been under pressure starting from the notorious June 23rd Brexit referendum where British 
people decided to leave the European Union, and from here on, the developments of 
international trade relationships and domestic political leadership became uncertain. This led to 
a substantial loss of confidence in the solidity of Sterling, by changing it from a relatively 
simple, cyclical currency to a very political currency.  
Under this uncertainty scenario, the Friday June 24th, the Sterling quotation against the Dollar 
registered an extraordinary downfall of over 8 percent, passing from $ 1.4878 to 1.3678, that is 
a loss of 1200 price interest points in a single day and touching an intraday minimum of $ 1.32 
(figure 30). This is also the time where volatility has reached extremely high values both in 
terms of implied and historical measures, with spikes well above the usual rates (figure 31 and 
32). 
In the following months, Pound oscillated just over $ 1.30 until the end of September 2016 and 
variability of prices returned to be more moderate. 
However, the week preceding the flash crash was characterized by another negative climate 
about UK stability.  
Indeed, on 2nd October 2016, British Prime Minister Theresa May announced plans to trigger 
EU article 50341 starting from Spring 2017, by confirming the intention of the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawing from the European Union. This implied that, during the week prior to 
7 October, Sterling had again trended lower against Dollar, with the GBP/USD value that 
decreased from a level of about $ 1.30 at the beginning of the week to just over $ 1.26 at the 6 
October London close, a weekly deflationary pressure of about 3 percent but daily moves in 
Sterling during that week had been relatively orderly and measures of implied and historical 
volatility had ticked up only slightly from their post-EU referendum lows. Nonetheless, at that 
                                                 
340 Id 
341 Article 50 sets rules for the withdrawing of a European member, including economic negotiations and future 
relationship with the Union. 
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time, this is likely to have further increased the traders’ loss of confidence in the currency 
because from the day of referendum up to the 6 October, Sterling had lost about 15% against 
Dollar. 
Table 6 reports some summary statistics about turmoil periods preceding the flash crash. 
Summarizing, the sharp intraday volatility hike observed on 7 October happened in an overall 
UK currency instability scenario as a result of the Brexit referendum, including news and 
decisions with regard to. This fact may have influenced a lot on behavior, trading activity, and 
responses that market participants adopted during that day, for instance in terms of risk hedging 
and stop-loss levels and in general, of countermeasures against the initial price decline. 
 
Figure 30: GBP/USD Daily Closing Prices before Flash Crash. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters 
data342. 
 
Sample Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Range Skewness Kurtosis 
1 Jan – 6 Oct 
24 Jun – 6 Oct 
3 Oct – 6 Oct 
199 
75 
4 
-0.07403 
-0.21208 
-0.70165 
0.92051 
1.23530 
0.58713 
-8.0656 
-8.0656 
-1.0511 
2.25440 
1.91640 
0.17287 
10.3200 
9.9820 
1.2240 
-3.4013 
-3.6045 
1.1078 
30.794 
23.415 
2.294 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics before Flash Crash. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
                                                 
342 The dataset is obtained by Thomson Reuters Eikon data-provider and includes daily closing prices from 1st 
January 2016 through 13th October 2017 (excepting weekends) for a total of 205 observations.  
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Figure 31: 1-week moving historical volatility before Flash Crash. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters 
data. 
 
Figure 32: 1-month implied volatility. Source: Financial Times on Bloomberg data. 
 
7.8. The Lasting Impact of the Pound Flash Crash  
After reporting the potential triggers and the broad context in which the flash crash occurred, 
the fundamental target is to attempt identifying the potential market consequences of the event 
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on the future Sterling trading; in particular, we assess whether the volatility outburst observed 
on 7 October left some trace on the following weeks and months in terms of higher price 
turbulence and in general of higher transaction costs for market participants and whether other 
similar intraday price behaviors occurred. 
Broadly, there were little observable evidences of a lasting impact on market functioning and 
pricing behavior because of the Sterling flash event. 
Wide bid-offer spreads on 7 October appeared to quickly recover to around normal levels, with 
no evidence of impaired market functioning when trading recommenced on the evening of 
Sunday 9 October in Asian markets, and measures of the price impact of trading activity showed 
no signs of any persistent impact on liquidity in the futures market in the weeks that followed 
(figure 27)343. 
But in the weeks following 7 October it was notable that a number of retail trading platforms 
increased their margin requirements for clients trading sterling FX, which may encourage 
prudent risk management but at the cost of higher transaction costs344. 
About that, we observe a slightly increase of implied volatility measures in the close period 
following the event; 1-week option-implied volatility in Sterling FX pairs remained elevated 
for a number of days after 7 October before retracing, but it is difficult to determine whether or 
not this reflected factors other than the flash event (figure 33). 
Implied volatility is a forward-looking measure that helps to gauge the sentiment and the 
expectation about the price changes of the exchange rate in the future; therefore, it can be 
defined as an indicator of expected exchange rate uncertainty.   
 
Figure 33: 1-week option-implied volatility around 7 October. Source: Bank of England calculations. 
                                                 
343 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, 10 
344 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, 16 
122 
 
Similarly to implied volatility measures computed by Bank of England, we perform the 1-week 
moving historical volatility on daily closing prices for the period ranging from 1st September 
2016 through 15th May 2017 in order to check whether historical data has trended similarly. 
The weekly moving historical volatility is computed for each day as the standard deviation over 
a sliding window of one week (5 days) across neighboring values and the window is centered 
about the element in the current position. Figure 34 points out that during the week following 
the crash, the standard deviation slightly increased with respect to previous values but this 
persistence lasted only for few days and however, in an orderly fashion if compared of that 
observed in the post-referendum window (figure 31).  
Table 7 confirms a more turbulence in daily price returns during the week 10-14 October with 
respect to 3-6 October but this trend had no persistence in the following weeks. 
Furthermore, in the following months there were no observations of similar intraday abrupt 
price fluctuations, reinforcing the hypothesis of an isolated event occurred during a particular 
trading context. 
To be thorough, on the first month of 2017, we noted high volatility values but these are likely 
to be the effect of Theresa May’s announcement about 12 negotiating objectives in the Brexit 
procedure, and specifically as a consequence on a potential UK withdrawal from the European 
single market, that has put further pressure on the British currency.   
Therefore, we can conclude that the Pound flash crash probably did not leave particular extreme 
consequences on the price changes of the Sterling quotations, except for a more prudence on 
GBP trades and a slightly higher volatility in the subsequent week.  
 
Figure 34: 1-week moving historical volatility after Flash Crash. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
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Sample Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Range Skewness Kurtosis 
3 Oct – 6 Oct 
10 Oct – 14 Oct 
17 Oct – 21 Oct 
24 Oct – 28 Oct 
4 
5 
5 
5 
-0.70165 
-0.39619 
+0.07961 
-0.08593 
0.58713 
1.04140 
0.48953 
0.46700 
-1.0511 
-1.9502 
-0.2524 
-0.6941 
0.17287 
0.73451 
0.94409 
0.49237 
1.2240 
2.6847 
1.1965 
1.1865 
1.1078 
-0.4628 
1.4043 
-0.1301 
2.2936 
2.0749 
3.1275 
1.7213 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics before and after Flash Crash. Source: author’s elaboration on Thomson Reuters data. 
 
7.9. Conclusions about Pound Flash Crash 
The Pound Flash Crash of 7 October, where the Sterling suddenly depreciated by around 9% 
versus the Dollar in early Asian trading before quickly retracing, is not a new phenomenon for 
financial markets; rather, it represents an additional empirical observation in what appears to 
be a series of mini-flash crash events occurring in a broad range of electronic markets, including 
equities, government bonds and FX, since the advent of high-frequency trading. 
The dynamics of the Sterling event can be divided in three distinct phases. First, the early phase 
of the move, during which Pound decreased rapidly in response to significant selling flow but 
in an orderly fashion and with broad participation on key venues. Second, a period of few 
minutes of extreme dysfunction where Pound fell dramatically because of the evaporation of 
market liquidity and narrower participation, pointing to a greater role for the actions of 
individual market participants as a driver of the sharp moves. And finally, the gradual recovery 
in prices and market liquidity over the hours that followed.  
Based on available evidence, this event appears to have been the product of a confluence of 
factors. Whatever the cause of the initial move, the market was likely to be vulnerable at that 
time of day to sharp moves and an associated withdrawal of liquidity. Among these, we 
recognize the occurrence of the event during a typically illiquid period of the trading day, that 
is outside the currency’s core time zone with presence of staff less experienced in trading 
Sterling, the significant mechanistic demand to sell Sterling to hedge positions, the trigger of 
stop-loss orders as the currency traded through key levels, and the fact that trading halts were 
present in futures but not in spot markets. Additionally, a somewhat sterling-negative media 
report released shortly after the move began is only likely to have added marginal weight to the 
move. 
Typically, mini-flash crash events have proven to be short-lived and without dramatic 
consequences for the financial stability, but if occurrences of heightened intraday volatility 
were to increase in frequency, or if disruption persisted for longer in future episodes (at the 
extreme this could involve a flash event that did not self-correct i.e. one which moved a market 
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to a new, non-fundamental, equilibrium), confidence in these markets could be undermined, 
potentially impacting financial stability345. In the FX market, this could manifest in a number 
of ways. Market-makers may demand additional compensation for liquidity provision, 
impairing market liquidity via wider bid-offer spreads and/or higher margin requirements. Or 
end-investors may show an increased reluctance to hedge due to concerns that their hedges will 
be crystallized not by the persistent changes in rates but rather by short lived market 
phenomena346. Were these dynamics to play out, there could be knock-on consequences also 
for the real economy since exchange rates are one of the most traded assets in the world both 
for speculative purposes but also for simple payments of goods and services. 
Nevertheless, the flash event of 7 October provided limited evidence of persistent effects and 
market functioning appeared to have recovered more quickly with respect to similar episodes 
observed in recent years. In fact, volatility measures, both historical and implied ones, remained 
elevated only for a number of days; bid-ask spreads, appeared to quickly retrace to around 
normal levels when trading resumed, and in general measures of the price impact showed no 
signs of a persistent effect on liquidity in the weeks that followed; however, it was notable that 
a number of trading platforms increased their risk requirements with associated higher 
transaction costs for those who wanted to trade in Sterling in the weeks following 7 October.  
Last but not least, there remain unresolved issues about what really happened during the specific 
time window of one minute where Sterling trading registered the peak of market quality 
deterioration and specifically, what was the behavior of market participants who continued to 
trade during that time.  
As reported, during the second phase of the flash event, it is likely that the trading activity of 
individual participants have had a significant impact on market functioning and prices traded, 
given the lack of depth, and since the only traders that can trade large quantities in such a flash 
periods are definitely high-frequency traders, this may suggest that their activity is likely to 
have conditioned the prices behavior at that time.  
Indeed, Sterling FX participants, regulators, and public attention are strongly concerned to the 
high frequency trading activity during that specific circumstance. About that, they ask: what 
was the role of algorithmic and high frequency trading on 7 October? Did they trigger out the 
Pound flash crash occurrence? Did their trading play a fundamental role on the sharp decline in 
prices? Did they leave the markets during the volatility burst? Did they adopt manipulative 
strategies that contributed the flash crash? Did they make or lose money at that time?  
                                                 
345 The Sterling ‘flash event’ of 7 October 2016 (2017), Bank for International Settlements, 16 
346 Id 
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These questions will probably remain unanswered if not in all at least in part, because in order 
to provide this evidence, it should be necessary to have ultra-high frequency data including all 
trades transacted during that period, an identifier of the traders for each trade and the possibility 
to distinguish high-frequency traders according to their specific trading characteristics.  
Nevertheless, it can be consolidated that surely a high frequency trading component was 
fundamental on 7 October because the Sterling event showed some similarities with other flash 
crashes happened in recent years where high frequency trading demonstrated to have had a 
determinant role in the sharp price movements, either in the triggering or in the reinforcing of 
downward pressure. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
High frequency trading is a very controversial trading practice that dominates the modern 
financial markets. It refers to proprietary traders that use complex algorithms and specific 
infrastructure to generate a very large number of trades at an extraordinary speed, with very 
short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions, and high message intraday rates, 
including orders, quotes, or cancellations.  
The use of co-location services and direct data feeds allows to minimize as much as possible 
the latency for generating, routing, and executing orders, which represents a significant 
competitive advantage with respect to other traders.   
The quick development of HFT has implicated a substantial change on how trades are carried 
out with a heated discussion whether such phenomenon is beneficial or detrimental for market 
metrics, and investors. 
Academics tried to study and analyze its influence on capital markets but the results show 
discordant conclusions. This is due by the fact that HFT represents a trading technique that 
potentially may be applied in a wide range of strategies, each of them have markedly different 
effects on market quality and investors, which entails a considerable difficulty on evaluating 
the phenomenon as a whole.  
Nevertheless, pertinent literature, overall, claims that HFT can be considered as a significant 
provider of liquidity for the markets, in the form of increasing trading volume, tightening bid-
ask spreads, and greater trading immediacy for participants. However, liquidity offered by 
HFTs is also dubbed as “phantom” liquidity as it might disappear at any moment since HFTs 
can modify and cancel their orders before execution in case of changing trading conditions.  
Furthermore, HFT quotes play a large role in the price formation process by supporting the 
discovery and incorporation of information into the securities among trading venues, in 
particular in a highly fragmented market scenario where they are offered in different platforms 
at different prices. However, such process is assessed too fast and aggressive with imposition 
of heavy costs for slower traders that might decide to abandon the markets. 
The behavior of HFTs strongly depend by the specific situations of the markets, in fact, they 
seem to act differently depending on market conditions are normal or turbulent. Indeed, during 
stressed periods in terms of price fluctuations and scarce liquidity, HFT activity has proven to 
play a significant role in exacerbating the turmoil of markets. This is demonstrated by 
observation of episodes of heightened intraday volatility, called flash crashes, where prices 
collapsed down and subsequent recovered in a time window of few minutes. The most notorious 
is that of May 6, 2010 that involved the major US securities indices, and where was provided 
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documentary evidence that HFTs led to a hike of volatility and an erosion of existing liquidity 
through an incessant trading activity.  
Because of this event and followed by other mini-flash crash episodes and manipulative 
conducts, HFT was increasingly and heavily criticized for its potential risks and disruptive 
effects on market integrity, investors confidence and financial stability. This led over the years 
a stricter regulation about its activity, with more duties regarding information and specific 
requirements. 
Accordingly, in this work, we have decided to analyze a recent episode of mini-flash crash 
occurred on Sterling trading, given that such events are considered and perceived as the result 
of the diffusion of HFT techniques on the capital markets. 
Specifically, on 7 October 2016, the British Sterling depreciated by around 9% versus the Dollar 
in less than one minute, before quickly retracing much of the plunge. 
Like many similar flash events, the Sterling moves seem to have no clear trigger, just unusually 
large selling flows at a typically quiet period of the trading day, where, theoretically, HFT 
activity might have acted as provoker of the initial price movement, but also for the lack of hard 
data and relevant information, the role of HFTs in this circumstance cannot be proven but 
neither ruled out a priori. We’ll probably never know why the flash crash actually triggered out, 
if it was a fat finger, or some execution algorithms but there is no doubt that there was an 
electronic component to it considering the impact and velocity of the event. A hypothesis is that 
some algorithms have heavily reacted to a Sterling negative article by activating a cascading 
selling flow. 
The British Pound, however, has been volatile since the Brexit referendum and during the flash 
day the Sterling market exhibited relevant idiosyncratic vulnerabilities and technical factors 
that contributed and amplified the market dysfunction during that time.  
Despite the relevance of the price movements, this phenomenon did not have significant 
consequences for the markets and participants; there were few spillovers and no systemic 
financial institutions incurred material financial losses in this instance. The volatility remained 
high for short time periods following the event, and liquidity quickly returned to the market. 
This might point to market participants having learnt lessons from past episodes, and regulators 
having adopted a series of well-focused policies to contrast such events. 
Nevertheless, these episodes, given their public attention, have the capability to undermine the 
investor confidence with significant consequences for the real economy. 
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